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PREFACE 
When the Third Reich opened its attack on Yugoslavia on the night 
of April 6-7, 1941, there were within the Yugoslavian borders some 
500,000 people who, despite their citi~enship in this South Slavic 
1 
country, thought of themselves as Germans. The position of the mem-
be rs of this minority during World War II is a topic which merits con-, 
siderable study. In the first place, a systematic review of their life 
during the four years when Yugoslavia ceased to exist as a political 
entity has yet to appear. Moreover, the degree of responsibility of the 
Yugoslav Volksdeutschen for their suffering at the end of the war is an 
issue which still evokes heated controversy. Upon the defeat of 
Germany, most of them were either annihilated or expelled from Yugo-
slavia. More impartial treatment than has yet been given to their in-
volvement in the Nazi occupation should be welcomed by contemporary 
historians. Finally, the manipulation .of these people by Berlin indi-
cates that Nazi policy toward Southeastern Europe was deeply rooted in 
the vilkisch movement of the mid-nineteenth century. This study pur-
ports to identify those precedents or predispositions in German history 
which contributed to the ideological foundation for Hitler's New Order 
for Europe. 
1 
Yugoslav census figures for 1931 will be utilized throughout this 
presentation. German estimates on the total number of ethnic Germans 
within Yugoslavia in the interwar period run 200,000 higher than the 
half million indicated. 
iii 
At the onset, several terms referring to German minorities abroad 
and widely used in the Nazi era must be clarified, insofar as it is 
possible to apply strict definitions to vague ethnic concepts, Ethnic 
Germans who were non-citizens of Germany were called Volksdeutsche, In 
order to qualify as volksdeutsch, a person had to have some 11 Gerl.I'an 
blood," rather than a mere knowledge of the German language and customs, 
German nationals were known as Reichsdeutsche, Both categories of 
people were embraced by the expression Auslandsdeutsche, to the dismay 
and confusion of some diplomats in the 1930's, 2 They felt that the 
term Auslandsdeutsche should only include German citizens living abroad, 
in that ethnic German citizens of other countries were in the strictest 
legal sense by no means abroad. But Nazi nomenclature paid little heed 
to strict legalities. 
A comprehensive view of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen during the war 
years is exceedingly difficult to achieve, in that the community was 
split into four segments after Hitler's partition of Yugoslavia, Each 
had an entirely distinct organization and set of goals within separate 
component parts of the former Yugoslav state. The political divisions 
in which the Volksdeutschen found themselves between 1941 and 1945 were: 
The Independent State of Croatia, Hungary, the Banat within Old Serbia, 
and t:he S•.Le~eae'"•'iU::.e.as annexed to the Third Reich, Studies appearing so 
far on the Volksdeutschen of Yugoslavia during World War II are 
2 
Report of Otto von Erdmannsqorf, German Minister in Hungary, 
October 5, 1937, United States D~partment of State, Documents on 
German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 (18 vols, to date, Washington, 1949-
), Series D, Vol, V, p. 192, Hereafter each volume of the Documents 
on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, will be designated DGFP followed 
by the series letter and volume number, 
incomplete. Scholars have tended to concentrate on one or two of the 
four wartime groupings, with little, if any, mention of the others. 3 
The five-volume series on the Germans expelled from Eastern Europe 
after World War II, published by the German government, includes one 
vblume on the Yugoslav Germans. Documents on all four political seg-
ments appear on its pages. 4 Nevertheless, since the publication 
centers on the postwar expulsions, the picture of Volksdeutsch wartime 
existence is sketchy and disjointed. 
A major reason for this deficiency in Germany has been the inacces-
sibility of source materials on the war period. A foremost authority 
on the German minority in Yugoslavia during the war has been Johann 
Wuescht, a former leader of the group and an archivist in the Bundesar-
chiv in Koblenz from 1957 to 1964. When he assumed his position in the 
archives, Wuescht found that documentation on the Germans from South-
eastern Europe during the years 1939-1945 was practically non-existent, 
for official records had been lost. He was thus forced to create a 
. . 1 h' 5 prov1s1ona arc ive. Problems involved in recreating history by 
collecting eye-witness testimonies many years after the event are 
3see for example: Leopold Rohrbacher, Ein Volk-ausgelgschto Die 
Ausrottung des Donauschwabentums in Jugoslawien in den Jahren 1944-
1948 (Salzburg, 1949); Go Co Paikert, The Danube Swabians (The Hague, 
1967); Johann Wuescht, Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen in 
Jugoslawien, 1934-1944 (Kehl, 1966) and Jugoslawien und das Dritte 
Reicho Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-jugoslawischen 
Beziehungen von 1933-1945 (Stuttgart, 1969). 
4Theodor Schieder, et al., Dokumentation der Vertreibung der 
Deutschen aus Ost-·:biitteleuropa (5 volumes in llParts, Bonn, 1954-
1961). Volume V, ··Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Yugoslavien (1961) o 
(Hereinafter cited as Schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V). 
5 Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 352. 
attested to by the Schieder collection. For example, it includes a 
report on the resettlement of the Bosnian Germans in 1941/1942 which 
was written from memory in 1958. 6 The German archival holdings on the 
German minority in Yugoslavia were greatly enriched in 1958, when the 
German documents confiscated by the American and British governments 
after the war were returned to Bonn. However, these records, now 
housed in Koblenz, had not been made available to scholars for research 
by the mid-1960's. 7 
On the Yugoslav side, source material on the Volksdeutschen has 
also been scarce. The archives in Yugoslavia hold few documents ema-
8 nating from the offices of the occupiers during the war. While Dusan 
Biber has published an excellent book on the German minority in Yugo-
slavia between 1933 and 1941, no major work has yet appeared in that 
Balkan land on the group between 1941 and 1945. Biber lamented that in 
many instances it was easier to find important documents of Yugoslav 
origin in German archives than in Yugoslav repositories. 9 Presumably, 
this holds true for many documents in the war period. 
6 
Report of Ferdinand Sommer in Schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V, 
pp. 37-63. 
7nuYan Biber, Nacizem i nemci y__ Yugoslavijie 1933-1941 (Ljublja.na, 
1966), pp. 281-282. 
8wayne S. Vucinich, "Postwar Yugoslav Historiography," Journal of 
Modern History, Vol. 23 (1951), p. 47; Tone Ferenc, "Le Syst~me 
d'Occupation des Nazis en Slovif'nie," tr. Sidonija Jeras, in Petar 
Brajovich, Jovan Marjanovich and Franjo Tudman, eds. Les Syst~mes 
~'Occupation~ Yugoslavie, 1941-1945 (Belgrade, 1963), p. 121; Franjo 
Tudman, "The Independent State of Croatia as an Instrument of the 
Policy of the Occupation Powers in Yugoslavia." tr. Miroslav Beker and 
Leonardo Spalatin, in Brajovich, Les Syst~mes i'Occupation en Yougo-
s la vie, p. 135. 
9Biber, Nacizem i nemci, pp. 272-275. 
vi 
An American scholar is in an advantageous position to help correct 
this problem. In the United States National Archives, rich source 
materials are available dealing with the Volksdeutschen in Yugoslavia 
during World War II. These may be found among 15,000 rolls of micro-
film which contain the confiscated German records produced in 
Alexandria, Virginia, between 1956 and 1958. Although fifidin6 aids 
for these microfilms are as yet incomplete, it is relatively easy to 
f . d h . . 1 lO in t e pertinent materia . 
N.ot o-nly have publications on the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen during 
the Second World War been fragmentary, but they have usually been 
written to bolster preconceived conclusions on the degree of responsi-
bility of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen for their fate in 1945. While 
most German scholars are eminently fair in assessing the guild of the 
Volksdeutschen, their understandable sympathy for these people so 
tragically displaced after 1945 detracts from the objectivity of their 
judgments. Wuescht is a radical spokesman for the view that the Volks-
deutschen were innocent victims of events beyond their control. Since 
the Nazis were magnanimous in their wartime conduct toward the Yugo-
slavs, the German minority was hardly a tool of aggression. 11 His tone 
verges on the polemical. On the other hand, Yugoslav historians tend 
to indict summarily the German minority for involvement in the odious 
10united States National Archives, Guides to German Records Micro-
filmed at Alexandria, Virginia (65 vols. to date, Washington, 1958-
). When completed, the guides will number 70 volumes. For an 
excellent account of German records in the United States, see John A. 
Bernbaum, "The Captured German Records: A Bibliographic Survey," The 
Historian, Vol. 32 (1970), pp. 564-575. 
11see entries on Wuescht in footnote 3. 
'l7i; 
12 
occupation of their country. A more balanced statement than has yet 
been advanced on the role of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen in forging 
their fate is sorely needed. 
In order to present a complete account of the Yugoslav Germans, it 
is necessary to place their experience into historical context. It 
would be remiss to recount and interpret 'the wartime chronicles of these 
people without making indispensable connections with the past. Their 
years within the Habsburg Empire and within interwar Yugoslavia colored 
their history under Axis control. Certainly, Hitler's decisions which 
resulted in the splintering of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen into four 
divisions are meaningless without a proper appreciation of the 
Habsburg past. Those arrangements actually achieved for th~ Yugoslav 
Germans by the Nazis and those plans drafted for them put not carried 
out--all these had "slender threads", to use the term of Henry Cord 
13 
Meyer, leading back almost a century to Pan-German ideology. There-
fore, this study will trace the volkisch outlook and German dreams of 
destiny in Eastern Europe from their origins to their impact upon the 
Yugoslav Germans. 
This work is the outgrowth of the author's earlier research for 
14 the Master of Arts degree. It is based on a number of primary source 
12Brajovich, Les Systemes. E_'Occupation en Yougos la vie, passim; 
Ahmet Donlagic, Zarko Atanackovic and Dusan Plenca, Yugoslavia in the 
Second World War, tr. Lovett F. Edwards (Belgrade, 1967), p. 36; 
Ljubisa Stojkovic and Milos Martic, National Minorities in Yuguslavia 
(Belgrade, 1952), p. 22. 
13Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 
1815-1945 (The Hague, 1955), pp. 30-56. 
14 Helga H. Harriman, "Slovenia as an Outpost of the Third Reich" 
(unpub. M.A. thesis, Oklahoma State University, 1969). 
viii 
materials. Twenty-two microfilm rolls of German records dealing with 
the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen were utilized. 15 Most of the emanated from 
the offices of the German Foreign·Institute (Deutsches Ausland-Institut, 
DAI). The DAI files are particularly useful, because that agency 
studied all aspects of the problems of the Auslandsdeutschen in a 
highly competent manner. Since the microfilm rolls represent approxi-
mately 26,400 pages, they were most helpful in illuminating the history 
of the German minority in Yugoslavia between 1941 and 194.5. Also ex-
tremely valuable to this study were the Documents on German Policy, 
1918-1945, published jointly by the United States Department of State 
and the British Foreign Office. 16 
I wish to express appreciation to members of the advisory committee 
for my program for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at Oklahoma StAte 
University who gave helpful criticism in the preparation of the text. 
Professor Douglas Hale, my long-time mentor, served as committee chair-
man and offered valuable advice concerning the study from its inception 
to its conclusion. To Professors Bernard Eissenstat, Charles Dollar 
and Neil Hackett of the Department of History and to Professor Bogumil 
Frenk of the Department of Foreign Languages, all of whom read the 
study in its final form, I am also indebted. 
15united States National Archives Microfilm Publication, Micro= 
copy T-81, Records of the Nationai Socialist German Labor Party (NSDAP), 
Rolls, 136, 150, 270, 279, 284, 285, 306, 307, 322, 428, 444, 521, 
522, 544, 553, 554, 559, 564. United States National Archives Micro-
film Publication, Microcopy T-71, Records of the Reich Ministry of 
Economics, Rolls 61, 78. United States National Archives Microfilm 
Publication, Microcopy T-74,. Re~ards of the Reich Commissar for the 
Strengthening of Germandom~ Roll 17. 
16see footnote 2. 
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CHAPTER I 
SHORT HISTORY OF THE VOLKSDEUTSCHEN OF 
YUGOSLAVIA TO APRIL, 1941 
Some groups of the Volksdeutschen within Yugoslavia at the time of 
the Nazi invasion in April, 1941 had been in possession of their land 
for as long as six centuries, while others had settled there as recently 
as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Almost all of 
them were located on territory formerly incorporated in one form or 
another in the Habsburg Empire. How they had arrived and how they had 
fared under the Habsburgs, particularly in the last years of the 
Monarchy, forms one important facet of their history. After the col-
lapse of the Habsburgs in 1918, as a consequence of the defeat of the 
Central powers in World War I, these ethnic Germans suddenly found 
themselves within a brand new political unit, one of several successor 
states established at the Paris Peace Conference. An understanding of 
their aspirations and endeavors during the twenty-odd years of rule 
from Belgrade is indispensable to a study of their experiences between 
1941-1945. 
Some of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen, who had 1i ved i.n old Hungary 
under the Habsburgs, were restored to Budapest's control after the Nazi 
partition of Yugoslavia. Their fate was once again intimately entwined 
with that of the Hungarian Volksdeutschen as a whole. Consequently, a 
note on developments among the German minority within Hungary in the 
2 
interwar period is relevant to a short history of the Yugoslav 
Volksdeutschen before the Nazi invasion. In view of the above obser-
vations, the historical survey which follows will be divided into three 
sub-divisions: I. The Germans within the Habsburg Empire on lands 
destined to form Yugoslavia; II .. The'V6lksd~utschen within interwar 
Yugoslavia; and III. The Volksdeutschen within interwar Hungary, 
Part I: The Germans Within the Habsburg Empire 
on Lands Destined to Form Yugoslavia 
In order to alleviate the complexities which surround any study of 
the multinational Habsburg Empire, modern scholars are accustomed to 
differentiate between its two most clearly recognizable components--the 
Austrian and the Hungarian. For this purpose, they turned to a rel-
atively insignificant river which separated these halves along a short 
stretch of their long common border. Travelers between Vienna and 
Budapest in the days of the Empire crossed the Leitha; when they did, 
they stepped from Austrian onto Hungarian soil. Thus, the term 
Cisleithania was utilized to refer to that part of the Empire which 
was bound historically to Vienna, while Transleithania referred to those 
territories bound to Budapest, 
~ore than geographical convenience is involved in this division, 
A study of the Habsburg Empire, as it existed in the late nineteenth 
century, shows substantive differences in the development of the peoples 
3 
of Cisleithania and Transleithania. 1 (See Map 1), The first formed 
the core around which the Habsburg power (Hausmacht) evolved during the 
Middle Ages and the early modern period. The largest portion of 
Cisleithania, excluding a few late additions (Galicia, Bukovina, 
Dalmatia and part of !stria), was included in the Holy Roman Empire, 
This medieval structure, which survived until 1806 despite its obsolete 
character, was led by Habsburg rulers for nearly four hundred years, 
Although the association with the Holy Roman Empire was largely meaning-
less, it did serve to tie more firmly the destinies of Cisleithania to 
those of Germany as a whole. Furthermore, the Turks, while they press-
ed upon the gates of Vienna twice--in 1529 and 1683--never interrupted 
the progress of the state. Although Czechs and Slovenes respectively 
dwelt in the northern and southern confines of Cisleithania, the more 
culturally advanced Germans provided the driving force for centuries. 
The addition of Polish and Ruthenian lands in the eighteenth century 
diluted German strength. By 1910, the Germans of Cisleithania numbered 
less than ten million (thirty-six per cent) among eighteen million non-
Germans, largely Slavs. The national movements of the nineteenth 
century served to swing the balance of influence gradually away from 
the German toward the Slavic element in the population. Such "centrif-
ugal forces" within the Empire, to use the term of Oscar J}szi, 
1For excellent introductions to the most recent history of the 
Habsburg Empire, see: C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918 
(New York, 1969); Fran Zwitter, J. ~idak and V. Bogdanov, Les Probl~mes 
nationaux dans la Monarchie des Habsbourgs (Beograd, 1960); Oscar 
J~szi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1966); R. A. 
Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918 (2 vols., New York, 1950). 
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contributed to its collapse in 1918" 2 However, the decay within the 
Empire does not gainsay the observation that the peoples of Cisleith~ 
ania were oriented toward the West and progressive by Central European 
standards" 
By contrast, the peoples of Transleithania suffered severe set-
backs in the course of their history, Unified loosely during the 
Middle Ages under Magyar leadership, they were rent asunder by the 
Turkish assaults on the early sixteenth century, For over a century 
and a half, Hungary lay exhausted, the largest part of its territory 
occupied by the Ottoman power" Only a slender Western strip fell under 
the~ facto rule of the Habsburgs" When the Hungarian kingdom was 
finally freed from the Turks at the end of the seventeenth century 
under Habsburg auspices, the Magyars were too weak to form a dynamic 
ruling class, The Croatians, Slavonians, Serbians, Saxons and 
Rumanians, who lived in areas to the south, as well as Slovaks and 
Ruthenians to the north, shared the destiny of the Magyars for another 
century and a half--life as a backward and downtrodden people, The 
Magyars finally succeeded in obtaining what they deemed a fair share in 
the rule of the Empire under the terms of the Compromise of 1867~ by 
which the Empire was rearranged into the Austro-Hungarian or Dual 
Monarchy" But they were not magnanimous toward the numerous ethnic 
groups under their control, The Hungarians missed holding a bare 
majority because they accounted for only ten million (forty-eight per 
cent) among nearly elsven million non-Magyars in 1910 (including 
Croatia-Slavonia)o In desperation, they instituted a repressive policy 
2J~szi, Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, passim" 
6 
toward non-Magyars and actively promoted Magyarization of the minori~ 
ties. In short, when the Empire disappeared after World War I, the 
peoples of Transleithania were only just beginning to formulate their 
national aspirations and to emerge into the modern world. 
The differences between the peoples of Cisleithania and Trans-
leithania in general are reflected in the history of the Germans within 
the Habsburg Empire who settled on future Yugoslav territory. Those 
found in Cisleithania, and most particularly in Slovenia, enjoyed an 
advanced existence in every sense. The German minority in Transleith-
ania, both in Hungary proper and in Croatia-Slavonia, were by comparison 
slow to realize their potentialities. The Volksdeutschen of Bosnia 
will be considered in the section on Cisleithania, although Bosnia was 
an exceptional case and technically separate from the Dual Monarchy. 
An elaboration on the development of these Volksdeutschen as they were 
grouped within the two divisions of the Empire follows. 
1. The Cisleithanian Half 
Slovenia.--The Germans living on Slovene lands were never unified 
into one political unit under the Habsburgs, since Slovenia existed 
only as a concept, not a reality prior to 1918. (See Map 2). Slovene 
areas were found in three crownlands: 
'V 
Styria (Steiermark, Stajerska, 
Styrie), Carniola (Krain, Kranjsko, Carniole) and Carinthia (i~rnten, 
.,,, 
Koroska, Carinthie). In addition, they were located in the Littoral 
(Klistenland, Primorska), situated at 1the headwarters of the Adriatic Sea, 
and in the Upper Mur Region of Hungary proper. The Cisleithanian 
domain of the Habsburgs, which formed Slovenia within Yugoslavia in 
1919, included nearly all of Carniola, but only the southern extension 
s T y 
CJ 
... ····· 
·.•· .. . . 
.. . · ... 
:=.:.:.:.:Border between Cisleithania 
and Transleithan1a 
i ., Slovene areas attached to 
Yugoslavia after World War I 





of Styria or Lower Styria (Untersteiermark, Spodnja Stajerska, Basse-
Styrie) and three small districts in the southern corner of Carinthia: 
v 
the Meza Valley (Miesstal), the Commune of Jezersko (Seeland) and the 
area around Dravograd (Unterdrauburg). 
The Slovene region has been characterized by A. E. Moodie, one of 
its chief geographers, as "a zone of strain. 113 Spilling over from the 
northernmost reaches of the Balkan Peninsula into Central Europe, it is 
located at the juncture of two great geological formations--the Alpine 
and Dinaric ranges. Here run passes of~incalculable strategic value 
connecting the heart of the Continent with the Adriatic Sea. Indeed, 
Slovenia has served as the crossroads of the Danubian and Mediterranean 
powers since ancient times. 
The Slovenes, a branch of the South Slavs, came into possession of 
their land in the sixth century A.D. In the early Middle Ages, they 
succumbed to German domination. By the fourteenth century, the great-
est part of Slovenia had already fallen to Habsburg power. Placed at 
the borders of the Slavic and Germanic worlds, these Roman Catholic 
mountain peasants and herdsmen were torn between the two cultures. 
They retained their language, but were profoundly influenced by German 
thought. Many of them were assimilated into "Germandom" throughout the 
centuries. In recent times, when nationalism became a dominant force 
in Europe, the Slovenes defied clear-cut classification. Were they 
Germans because of their integral and age-old association with German 
history, or were they Slavs because of their ethnic heritage? 
3 A. E. Moodie, "S lovenia--A Zone of Strain," Journal of Central 
European Affairs, Vol. III (1943), pp. 66-68. 
9 
The Germans who shared these lands with the Slovenes were no late-
comers, Already in the Middle Ages, the aristocracy was German or 
germanized, On the heels of a conscious German expansion during the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, German blood was also infused into the 
under-stratum of society, Franconian and Rhenish peasants settled in 
Styria and Carinthia, while Bavarians migrated to Carniola under the 
auspices of the Church. 4 In the fourteenth century, Count von 
Ortenburg of Carinthia sponsored a colony of Bavarian, Swabian and 
Thuringian peasants in an infertile district of Carniola, Eventually, 
v 
170 communities developed there around the town of Gottschee (Kocevje), 
This settlement remained a German enclave in an area dominated by South 
Slavs for six centuries. In the twentieth century, the isolation of 
its residents amazed visitors, for the Gottscheers still spoke medieval 
5 
German. 
Although ethnic Germans were in the minority in the Slovene lands, 
they formed a substantial group, as the 1910 census, the last taken in 
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, clearly reveals, The imperial census 
determined nationality on the principle of the language habitually 
spoken (Umgangssprache). Since the Habsburg administration fostered 
the German language in the schools at the expense of the Slovene, the 
1910 figures weighted heavily toward the Germans, Nonetheless, the 
imperial census indicates roughly the number of people who thought of 
4J, W, Thompson, "German Medieval Expansion and the Making of 
Austria," Slavonic and East European Review, VoL II (1923-1924), 
pp, 281-282, 
5walter Tschinkel, V~lkischer Beobachter (Vienna), April 25, 1941, 
Anneliese Ngsselt, Ulmer Tageblatt, April 12, 1941, 
10 
themselves as German, as well as ,of those who spoke the German language, 
In Carniola, 28,000 Germans (approximately five per cent of the popula-
tion) were counted among 520,000 Slovenes, In Lower Styria, 76,000 
Germans (approximately sixteen per cent of the population) were 
enumerated among 411,000 South Slavs. In the Carinthian districts 
later added to Yugoslavia, 3,200 Germans (nearly twenty-one per cent 
6 of the population) were reported along with 11,900 Slovenes, In all, 
107,200 people who spoke German consistently lived amidst nearly one 
million Slovenes, It seems reasonable to surmise that the true German 
minority was considerable" 
The significance of the Germans in the Slovene territory extended 
far beyond actual strength in numbers, For centuries, the German 
ruling class had not been opposed in this predominantly agricultural 
region, Even after the Slovenes began to assert themselves in the 
nineteenth century, German supremacy lingered on, Loyalty to their 
crownland was more important to Slovenes than a consciousness of nation-
ality based on ethnic factors. 7 They saw themselves as Carinthians, or 
Styrians, or Carniolans first, then as members. of a distinct South Slav 
group, While the national awakening flourished in Carniola and its 
capital city of Ljubljana (Laibach), it was weakened by this provincial 
particularism in the other two political units. The results of the 
1910 census, already cited, confirm this development, While Carniola 
registered only five per cent of its population as German, Lower Styria 
6 Robert Langer, The Austro-Yugoslav Problem (New York, 1951), p, 
330 
7Michael B, Petrovich, "The Rise of Modern Slovenian Historiogra-
phy," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XXII (January, 1963), 
p, 4l~L 
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reached sixteen per cent and the Carinthian districts climbed as high 
as twenty-one percent in this categoryo By the opening of the twenti-
eth century, the urban population of Carniola had become solidly 
Slovene, but the bourgeoisie continued to speak German in Lower Styria 
and the Carinthian districts. 8 Significantly, the most important 
positions in banking, industry and the professions throughout Slovenia 
9 were held by Germanso The Germans still permeated the economically 
independent middle class, which formed the progressive element of the 
population, when World War I broke out. 
Aware of the dangers to their position inherent in nascent Solvene 
nationalism, the ethnic Germans of Slovenia were receptive to radical 
Pan-German ideas 0 They were identified as . a specific group of Austrian 
II II 
Germans, the Sudmarker, i.eo, residents of the southernmost border area 
10 of the German realm. As such, they were prepared to protect the 
German language and way of living which was threatened at the frontiero 
Already during the Revolution of 1848, they had expressed a strong 
desire that Styria, Carniola and Carinthia be absorbed into the German 
R 0 h 11 eic o Such sentiments grew as the century progressedo 
The major organizations for advancing the fortunes of the Germans 
in Slovene lands at the turn of the twentieth century were the German 
8Fran Zwitter, "The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy," Austrian 
History Yearbook, Volo III, Pto 2 (1967), ppo 171, 1770 
9Biber, Nacizem i nemci, ppo 23-29, 426. 
10 
Meyer, Mitteleuropa, po 400 
11 Josef Pfi tzner, "Die Grenz-und-Aus landsdeuts.che Bewggung des 
Jahres 1848," Historische Zeitschrift, VoL CUC (1939), ppo 310, 3160 
12 
School Association (Deutscher Schulverein) and the $lldmark, The former 
had been formed in Vienna in 1880 to oversee the educational interests 
of German minorities throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Questions 
on the language of instruction in schools, courses in the German lan-
guage and the qualifications of German teachers were among the concerns 
of this associati~n, Josef Feichtinger, a school administrator ln 
Graz, the capital city of Styria, however, felt that school problems 
were not the only ones which oppressed Germans in the mixed-language 
areas of Carinthia, Carniola and Styria, Accordingly, he organized the 
slldmark in 1889 to promote economic progress, The gr.oup sponsored such 
projects as aid to financially pressed vrilksdeutsche peasants, in order 
that they might remain in possession of their land and not be obliged 
,, 
to sell to Slovenes. Sudrnark grew prodigiously from a membership of 
2,500 in 1890 to a zenith of 88,000 in 1913, In 1909, cultural pursuits 
dd d . . ; . 12 were a e to its activities, Nationalism was strong and unified 
among the German minority in Slovene lands under the Habsburgs, 
The cultural attainments of the minority during the last years of 
the Empire were noteworthy, if the case of Celje (Cilli), a town 
located in Lower Styria, may be taken as indicative, From the 1880's 
into the twentieth century, its German residents sponsored and support-
ed many performances of renowned German musicians, In addition, they 
maintained a musical association, Der Cillier Musikverein, of high 
12Friedrich Pock, Grenzwacht im S~dosten; Ein halbes Jahrhundert 
al - -- ---- ------
Sudmark (Graz, 1940), pp, 5-8, 10, 52. Ferdinand Matras, "Leistungs-
schau deutscherVolkstumarbeit," Volksdeutscher Ruf, Vol, 8, Nr, 3 
(1942), pp, 1-5. United States National Archives Microfilm Publica-
tion, ¥fcrocopy T-81, Records of the National Socialist German Labor 
Party (NSDAP), Roll 559, Frames 5336040-45, (Hereinafter cited as 
T-81/Roll 559/5336040-45,) 
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caliber. The artistic life of these burgers indicated that the Germans 
of Slovenia knew with every heartbeat that they belonged to the German 
1 1 . 13 cu tura community. 
Perhaps the career of Josef Ornig, the last German mayor of Ptuj 
(Pettau), another town in Lower Styria, can exemplify the disruptive 
force which World War I unleashed upon the Germans of Slovenia. Elect-
ed to his office in 1894, while still a young man, Ornig feared the 
growing Slovene pressures. He urged the German youth to learn Slovene 
in order better to fortify themselves against their adversaries. Under 
his leadership, the German character of Ptuj seemed assured until 1918. 
Then suddenly in the midst of the German defeat, Ornig had to flee 
Slovenia for his life. 14 With hini. and those like him, went a multitude 
of German aspirations in the Slovene lands. 
Bosnia.--The ethnic Germans of Bosnia stand in sharp contrast to 
the long-established, prosperous and closely-knit Germans of Slovenia. 
Their settlements were the most recent of all the German communities 
outside the Reich. Thinly scattered over a difficult terrain dominated 
by Slavs, they were also among the poorest. 
Ever since their arrival in the Balkans around the seventh century 
A.D., the Serbs to the south and the Croats to the north had struggled 
13 . ,, 
Fritz Zangger, Kunstlergaste. Ein Ausschnitt aus dem Kulturleben 
der deutschen Minderheit in Slowenien (Celje, 1933), pp. i-ii, 21-26. 
14 Hans Pirchegger, "Mein Freund Saria und Pettau," in Festschrift 
fflr Balduin Saria. Vol. XI1 Buchreihe der Stfdostdeutschen Historischen 
Kommission, (Munich, 1964), pp. 5-7. 
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f h B . 15 or egemony over osnia, The Croatian area of settlement penetrated 
deep into its isolated mountains, Indeed, the capital of medieval 
Croatia was a Bosnian town, Banja Luka, After the Pacta Conventa of 
1102, by which the Croatian nobility submitted to the Hungarian kings, 
Croatian influence was buttressed by Hungarian power, Those Slavs in 
the western portion of Bosnia accepted the Roman Catholic faith as a 
result of their association with the Catholic Croats and Hungarians: 
The Serbian impact in the eastern sections of Bosnia led to the con-
version of its residents to Greek Orthodoxy, the national church of 
Serbia, After the Turks conquered this intermediary region in the 
fifteenth century, the Croatian-Serbian contest for Bosnia remained 
muted for four hundred years, During the long era of Ottoman rule, a 
new religious factor was added by the considerable inroads which Islam 
made upon the Bosnians. In 1878, following a decision of the Congress 
of Berlin, Bosnia was occupied by Austria-Hungary, By a unilateral 
action which provoked a violent crisis in Europe, Vienna annexed the 
province in 1908. 
The traditional antipathy between Croats and Serbs has been a 
driving force throughout Bosnian history, although it is exceedingly 
difficult to explain, These two peoples are so closely related that 
their language is almost identical in its spoken form, It is in fact 
more appropriate to refer to the Serbo-Croatian language, than to 
Serbian or Croatian. Only in their written manifestations can the two 
15 
Although Bosnia and Hercegovina are often referred to separately, 
they have had a de facto political unity since the sixteenth century, 
For this reason, the term Bosnia is used in this study to encompass 
both Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
15 
languages be distinguished, and then only by the Croat use of the Latin 
script and by the Serb use of the Cyrillic. These branches of the 
South Slavs are distinguished mainly by their religion and their area 
16 of settlement. Indeed, extreme Croat chauvinists have looked on the 
Serbs simply as Croats who had gone astray in religious matters or as 
17 "Orthodox Croats." 
A troubled past, deeply colored by the Croatian/Serbian heritage 
of enmity, created absurd ethnic problems in Bosnia. At the opening of 
the twentieth century, the people were almost one hundred per cent Serbo-
Croat, but nationality categories were based on religious convictions. 
Not only were there those who professed Greek Orthodoxy, so-called 
Serbs, and those who accepted Roman Catholicism, so-called Croats, but 
also Moslems. The converts' to Islan added to the turmoil in Bosnia. 
Extraordinarily fanatic, they persisted in calling themselves Turks. 18 
In 1910, out of a population of nearly two million, there were twenty-
one per cent Croats, forty-two per cent Serbs and thirty-four per cent 
just plain Mohammedians in Bosnia. 
At the time of the Austrian-Hungarian occupation, a few hardy 
German settlers were brought into the primitive and sparsely settled 
territory under both public and private auspices. The government in 
Vienna sponsored some of these colonists in the .expectation that they 
would serve to encourage better farming techniques among the native 
16 Kann, The Multinational Empire, Vol. I, p. 235. 
17Peter F. Sugar, "Nature of Non-Germanic Societies Under Habsburg 
Rule," Slavic Review, Vol. XXII (1963), p. 22. 
18Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in 
Yugoslavia (Stanford, 1955), pp. 102, 110-111. 
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peasants, Insurmountable difficulties such as malaria, lack of funds 
and crop failures caused many of these colonization projects to fail, 
By 1889, Vienna encouraged the migration of German peasants into Bosnia 
only if they had sufficient capital, 19 Private settlements fared 
better, Already in 1868, Trappist monks from the Rhineland had estab-
lished themselves near Banja Luka, (See Map 3). Their Maria Stern 
Monastery, known as the first German settlement in Bosnia, served as a 
focal point for the German Catholics who flocked from Germany to nearby 
villages such as Nova Topola (Windhorst) and Alexandrovac (Rudolfstal) 
a decade or so later, 20 Before the turn of the century, evangelical 
communities such as Glogovac (Schutzberg) and Petrovapolje (Franz-
Josefsfeld) also sprang up. 
Most of the settlers along the Drina River in eastern Bosnia did 
not emanate from Germany, but from German colonies in South Hungary. 
The tale of one young man who migrated from the Banat to Bosnia in 
1886, can be taken as a case in point. While in imperial military 
service, he +earned of wasteland available to pioneers in Bosnia, At 
the time of his move there, his ancestors had already been located in 
21 
southeastern Europe for 150 years, Several of the Bosnian German 
villages were known as daughter or secondary communites, since they 
received overflow population from primary colonies across the Danube 
(Donau, Dunav), 
19Pauline Irby, "Bosnia and its Land Tenure," Contemporary Review, 
Vol, LVI (1889), p, 32; Carl Bier, Deutsche Nachrichten in Griechenland, 
November 28, 1942, 
20B. ier, Deutsche Nachrichten in Griechenland, November 28, 1942, 











Map 3. Bosnia and Croatia-Slavonia Within the Habsburg Empire 
17 
18 
The German colonization in Bosnia was neither extensive nor com-
pact, In 1910, a little over 23,000 Germans were counted in the entire 
province, Continguous German settlements could be found on a belt of 
land to the north along the right bank of the Sava (Sau) rivero How-
ever, more than half of the Bosnian Volksdeutschen were located in iso-
1 d . h . f ' 1' , 22 ate sectors wit poor transportation aci ities, Although some 
communities were prosperous, the struggle for survival for most was con-
stant during the brief forty years of their existence under the 
Habsburgs, 
2, The Transleithanian Half 
Hungary Proper (Banat, Batschka, Baranja).--Ethnic Germans were 
heavily concentrated in three divisions of Southern Huntary, parts of 
which eventually were incorporated into Yugoslavia. (See Map 4), They 
were located in the counties of Bfcs-Bodrog and Baranja (Branau, Baran·., 
~), as well as in a much larger area known as the Banat, Much of Bies-
Bodrog was part of a loess tableland called the Batschka (Ba~ka, Bacska), 
The Banat encompassed three counties: I 11 I Krasso-Szoreny, Ternes and Toront-
I 
al, Major rivers traversed these fertile lowlands and helped to form 
boundaries: the Danube, the Drava (Drau), and the Tisza (Theiss, Tisa), 
The Germans were only one minority among many in what has rightly been 
23 
called "The most intricate lin_guistic mosaic in Europe," 
Most of the minorities had arrived in the plains of this region in 
22 d' d S h . B . 1929 Fer inan ommer, Das Deutsc tum in osnien, , T-81/Roll 
444/5195467-76. 
23 
Steven Clissold, ed, ~ Short History of Yugoslavia from Early 
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Map 4. Southern Hungary Within the Habsburg Empire. 
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modern times. In the Middle Ages, Magyars were apparently the sole 
residents of Baranja and Batschka. 24 Although it is certain that Serbs 
and Rumanians were established in the medieval Banat, the question 
25 whether Magyars were also located there is open to controversy. Such 
debate is academic, because southern Hungary was largely depopulated 
after the Turkish conquest of the sixteenth century" When the Habsburgs 
finally freed Batschka and Baranja by the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 
and the Banat by the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, they found it neces-
sary to encourage settlers into the devastated realm" To whatever 
remnants of Magyar, Serbian and Rumanian settlements were left, many 
new peoples were added" The Serbs were reinforced by a large influx of 
their countrymen in 1690 under the patriarch of Ipek. These Serbian 
immigrants, 200,000 strong, received ~ grant of substantial privileges 
from Emperor Leopold I. At about the same time, Catholics of Serbian 
origin, but ardently claimed by the Croats, came from Dalmatia and 
v 
Bosnia" The Sokci (Schokatzen) settled predominantly in Baranja, while 
the Bunyevci (Bunjewatzen) colonized the Batschka around Subotica 
(Subotitza, Maria-Theresiopel, Szabadka). 
During this period of migration, many Germans of peasant stock 
also made their appearance in southern Hungary. Their journeys were 
undertaken in three great colonization waves under the auspices of the 
Habsburgs: between 1718 and 1737 under Char1es VI, between 1744 and 
24:Ql Magyars(g (Budapest), June 21, 1941. (German translation,) 
T-81/Roll 553/5328216-9. 
25N. 1 . T . . "S t . . . . B 1co ai om1c1, ate romanes 1 s1 sate ungurest1 1n anat -
Epoca de aur in istoria Banatului," Revista Institutului Social Banat-
Crisiana (October, 1940)" (German translation)" T-81/Roll 544/ 
5316539-42. 
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1772 under Maria Theresa and between 1782 and 1787 under Joseph u; 26 
Since these Germans came to be called Swabians (Schwaben), their mi-
gration into Southeastern Europe during the eighteenth century is known 
as the great Swabian trek (Der grosse Schwabenzug). The provenance of 
the immigrants had little to do with their name, since they came from 
various German regions including Alsace-Lorraine, the Palatinate and 
Austria. However, the first contingent of settlers originated in 
,, 
Wurttemberg, which was essentially a Swabian state, and possibly the 
term Swabian was generalized from its early application to these people 
to include all Germans. 27 Although the early colonists were Catholic, 
Protestants also arrived. The first Protestant community in Batschka 
" 28 was Torscha (Torza, Torshau), dating back to 1784. Hard-working, 
methodical, clean and proud of their possessions, the Swabians of the 
Banat, Batschka and Baranja struggled to turn the marshy wilderness 
they found into a productive agricultural area. Nothing can exemplify 
better the hardships they overcame than their own folk-saying about the 
first three generations of settlers: "The first had death, the second 
29 
want and only the third found bread." 
The Habsburgs not only encouraged settlers to come into these low-
lands, but they organized the southern frontier of the Banat and the 
26 
Paikert, The Danube Swabians, p. 14. 
27 ' Anton Scherer, Donauschw~bische Bibliographie, 1935-1955 (Munich, 
1966), p. vii. 
28Heinrich Rlz, "W~rttemberger Protestanten in der Batschka," Der 
Auslandsdeutsche, Vol .. XIX (1936), p. 12. 
2911 Die erste hat den Tod, der zweite die Not und der dritte erst 
das Brot." 
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southernmost tip of Batschka into a portion of their famous Military 
,, 30 v 
Border (Militargrenze). Peasant-soldiers or Grenzer (Granicar) 
resided in regimental communities there as a deterrent to further 
Turkish attacks. They formed eastern outposts of the Habsburg belt of 
defense against the Ottoman danger which swept from the Adriatic Sea to 
the Carpathian mountains. Throughout the eighteenth and late into the 
nineteenth centuries, the Military Border of the Banat and Batschka 
was governed directly by Vienna, not through Budapest like the rest of 
southern Hungary. Possibly this explains the proverbial Habsburg 
patriotism of its residents, who were mainly of Serbian and Rumanian 
extraction. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, cultural life in the Banat and 
Batschka came to be dominated by its Serb inhabitants. Far more ad-
vanced than their brothers within Serbia, these people sparked the 
development of Serbian religious and educational life as a whole. 31 
Indeed, the Batschka city of Novi Sad (Neusatz, Ujvidlk), where a large 
Serbian population was located, came to be called the Serbian Athens. 
During the 1848 Revolution, these Habsburg Serbs ignored the numerous 
non-Serbs in their midst and declared that their area of residence was 
an autonomous unit under a Serbian military leader (vojvoda). Although 
the Emperor recognized this Voivodina between 1849 and 1860, he did so 
in name only. The Serbs of southern Hungary never in fact enjoyed the 
political self-government to which they aspired under the Habsburgs. 
3oF d' ' f h . ' f h . or a iscussion o t e origin o t _is institution in Croatia, 
see pages 27-28 infra. 
31wayne Vucinich, "The Serbs in Austria-Hungary," Austrian History 
Yearbook, Vol. III, Pt. 2 (1967), p. 5. 
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In the post-revolutionary decade, the Voivodina as recognized in Vienna 
included all of the Banat, B'cs-Bodrog and two districts of Srem 
(Syrmien, Szer(m), the easternmost tip of Slavonia to the South. It 
was peopled by approximately 407,000 Serbs (twenty-nine per cent of the 
total), 395,000 Rumanians (twenty-eight per cent), 325,000 Germans 
(twenty-three per cent), 241, 000 Magyars (seventeen per cent), and 
32 
32,000 others. Despite their attempt~ to dominate 9 the Serbs could 
never make inroads into other ethnic enclaves. The Voivodina as 
' 'l ' h H b b E , 1 ' 33 simi ar areas in t e a s urg mpire was not a me ting pot. 
In this multinational milieu, the Germans of the Voivodina were 
slow to form a national movement. Many responded to pressures from 
Budapest and assimilated with Magyars. However, in the early nineteenth 
century, German schools were opened to counteract Magyarization. Al-
ready in 1809, a four-class middle school for volksdeutsch children 
began operation in Novi Vrbas (Neu-Werbass, Ujverbfsy), a Batschka town 
which emerged as the center for German education, The fact that the 
German character of the school remained intact for a century bespeaks 
of a wellspring of German consciousness among the Germans of the 
' 34 Voivodina ready to be tapped. During the 1848 Revolution, they re~ 
mained by and large indifferent to German aspirations, 35 Yet, portents 
of things to come were faintly discernible in the revolutionary period. 
32 
Macartney, Habsburg Empire, pp. 446-447, 449, 507. 
33zwitter, Les probl~mes nationaux, pp. 15-16. 
34Aussendeutscher Wochenspiegel (hereinafter cited as A.W.), 
November 19, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329642-5. 
35Pfitzn~r, "Bewegung des Jahres 1848," pp. 314-315. 
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Although the Bogaroscher Swabian Petition of 1849, which requested 
autonomy for the Volksdeutschen of the Banat and Batschka, came to 
naught, it proved to be a beginning. By the 1870's, strong German 
centers had been rooted in the Banat communites of Vr'+{,ac .(Werschetz, 
Versec) and Bela-Crkva (Weisskirchen)~ 36 Pivotal support was found 
there for the Hungarian German National Party (Ungarl:ndische Deutsche 
Volkspartei, UDVP), which was organized in 1905 by Edmund Steinacker 
.37 
and others on behalf of the German minority in Hungary, Never tol-
erant of minority ·agitators, the Hungarian authorities forced Steinacker 
to leave Hungary and to work underground in Vienna, Although he was 
receptive to Pan-German ideas, his championship of minority rights was 
38 
moderated by his loyalty to Hungary. The German Hungarian catechism 
of 1907, which he circulated among volksdeutsch peasants under the dis= 
guise of an agricultural impelemnt catalog, popularized a program of 
reasonable demands: the right to speak German, to maintain German 
39 schools and to enjoy press freedom, The national movement among the 
Germans of southern Hungary, when it finally coalesced in the early 
twentieth century, was essentially moderate, 
Although the term had encompassed wider boundaries in the past, 
36F . v l' II "1 f" d 11 lk h h ri.tz a Javec, Das A teste Zeugnis ur as Vo isc e Erwac en 
desDonauschwabentums," Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. CLIX (1939),.pp, 
·316=317 0 
37Mattias Wolfgang Weiland, .Zweihundert Jahre Donauschwaben 
(Augsburg, 1949),.pp, 65-66. 
38Harold Steinacker, Austro~Hungarica: Ausgew~hlte Aufs~tze und 
Vortr!ge ~ Geschichte Ungarns und der ~sterreichisch-ungarischen 
·Monarchie (Munich, 1963), pp• 312-325, 
391bid,, pp. 304-311, 
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the Voivodina was officially resurrected to designate the additions to 
Yugoslavia from southern Hungary. These included nearly all of B~cs-
Bodrog, the area generally denoted as Batschka; less than a quarter of 
Baranja, the Baranja triangle (Baranja-Dreieck) formed by the conflu-
ence of the Danube and Drava rivers; and one-third of the total Banat. 
The ethnic composition of this truncated Voivodina showed a different 
pattern in 1910 from that of the Voivodina of the mid-nineteenth 
century. Without the eastern two-thirds of the Banat which was con-
tiguous to Rumania, the Rumanian element was significantly weakened. 
The Batschka, the Baranja triangle and the western or Serbian Banat in= 
eluded out of a total population of approximately 1,320,000: 382,000 
Serbs (twenty-nine per cent), 422,000 Magyars (thirty-two per cent)~ 
300,000 Germans (twenty-three per cent) and only 75,000 Rumanians (five 
per cent). WhereaS<t"it contained now only three rttajor groups rather 
than four, the Yugoslav Voivodina was still as ethnically mixed as the 
Voivodina under the Habsburgs had been. 
Croatia-Slavonia.--The German minority in Croatia-Slavonia, which 
was formed later than that in the Voivodina, were for a long time 
largely overlooked by historians despite their rather substantial 
40 number. The intricacies of the history of Croatia-Slavonia and its 
relationship to Hungary possibly overshadowed the development of this 
national group and delayed its recognition until after World War I. 
The main body of Croatians and Slavonians lived in the region 
extending in a semi-circular fashion from the narrow corridor between 
40 ,, . 
Herman Rudiger, "Deutsch tum in S lawonien und Syrmien," Der 
Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XX (1937), p. 198. 
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the Danube, Drava and Sava rivers to the Adriatic Seao (See Map 3)o 
The northern portion of this area was known as Croatia proper; the 
riverine arm was called Slavoniao The latter term has had no real 
41 
political meaning since the Middle Ages. As has been indicated, the 
easternmost tip of Slavonia, Srem, was sometimes considered as part of 
the Voivodina because of its extensive Serbian populationo Here the 
Serbo-Croat conflict, which animated so much of Bosnian history, also 
42 
came into play. Croatians in addition inhabited the Littoral, 
Dalmatia and the Lower Mur Region (Medjumurje, Murinsel) of Hungary 
. I 
propero The latter area, a triangle at the confluence of the Drava 
and Mur rivers, was included in the County of Zalao 
The centr~l theme around which most of Croatian history before 
1918 revolved was the Croatian connection with Hungaryo It began in 
1102, when the Croatians, no longer able to maintain their medieval 
kingdom, signed the Pacta Conventao This union accorded to the Croats 
a modest degree of autonomy which existed largely on papero It pro-
foundly influenced the Croatian nobles, in that they assimilated with 
the Magyar nationo After the disastrous defeat which the Hungarians 
and Croatians suffered from the Turks at Mohacs in 1526, much of 
Croatia proper fell to the Habsburgs along with the western strip of 
Hungaryo Slavonia, however, suffered under the Turkish yoke until the 
Treaty of Carlowitz of 1699, when it too passed under the Habsburgso 
The fiction of the privileged status of the Croats was scrupulously 
41 
Kann, Multinational Empire, Volo I, ppo 237-2380 
42 
For a discussion on the Serbo-Croat conflict in Bosnia, see 
pages 13-15 suprao 
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maintained under the Habsburgs, but Croatia was still ruled as part of 
I I Hungary, and the Croatian capital, Zagreb (Agram, Zagrab), was never 
more than a provincial seat. Even their military support to Vienna 
against insurgent Hungarians during the 1848 Revolution did nothing to 
give Croats greater autonomy. Their decision to march under an imperi-
al banner was simply dictated by their status as a weak people unable 
to follow an independent course and could hardly result in rewards. 43 
After the 1Compromise of 1867, the Croats were as firmly under the con-
trol of Budapest as before. 
The Turkish impact on Croatia-Slavonia can be seen most particu-
larly in the institution of the Military Border. ·In the sixteenth 
century, the Habsburgs established communities of peasant soldiers 
along the then Croatian border to defend the Empire against the Asiatic 
hordes. In the early eighteenth century, when Slavonia was incorpeJ-
rated with the Empire, the Military Border was extended. It eventually 
ran the entire length of the southern boundary of Croatia-Slavonia, a 
strip about 20-30 kilometers wide, stretching from Rijeka (Fiume) to 
Belgrade (Beograd), where it converged with the military districts of 
southern Hungary. Since Slavonia had been effectively depopulated 
during the Turkish occupation, Vienna invited Serbs into the area. As 
a consequence, most of the Grenzer in the Slavonian portion of the 
Military Border were of Serbian origin. The Croatian-Slavonian mili-
tary border district was ruled directly by Vienna until 1881, when it 
was abolished as obsolete. 
43charles Jelavich,. "The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire 
in the Nineteenth Century," Austrian History Yearbook, VoL III, Pt. 2 
(1967), p. 95. 
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German pioneers found their way into Croatia~Slavonia in substan-
tial numbers only in the nineteenth century, a~l!'ld then chiefly as 
secondary settlers. Although Germans were noted in Zagreb in the 
Middle Ages as handworkers and craftsmen, they never became a large 
44 group in Croatia proper. When the Slavonian regiments of the Mili-
tary Border were formed, Germans began to enter Slavonia in military 
capacities. Osijek (Essegg) was a major site for these settlers, who 
were in the majority there with 87 families by 1702. 45 Later in the 
eighteenth century, some German communities also were founded, such as 
. v 46 
Kula (Josefsfeld) and Poree (Poretsch), both dating from 1786. How-
ever, the major immigration of Volksdeutschen into Slavonia took place 
in the nineteenth century. Peasants from South Hungary S'treamed into 
47 the province, particularly into Srem, to form daughter settlements. 
Their presence swelled the German minority to the point that by 1910 
it comprised about five per cent of the total population of Croatia-
Slavonia, which amounted to over two and a half million. The Volks-
deutschen numbered 134,000, compared to 106,000 Magyars (four per cent), 
1,638,000 Croats (sixty-four per cent) and 645,000 Serbs (twenty-two 
per cent). 
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Volksdeutscher Ruf, November, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317113-5. 
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The Germans of Croatia-Slovania were even less conscious of their 
ethnic heritage than their brothers in the Voivodina at the dawn of the 
twentieth century. Most of them were Catholic and under strong Croa= 
tian influence. In 1913, the League of Germans in Slavonia (Bund der 
Deutschen in Slawonien) was begun, but this remained only a fledgling 
organization. 48 The retarded nature of the German movement here may be 
attributed to the fact that the German settlements were widely 
49 scattered. 
Hungary Proper (Upper Mur Region).~-A tiny German enclave was also 
found in the Upper Mur Region of Hungary proper, called Prekmurje 
(Dbermurgebiet, Muravid~k, Outre-Mura). (See Map 2). Before it was 
awarded to Yugoslavia, where it was included in the Province of 
Slovenia, this small district, extending north of the Mura (Mur) river" 
was divided between the counties of Vas and Zala. 
The residents of Prekmurje were preponderantly descendants of old 
Pannonian Slovenes, mentioned by the Romans and known variously as 
Bunyevci or Wends. In the ninth and tenth centuries, they fell to 
Magyars, who thereafter formed the ruling class as owners of large 
estates. Because of the long association with the crown of St. Stephen, 
Budapest maintained that by modern times the culture of these Slovenes 
exhibited distinct Hungarian tendencies. 50 Between 700 and 1100, 
Germans also settled in Prekmurje. They were apparently impervious to 
48 Volksdeutscher Ruf, November, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317113-4. 
49 Lendl, "Die Stellung des Slawonien-deutschtums," pp. 205-206. 
SOAlexander Mikola, Kisebs~gi K~rlev:l, Vol. V, No. 4 (July, 
1941). (German review, September 15, 1941). T-81/Roll 554/5330004-6. 
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Magyarization, in that they steadfastly maintained their German tra-
d . . h h h . 51 itions t roug out t e centuries. At the turn of the twentieth 
century~ the population consisted of approximately 100,000 Slovenes, 
25,000 Magyars and 1,500 Volksdeutschen. 
In summary, the Germans on territory within that part of the 
Habsburg Empire which was to be absorbed by the future state of 
Yugoslavia developed according to whether they were inhabitants of the 
Cisleithanian or the Transleithanian half of the monarchy. Those in 
Slovenia were prosperous and cultivated burgers, whose ancestors had 
been in the land for centuries. Already in 1889, they had founded a 
powerful organization in the S~dmark to battle for their national 
interests against Slovene nationalism. By contrast, the Germans in 
Hungary proper and in Croatia-Slavonia were relati"e newcomers in a 
wilderness which the Turks had devastated for nearly two hundred years. 
They had little time from their labors to protect their German culture 
from the myriad foreign influences surrounding them--Magyar, Serb, 
Rumanian, and Croatian. It was not until 1905 that the Hungarian 
Germans organized and even then only as good citizens of Hungary first, 
and Germans second. The Germans of Croatia-Slavonia were even more 
retarded in their national awakening, since their communities were of 
more recent origin and more widely scattered. Although the Bosnian 
Germans have been included within Cisleithania for convenience in this 
study, their case was too special to lend itself to comparison. In 
1918, the Habsburgs bequeathed to Yugoslavia individual groupings of 
Volksdeutschen with vastly different histories. 
51 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XX (1937), p. 444. 
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Part II: The Volksdeutschen Within 
Interwar Yugoslavia 
The necessary context for a discussion of the Volksdeutschen with-
in interwar Yugoslavia can be gained by a brief summary of Yugoslav 
history in those years, which extend from the formation of the state 
after World War I to its involvement in World War II.o The beginning 
of this period is somewhat obscureo Though the Yugoslav state was pro-
claimed by the Yugoslavs themselves on December 1, 1918, it was not 
confirmed until September 10, 1919 by the Treaty of St. Germain for 
its Austrian awards, nor until June 4, 1920 by the Treaty of Trianon 
for its Hungarian awards. On the other hand, the Nazi invasion on 
April 6, 1941 marks the opening of hostilities in Yugoslavia during 
World War II. Events within Yugoslavia between the wars furnish a tur-
bulent backdrop for the chronicle of the German minority within its 
borders. 
The new South Slav state began its existence as a constitutional 
monarchy, (See Map 5). Serbia provided the nucleus for the country 
and its ruling house, the Karageorgevich dynastyo From the Habsburg 
Empire, Yugoslavia received Dalmatia and the lands discussed in Part I 
of this chapter: Slovenia, including the Upper Mur Region; Bosnia; 
the Voivodina, made up of the Baranja triangle, Batschka and the 
Serbian Banat; and Croatia-Slavonia with the addition of the Lower Mur 
Region, Montenegro also joined the union. Between 1918 and 1929, the 
country was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to sig-
nify the three dominant ethnic groups in its population. Thereafter, 





Map 5. Political Divisions Within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), 1918-1929 
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Among the early developments of importance within the new nation 
was a drastic land reform carried out in the more prosperous provinces 
of Slovenia, the Voivodina and Croatia-Slavonia, Large landowners, 
mainly of Austrian-German and Hungarian extraction, were dispossessed 
in an effort to redistribute wealth, In the Voivodina and Croatia-
Slavonia, the beneficiaries were generally Serbs, either of local 
origin or from other parts of the country, They were called volunteers 
(Dobrovolzen)~ in that many qualified for free land as a reward for 
voluntary service during World War I, By 1935, 250,000 families had 
been relocated on small properties carved out of the larger estates in 
52 
former Habsburg areas, 
Shortly after Yugoslavia was established, the Croats and, to a 
lesser extent, the Slovenes began to feel deceived about their hopes 
for national fulfillment within the new borders. The Serbs with a 
population of six million significantly outnumbered the Croats, with 
less than four million, and the Slovenes, with a little over one mil-
lion. In addition to the obvious advantages of numerical supremacy, 
the Serbians were dedicated to a "Greater Servian" ideal in the running 
of the government. The bureaucrats in Belgrade built up a centralist 
administration which disregarded the cultural and political aspirations 
and the economic interests of their fellow compatriots. 53 Throughout 
the entire interwar period, Yugoslav politics were stormy and character= 
ized by bitter rivalry between the Croats and the Serbs. 
521 · h l' . d h 329 366 omasevic , Peasants, Po itics an Economic C ange, pp. , , 
368. 
53Dinko Tomatfi~, "Struggle for Power in Jugoslavia, 11 Journal of 
Central European Affairs, Vol. I (1941), p. 155. 
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Between the wars, three separate territorial organizations with 
political implications were instituted. None worked effectively to 
break down the mutual antagonism of the Serbs and Croats, During the 
first decade, the component parts of the country retained their historic 
boundaries. In 1929, when Alexander I reorganized the kingdom, he 
established a virtual dictatorship in order to introduce stability. 
Nine provinces (banovinas) were created in an effort to show a Serbian 
majority in as many administrative districts as possible. (See Map 6). 
After Alexander's assassination in 1934, Prince Regent Paul ruled 
Yugoslavia until March, 1941 on behalf of the young Prince Peter. 
Under his regime, yet another territorial adjustment was made. Sensing 
that Croatian disaffection within the country had reached dangerous 
proportions, Paul decided to appease the dissidents. On August 26, 
1939, an agreement (Sporazum) was signed, by which an enlarged Croatian 
province was formed with considerable autonomy. (See Map 6). The 
agreement did little to ease tensions. On the eve of World War II, 
Yugoslavia was still very much a house divided. 
In international affairs, the position of Yugoslavia was precar-
ious. It was confronted by Italy and Hungary, both of which aggressive-
ly coveted Yugoslav territory. Membership in the Little Entente along 
with Czechoslovakia and Rumania provided no real support against these 
revisionists states. In addition, as Germany rose in power after the 
advent of Hitler on January 30, 1933, Yugoslavia fell increasingly 
under Berlin's influence. Milan Stojadinovich, who became premier in 
v 
1935, and Dragisa Cvetkovich, who followed him in early 1939, found it 
progressively more difficult to resist German demands. They were 
forced to acquiesce in the abrogation of the Paris peace settlement, 
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Map 6. Provinces of the.Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 1929-1941 
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the German Anschluss with Austria in March, 1939, and the dismemberment 
of Czechoslovakia a year later. 
The German political hegemony in Yugoslavia was built upon a pene-
tration into the country's markets, The helplessness of Belgrade in 
this regard was aggravated by the fact that Yugoslavia suffered from 
enormous problems of over-population in the inter-war period. For 
example, the surplus agricultural population stood at forty-four per 
54 
cent, Under these conditions, Yugoslavia had no choice but to enter 
into trade agreements with Berlin, By early 1938, trade volume between 
Yugoslavia and Germany had trebled its 1934 level, 55 In that year, 
Yugoslavia sent to Germany half of its total exports, which represented 
less than three per cent of total German imports, 
56 
The South Slav 
state was rapidly becoming a virtual colony of its Teutonic neighbor, 
and the increasing power of Germany on the continent after 1938 en-
hanced German supremacy in the Yugoslav economy even more, 
After World War II had begun on September 1, 1939, Yugoslavia 
attempted valiantly to steer a neutral course. For nineteen months, 
it succeeded; but early in 1941, Yugoslavia too became embroiled in 
the conflagration raging on the continent. After the inept invasion 
of Greece by the Italians in October, 1940, Yugoslav cooperation had 
become extremely important to the Germans, A quick suppression of the 
dogged Greek resistance by German forces was an absolute necessity, if 
54Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and Economic Change, p, 324, 
55Brief for Hitler-Stojadinovich talks by Clodius, January 7, 
1938, DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, pp, 217-218. 
56 Stoyan Pribichevich, "Nazi Drive to the East," Foreign Policy 
Reports, Vol. XIV (1938), p, 176. 
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the German attack on Russia, planned for May, was to succeed. Hitler 
needed assurance of Yugoslav acquiescence toward this military intru-
sion into the Balkans. As a result, he demanded that Yugoslavia sign 
the Tripartite Pact, which would safely orient the state toward the 
Axis sphere. Two days after the pact was signed by the Cvetkovich 
government, on March 27, 1941, the people of Yugoslavia rose up against 
this collaboration with Hitler. A revolutionary government under the 
boy King Peter II was formed by General Dushan Simovich, In a fury 
over the developments in Belgrade, Hitler held a conference in Berlin 
on the same day as the coup, during which he determined to smash 
57 Yugoslavia militarily and as a state. Shortly thereafter, on the 
night of April 6-7, German bombers attacked Belgrade without a declara-
tion of war. 
The fortunes of the German minority within Yugoslavia fluctuated 
in an inverse relationship to the course of their host country's 
history between the wars. As Yugoslavia gradually lost its independ-
' ence vis-a-vis Berlin, the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen gained more and more 
concessions. By the late 1930's, although problems remained severe in 
Slovenia, the minority as a whole fared extremely well compared to 
58 
other Germans throughout eastern and southeastern Europe, In a 
treaty signed in conjunction with that of St. Germain, Yugoslavia 
promised to protect the rights of its minbrities residing on former 
Habsburg lands. Since guarantees were under the supervision of the 
57Minutes of conference in Berlin, March 27, 1941, DGFP, Series 
D, Vol, XII, p, 373. 
58schieder, Vertreibung, Vol, V, p, 37E. 
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League of Nations, these provisions diminished in value as the League 
itself lost strength. Eventually, Belgrade accorded concessions to 
minorities on the basis of how strong the mother country was in backing 
them. No wonder that the Germans enjoyed exceptional privileges on the 
eve of World War II. To some observers, they formed almost a ''state 
within a state. 1159 
Berlin worked within legal international bounds for the benefit 
of the Germans in Yugoslavia. The Fahrer posed as their champion, as 
well as of all Germans abroad. In his Reichstag speech of March 23, 
1933, he said: 
We have particularly at heart the fate of the Germans 
living beyond the frontiers of Germany who are allied with 
us in speech, culture, and customs and have to make a hard 
fight to retain these values. The national Government is 
resolved to use all the means at its disposal to support 
the rights internationally guaranteed to the German minor-
ities. 60 
In interviews with Yugoslav diplomats, he often insisted that goO'tt 
German-Yugoslav relations hinged upon acceptable treatment of the 
61 
group. 
The favor thus won for the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen exacted a 
price, for it generated much ill-will among the Yugoslav population 
as a whole, Resentment toward the Germans undoubtedly was heightened 
by the outbreak of World War II and the course of German victories in 
59stojkovi~, National Minorities in Yugoslavia, pp. 6-8, 
60Adolph Hitler, ~New Order, ed. Raoul de Roussy de Sales (New 
York, 1941), p. 158. 
61see, for example: Memorandum on conversation between Hitler and 
the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, April 21 [sic], 1939. DGFP, Series D, 
Vol, VI, p. 341; Memorandum on conversation between Hitler and Prince 
Paul, June 5, 1939, DGPF, Series D, Vol, VI, p. 637. 
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the early years of combat. The German Minister in Belgrade, Viktor 
von Heeren, reported in May, 1940, that anti-German feeling in Yugo-
slavia had reached enormous proportions. This situation was so fraught 
with danger that he counseled the curtailment of German cultural activ-
. . f h . G . . d 62 ities to prevent urt er anti- erman inci ents, Both the concessions 
and the prospect of more of them promised by German military prowess 
made the position of the Volksdeutschen increasingly precarious. 
The furor over the German minority far surpassed the numerical 
strength of the group. In the 1931 Yugoslav census, it numbered only 
500,000 members (less than four per cent of the total) in a population 
63 consisting of nearly 12 million souls. On the basis of this census, 
the largest German population, some 310,000 people, inhabited the 
Voivodina. The second in size, about 130,000 Volksdeutsche, lived in 
Croatia-Slavonia, while Slovenia counted 29,400 and Bosnia 19,900. A 
colony of 9,300 Germans also resided in Belgrade, Of these, probably 
half were not Yugoslav citizens but Austrian Germans and Reichsdeutsche 
d . d 64 engage in tra e. All of the Volksdeutschen in Yugoslavia, with the 
exception of those in Slovenia, were known as Danube Swabians (Donau-
schwaben) during the interwar period. This term was coined around 1922 
to denote the one and a half million ethnic Germans living along the 
62 Report from von Heeren, May 20, 1940. DGFP, Series D, Vol, IX, 
p. 384. 
63nespite the much-vaunted private observations that the German 
minority ran 200, 000 higher, the German Forei.gn Office accepted the 
1931 Yugoslav census as reliable in 1941. (Biber, Nacizem i. nemci, pp. 
15-23, 425. 
64 ., . " Ververoffentlichung aus: Handworterbuch des Grenz-und-Ausland-
deutschtums: Slldslawien, p~l-2. T-81/Roll 150/0153214-S:--
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Danube in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 65 
The national life of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen between 1918 and 
1941 was fostered by a number of political, economic and cultural or-
ganizations. Foremost among these was the Swabian German Cultural 
Union (Schwgbisch-deutscher Kulturbund). Founded in 1930 in Novi Saq, 
it at first encompassed mainly the ethnic Germans in the Voivodina, but 
eventually expanded to include. all in Yu~oslavia. The tribulations of 
this group in the early years of the Yugoslav state and the dilemmas 
faced after the Nazi assumption of power in Germany were representative 
in large measure of the total prewar experience of the ethnic Germans 
in Yugoslavia. 
At the time of its formation and for nearly two decades thereafter, 
the Kulturbund was dedicated to the motto of the Danube Swabians: 
"L 1 h d h · l" 1166 oya to t e state an to t e nationa ity. The goals of the group 
were listed as economic and cultural; political activity was specif~ 
ically barred by its constitution. Paragraph 3 read: 
The Union strives for the improvement and stimulation of 
the material, spiritual, aesthetic and ethnical culture 
of the people of German nationality residing in the state 
and authorized by it ... Every political activity within 
the framework of the Swabian German Cultural Union remains 
excluded.67 
The guiding spirit and an early presiding officer of the Kulturbund was 
Dr. Stephan Kraft, a politician who had been a fighter for German 
65 d 
Scherer, Uonauschwabische Bibliographie, p. vii. 
66 "Staatstreu und volkstreu." Weiland, Zweihundert Jahre 
r::--
Donauschwaben, p. 80. 
67 Quotej in Theodor Grentrup, Das Deutschtum an der mittleren 
Donau in Rumanien und Jugoslawien (Mftnster, 1930), pp. 327-328. 
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cultural rights within Habsburg Hungary as a member of the moderate 
UDVP. Born in 1884 in Srem, he had studied at the universities of 
M b d L h d Vo 68 ar urg an er a n an ienna. In the late 1920's Captain Johann 
Keks was elected president of the association. He adhered strictly to 
the constitutional goals, which stressed education and welfare and 
eschewed political involvement. 69 
Despite a program designed to create a harmonious relationship 
with Belgrade, the Kulturbund experienced legal difficulties in its 
e.arly years, The Yugoslav government followed contradictory policies 
of oppression and appeasement toward the organization in an effort to 
minimize the threat which many Yugoslavs believed the German minority 
d h I , 70 pose to t e country s security. Between 1924 and 1930, the Kultur-
bund was dissolved and reinstated intermittently. Thereafter, it was 
allowed to function without interruption, although separate chapters 
(Ortsgruppen) were closed down sporadically in the mid-1930's, The 
harrassment by Belgrade did not seem to affect permanently the size of 
the membership. In 1924, the Kulturbund included 211 Ortsgruppen with 
71 72 42,000 members, In 1936, it still boasted of 210 Ortsgruppen, 
Once the Nazis achieved control in Germany, the unity of the 
Kulturbund was threatened by younger members who finally took charge of 
the organization. In 1934, the Renovation Movement 
68Grenzwacht (Osijek), October 23, 1942, 
69 Grentrup, Das Deutschtum, pp. 328-329, 
70Paul Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities," Slavic Review 
Vol, XXII (1963), p, 66, 
71 Grentrup, Das Deutschtum, p, 329. 
72 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol, XX (1937), p, 368, 
(Erneuerungsbewegung) was organized by Dr, Jacob Awender, a physician 
v 
of the Banat town of Pancevo (Pantschowa). Awender and his fol,lowers 
believed that the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen should experience a rebirth 
of their energies and abilities in order that the German nationality 
42 
could triumph in hostile territory. While they claimed the same goals 
as members of the Kulturbund, the Renovators espoused more "en thus"" 
iastic" tactics and tempo of operationJ3 The movement's weekly news-
paper, the Volksruf, formerly the Pan~evoer Post, was edited by Awender 
in association with Gustav Halwax, an inflammatory agitator, For 
several years, the Kulturbund leadership was successful in combating 
forays by the members of the Renovation Movement into its affairs. At 
the general assembly of the Kulturbund in December, 1935, the policies 
of the executive committee under Keks were reaffirmed and the Reno-
vators 1 f h ' . 74 e t t e organization, 
Dissention also split the Renovation Movement in the spring of 
1937, A moderate wing was formed by Branimir Altgayer and Dr, Josef 
"Sepp" Janka, Altgayer, born in 1897 of an old Slavo:nian military 
family, had been an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army. He engaged 
in minority work on behalf of the Volksdeutschen in the Osijek area, 
75 
where he published the weekly Slavonischer Volksbote. Janko, an 
assessor in the Banat town of Veliki Be~kerek (Zrenjanin, Petrovgrad, 
Gross-Betschkerek) was born in the Banat in 1905 and completed his 
73 Wuescht, Beitrag zur Geschichte, pp. 23-25, 27-29, 
74 Der Aus landsdeutsche, VoL XIX (1936), p, 43, 
75 Hans Karl Andras, Weltwacht der Deutschen, September, 1941. 
T/81 Roll 545/5317405. 
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education at the University of Innsbruck, After the split, proceedings 
were instituted to merge the moderates with the Kulturbund. 76 The 
radicals continued under the leadership of Awender and Halwax, who 
established a liaison with the tiny Serbian fascist movement under 
Dimitrije Ljoti~ 
By the late 1930's, the elder statesmen of the Kulturbund could no 
longer stem the tide. Berlin accused them of internecine warfare 
damaging to the organization and Kraft, in particular, of mismanagement 
of finances. A meeting was held in Vienna on May 15, 1939, at which 
the problems of the Kulturbund were submitted to arbitration. 77 
Whether Kraft and his associates were guilty as charged can be ques-
tioned, but the Kulturbund was turned over to the moderate Renovators 
nonetheless. Janko became head of the union in the summer of 1939. 
Now under strong Nazi influence, the Kulturbund became aggressive. 
The slogan appearing on releases from its press service read "He who is 
78 
not a member of the Kulturbund can not be a good German!" Rewards 
were reaped from relentless membership campaigns among the Volks-
deutschen. By mid-1939, there were 320 Ortsgruppen in the organiza-
tion, with a membership of 305,000 or more than half of the total 
G 1 . 79 erman popu ation. Since the pattern of the Nazi party was 
76unsigned Memorandum, December 31, 1937. DGFP, Series D, Vol, 
v, p, 212, 
77 Wuescht, Beitrag zu~ Geschichte, pp. 26-27, 59-61. 
7811wer nicht Mitglied im Kulturbund ist, 
Deutscher sein!" Volk im Kulturbund (1940?). 
5285848-52, 
kann auch kein guter 
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79B "b N . . . i er, acizem i nemci, pp. 194, 433; Wuescht, Beitrag zur 
Geschichte, pp. 62-63. 
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introduced, these Ortsgruppen were divided into districts (Kreise), 
which in turn were divided into provinces (Gaue). Programs to strength-
en German consciousness were begun, such as the Kinder aufs Land 
project, which saw young city people sent to rural volksdeutsch fam-
ilies for extended visits in a "healthy" German atmosphere. 80 Loyalty 
to the state was overshadowed by commitment to the nationality in the 
ethos of the revamped Kulturbund. 
The Nazi leaders of the Kulturbund abandoned the 1920 constitution 
and entered politics, Between 1922 and 1929, the German minority in 
Yugoslavia had been represented by the German Party (Partei der 
Deutschen) under the guidance of Dr. Kraft. The party, which garnered 
about 45,000 votes in national elections, wielded very little power in 
the Parliament (Sku~tina) and held only between five and eight seats 
in the assembly. 81 After the establishment of the dictatorship in 
1929, the party was permanently banned. Thereafter, German delegates 
usually ran on the government list. By default, the Kulturbund appar-
ently began to fill the vacuum created by the demise of the German 
82 Party. Once the Nazis were in control, they openly used its offices 
for political agitation. In the national elections held in early 1940, 
Volksdeutsche were blatantly admonished to vote as directed by the 
' . 1 d h' 83 minority ea ers ip. 
Education for the Germans improved remarkably as Nazi strength 
80volk im Kulturbund (1940?). T-81/Roll 521/5285848-52. 
81 
Grentrup, Das Deutschtum, pp. 325-326. 
82 Volksdeutscher Ruf, November, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317113-5. 
83Deutschtum im Ausland, Vol. XXIII (1940), pp. 33-34. 
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expanded in Europe and the Balkans. In the 1920 1s, Belgrade had been 
remiss in honoring its treaty obligations toward the Volksdeutscheno 
Dro Kraft delivered an impassioned speech in the Parliament in 1927 
accusing deficiencies in the number of both German classes and teach-
ers. Two years later, a memorandum was prepared, which charged that 
10,000 to 12,000 German elementary school children, out of the 36,000 
to 40,000 total, were denied the German instruction for which they 
l 'f' d 84 qua i ie . This neglect by the government led to the formation of a 
foundation for private German schools (Schulstiftung der Deutschen des 
Kgnigreichs Jugoslawien) in 1931. General progress was made in the 
1930's in collecting funds for private schools and in attaining govern-
ment permission for their operation. By 1940, German secondary schools 
were reported in Novi Vrbas, Zagreb, Belgrade and Apatin (Abthausen). 85 
The Germans never forgot that the schools were the real lifeblood of 
h . . 86 t e minority. They fully realized that the minority could not sur-
vive if its youngest members lost their mother tongue. 
In the interwar period, many other agencies functioned to better 
the life of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen in diverse ways. Since seventy-
four per cent of them lived on the land, agricultural associations were 
f h . 87 o t e utmost importance. The Agraria coordinated efforts of various 
volksdeutschen agricultural cooperativeso Designed to stimulate 
84 Grentrup, Das Deutschtum, pp. 231, 237. 
85A. W., August 31, 1941, from Birsenzeitung (Berlin), August 25, 
1940. T-81/Roll 522/5287430. 
86 Ao W., March 16, 1940. T-81/Roll 521/5286379-81. 
87Joseph Bo Schechtman, "The Elimination of German Minorities in 
Southeastern Europe," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. VI 
(1946), p. 153. 
production and facilitate marketing, Agraria fell to Nazi control by 
88 
the late 1930's. An organization made up of welfare cooperatives 
(Lindliche Wohlfahrtsgenossenschaften) provided hospital and health 
care for the German peasants and workers. Directed by Wuescht, a 
pioneer in the area of public hygiene from Batschka, it was supported 
by 40,000 members in 1937. 89 
Further, a substantial German language press for the Yugoslav 
minority flourished in the prewar years. In the late 1920's, there 
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were sixteen German newspapers, of which one, the Deutsches Volksblatt 
of Novi Sad was a daily. 90 By 1935, two more newspapers were added to 
the list. 91 A year later, a total of 45 newspapers and periodicals 
were available to the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen, including four dailies 
with a combined circulation of 35,000. Only two of the dailies were 
openly committed to a German platform: Deutsches Volksblatt, which 
served as an organ for the Kulturbund, and Deutsche Zeitung, also of 
Novi Sad. Most of the weeklies were of a local character. 92 However, 
Awender's Volksruf and Altgayer's Slawonischer Volksbote took militant 
Nazi positions; Die Donau, a Catholic weekly published in Apatin, 
followed a decidedly anti-Nazi editorial policy. 
Religious bodies also mirrored the rift which developed among 
88Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics and Economic Change, pp. 618-619. 
89 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XX (1937), p. 122. Wuescht, 
Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, pp. 350-353. 
90 
Grentrup, Das Deutschtum, p. 306. 
91wilhelm Gradmann, "Die deutschspr~chigen Zeitungen im Aus land," 
Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XIX (1936), pp. 14-15. 
92 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XX (1937), pp. 176-177. 
47 
Yugoslav Volksdeutschen as a consequence of the rise of Nazism. About 
seventy-five per cent of the ethnic German population, nearly 400,000 
people, were counted as Roman Catholic in the 1931 census. Since the 
Catholic church was also strong among the Slavs in areas of German 
settlement, it was a powerful force for assimilation. Volksdeutsche 
theological students prepared for the priesthood in such Slavic strong-
h ld S . 93 o s as araJevo. The Protestants, totalling 100,000, were much 
weaker than the Catholics. Members of the Lutheran Evangelical Church 
adhering to the Augsburg Confession numbered 85,000; those of the 
Evangelical and Reformed Church, 15,000. While strong nationalistic 
tendencies were discernible in these Protestant circles, the Catholics 
played them down. Among the most vocal fighters for German rights in 
prewar Yugoslavia was the regional bishop of the Augsburg confesssional 
church, Dr. Philipp Popp. 
The picture of the Yugoslav Germans which emerges from a study of 
their political, economic and cultural organizations is generally valid 
for the entire country. Certain differences must be noted in various 
areas of residence, however, and the special problems encountered by 
the Germans of Slovenia, Croatia-Slavonia, Voivodina and Bosnia provide 
variety to the history of the Volksdeutschen of Yugoslavia between 1918 
and 1941. 
The drastic decline in the position of the German minority in 
Slovenia, or the Drava Province (Dravska Banovina), as it was called 
after 1929, is reflected in population statistics. (See Map 6). The 
93 Letter of Sebastian Werni, October 10, 1934. T-81/Roll 444/ 
5196044-6. 
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following figures for Slovene cities with the heaviest German concen-
t . l' 94 tra ions are revea ing: 
Ethnic German Population 
1910 1931 
Maribor (Marburg) 22,653 2,741 
Celje (Cilli) 4,625 449 
Ptuj (Pet tau) 3,672 559 
Although many Germans chose to emigrate from Slovenia, the actual popu-
lation losses between 1910 and 1931 were not as dramatic as pictured 
above. Many people who had been counted as Germans on the basis of 
Umgangssprache in the 1910 Habsburg census appeared on the 1931 census 
rolls as Slovenes, since official Yugoslav nationality figures were 
based on the criterion of mother tongue. Nevertheless, the most con-
spicuous loss of German strength occurred here in Slovenia, as seen by 
comparing the 1910 census (107,200 Germans) with that of 1931 (29,400 
Germans). The Germans represented only two and a half per cent of the 
total population numbering about 1,150,000, mostly Slovenes, 
During the interwar period, the ethnic Germans in Slovenia lived 
in compact enclaves. There was only one major German settlement in 
Carniola, the Ko~evje district, with 12,000 Germans, but a few Germans 
sti.11 resided in Ljubljana. Other German communities, comprised mainly 
of substantial citizens in market towns, radiated from the Austrian 
frontier throughout Lower Styria. The most important Styrian cities 
with small German minorities were Maribor (Marburg), Celje and Ptuj. 
In the Upper Mur Region, there were 1,500 Volksdeutsche, 
94 
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Anti-German sentiment was particularly strong in Slovenia in the 
interwar years. Germans blamed much of this exaggerated Slovene 
nationalism on the Primorzen, former residents of Slovene areas along 
the Adriatic coast who migrated to Slovenia when their home territory 
was awarded to Italy after World War I. Presumably, they were sophis~ 
ticated warriors for the national cause. For whatever reason, 
Slovenian authorities were preoccupied with strengthening the Slavic 
elements in their land at the expense of the German between 1918 and 
1941, There was some foundation to the charge that the blatant disre-
gard of German minority rights in Slovenia was designed to bring about 
"the entire pulverization of the German ethnic group in Slovenia. 1195 
An early Slovene-German dispute which attracted international 
attention centered on the German House (Deutsches Haus) in Celje. This 
case was the only petition on behalf of the German minority in Yugo-
1 . db d . h C ·1 f h L f N · 96 s avia e ate int e ounci o t e eague o ations. At the turn 
of the century, a German association was formed in Celje which took 
the name of its headquarters, the German House. Because they feared 
that the association served to convert Slovenes into Germans, the 
Slovene authorities dissolved it immediately after World War I. In 
1924, its property was given to the Celjski Dom, a Slavicized version 
of the German association, to fill the social, artistic and cultural 
needs of local Germans. Although a League of Nations report on the 
95 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XIX (1936), p. 855. 
96Paul A. Marrotte, "Germany at the League of Nations Council: 
The Defense of German Minority Groups in Poland, Memel and Yugoslavia" 
(unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1954), 
p. 4-L 
controversy in 1933 absolved the Yugoslavs of wrongdoing, the Germans 
remained dissatisfied. 97 
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The grievances of the German minority against Slovene authorities 
did not abate as the years passed. In the late 1930's, the Germans 
charged that the Yugoslav government placed unreasonable restrictions 
upon ethnic German subjects, such as prohibiting them from owning prop-
erty within fifty kilometers of the border. Members of the minority 
were incensed at the anti-German tone of the newspaper Slovenec, a 
Catholic daily published in Ljubljana, as well as "general chicaneries" 
practiced against them. They further demanded that cooperative organ-
izations and societies be permitted without official interference. 
Regulations which restricted German teachers and the German language 
in schools for children of the German minority aroused particular hos-
t ' l' t 98 l. l. y. Because German teachers were usually transferred from 
German to purely Slovenian communities, by 1936 hardly a dozen German .., 
teachers were left in the Kocevje area, which was eighty-nine per cent 
German, while the Slovenian teachers there numbered fifty. 99 The 
Slovene authorities clearly were following a course of Entdeutschungs-
politik (de-germanization) to the dismay of their German constituents. 
The Kulturbund, which was introduced into Slovenia relatively late, 
suffered repression as a consequence of the rapid strides tow~rd Nazism 
made by its members. 
v 
Only the Kocevje Germans were satisfied with the 
97Ibid., pp. 375-386. 
98unsigned Memorandum, December 31, 1937. DGFP, Series D, Vol. V, 
p. 213. 
99 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XIX (1936), p. 855. 
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moderate leadership of the Kulturbund.lOO Elsewhere more radical 
philosophies prevailed. The Maribor and Ljubljana branches were dis-
solved by order of the provincial governor in 1935 and 1936 respective-
ly for their covert political activity. Because of such punitive 
. 1 f d ' Sl . by 1937. lOl actions, on ya ew groups operate in ovenia The tale 
of the chapter in Ljubljana was typical. Formed in 1932, it was 
Nazified after a three-year battle. Official dissolution forced the 
group underground, where it operated until recognition was restored in 
1940. 102 Thereafter, the Kulturbund expanded rapidly throughout 
Slovenia under the leadership of its provincial chairman (Gauobmann) 
Senior Johann "Hans" Baron, an Evangelical priest. 103 
Even the tranquility among the Ko~evje Germans was destroyed by 
agitators who succeeded in radicalizing their Kulturbund by 1938. The 
moderate leadership of Dr. Hans Arko was challenged by Wilhelm Lampeter, 
a youth worker in touch with the Erneuerungsbewegung. Ultimately, Arko 
was deposed, and Nazification begun in a most intense manner. The 
" Kulturbund was renamed a Volksgruppe under a Fuhrer, an office filled by 
Josef Schober. The German population was divided into twenty-five 
groups, which were designated with typical Nazi bombast as St1~rme to 
denote their quasi-military role as vanguards of the German race. Each 
lOOBiber, Nacizem i nemci, pp. 428-429. 
101 
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St bd · · d d · t · f and chi' ldren, 104 urm was su ivi e in o various groups or men, women 
Trouble brewed in the KoYevje district by the continued presence of 
outside agitators. In 1940, a local leader was forced to order all 
foreigners to leave the area and to allow some to stay only if they 
surrendered their arms to the police. 105 
Generally speaking, the Germans of Slovenia evinced their heritage 
of strong nationalistic sentiment and privileged position in the inter-
war years. They embraced Nazi doctrines with enthusiasm very nearly 
to a man. Although only a small group, they were undaunted by ob-
stacles thrown up by the Slovenes. They believed that Hitler would be 
their savior, and, as Baron said in a speech on January 19, 1941, they 
confessed to an absolute faith in National Socialism. 106 
The creation of Yugoslavia affected the fortunes of the Germans in 
Croatia-Slavonia to a lesser degree than it affected those in Slovenia. 
Their number remained constant, in that there were still 130,000 Volks-
deutschen in 1931 compared to 134,000 in 1910. The greatest concentra-
tion of Germans occurred in Srem, where 50,000 Germans represented 
nearly fifteen per cent of the total population of 320,000. Because of 
the Serb majority in Srem, the region had a Serbian character, 107 Im-
portant German communities were established in Ruma and Zemun (Semlin, 
Zimony), which lay directly opposite Belgrade at the confluence of the 
104 
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Danube and Sava rivers, Excluding Srem, the approximately 80,000 
Germans in Croatia-Slavonia accounted for only three per cent of the 
total population, which included 2,731,000 people mainly of Croatian 
extraction. German settlements were concentrated in Slavonia. Impor-
ff 
tant ones were Virovitica (Verocze, Weretz, Wirowititz), Vinkovci 
(Vinocvici, Winkowzi) and Osijek. 
Internal Yugoslav border adjustments, which resulted from the 
Serbian-Croatian controversy over Srem dating to Habsburg times, caused 
the political detachment of many Germans of Srem from their brothers 
in Croatia-Slavonia during the 1930's. Following the administrative 
reorganization under Alexander I, most of Croatia-Slavonia was incor-
porated into the Sava Province (Savska Banovina). (See Map 6), How-
ever, a large portion of Srem, heavily populated by Volksdeutschen, was 
awarded to the Danube Province (Dunavska Banovina), which surrounded 
Belgrade and included all of the Voivodina. Zemun was incorporated 
into Belgrade as a suburb. In 1939, Croatia was enlarged according 
to the terms of the Sporazum by merging the Sava Province with the 
Coastal Province (Primorska Banovina), which included Dalmatia and 
parts of Bosnia. (See Map 6). Other Bosnian additions were made as 
well, However, only two districts of Srem were restored to the new 
province of Croatia and five remained attached to the Danube Province. 
Within Croatia, the German minority now comprised about 90,000, or 
a little over four per cent of the total population numbering about 
3,786,000, if the 1931 census figures are used. The Croats accounted 
for seventy-five per cent of the population and the Serbs nineteen 
54 
per cent. 108 The passing of Srem back and forth between Croatian and 
Serbian hands led to an ultimate decrease in the German minority in 
Croatia in the final months of peace. 
In the interwar period, Croatian Volksdeutsche had no real com-
plaints within Yugoslavia, except perhaps for deficient German instruc-
tion for German children in the schools. 109 Popp and Altgayer 
presented a memorandum .on schools for the German minority to the 
governor (Ban) of Croatia, Dr. Ivan Subasich, in the early summer of 
1940. They declared that the Croatian Volksdeutschen had the worst 
school conditions among all the German minorities in Europe. Of the 
53 German-speaking school divisions within the province, eight were not 
open and sixteen were staffed with teachers whose proficiency in German 
llO was poor. A month later, Subasich compli~d with their request for 
better German schooling by liberalizing conditions for the opening of 
. . 1 111 minority c asses. Thus, steps were taken to resolve the major 
source of discontent among Croatian Volksdeutschen. 
After the Sporazum, the Kulturbund flourished in Croatia. The 
implications of the political reorganization for the future of Yugo-
slavia did not escape the officials of the organization. The centrif-
ugal forces released by the grant of autonomy to the Croatians could 
well lead to the eventual establishment of an independent Croatian 
108Dr. Mladen Lorkovich, Narod l zemlija Hrvata (Zagreb, 1939). 
(German translation). T-81/Roll 136/173284-5. 
109 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XX (1937), pp. 122-123. 
llOAltgayer and Popp to Dr. Ivan Subasich, June 26, 1940. (German 
translation). T-81/Roll 521/5286737-9. 
111slawonische Volksbote (Osijek), July 27, 1940. 
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state. Accordingly, Altgayer was named a special representative to 
. 112 
Zagreb on behalf of the head of the Kulturbund, Janko. In January, 
1941, 95 out of every 100 Volksdeutschen were reported to be members of 
113 
the Kulturbund. Nazi organizational activities were astqundingly 
successful among t~ose Germans who had been quiescent for so long and 
who so strongly identified with Croatian soil. 
In the Voivodina, the ethnic Germans continued in their historic 
role as a substantial but isolated minority in a multinational area. 
As of 1931, there were about 3lp,OOO Germans (twenty-one per cent) in 
the area out of a million and a half population. The Serbs were the 
largest group with 461,864, and the Magyars next with 385,500. The 
















The German minority had increased since the 1910 census; it was the 
only volksdeutsche group within Yugoslavia to do so. Other ethnic 
groups included Bunjevci, Sokri, Rumanians and Croats, 
The Germans of the Voivodina lived in a number of communities. In 
Batschka, their largest settlement was in Apatin, which served as the 
center for Catholic life for the entire region. Other large German 
114s1awonische Volksbote (Osijek), October 5, 1940. 
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groups were located in Prigrevica Sveti Ivan (Sentiwan)~ Novi Vrbas, 
Novi Sad and Subotica. In the Banat, important German settlements were 
found in Veliki Be~kerek, VrY.ac, Pan~evo, and Velika Kikinda (Gross-
Kikinda). In all of these, the Germans were substantial citizens. 
In the years between 1918 and 1941, the Volksdeutschen in the 
Voivodina were content with Yugoslav rule, but they did not enjoy har-
monious relationships with other ethnic groups in their midst. They 
were pleased to be free from Hungary ("Los von Ungarn") and its poli-
cies of Magyarization. 114 Recognizing the potential utility of their 
anti-Magyar sentiments, Belgrade deliberately fostered national feeling 
among the Swabians in the Voivodina. Their contempt for Budapest thus 
reached flamboyant proportions by 1940. 115 The ill-will was returned 
by the Hungarians, who were particularly incensed that, compared to 
the Germans and Serbians there, the Magyars formed the poorest element 
' B hk 116 in atsc a. Nor were the Germans on much better terms with their 
Serbian neighbors, despite Belgrade's grace. Serbs expressed extreme 
hostility toward the Swabians in the Banat in the 1930's. 117 It seemed 
as if the Germans were caught in a cauldron boiling over with Hungarian 
and Serbian chauvinism in the pursuit of their own national life, The 
Voivodina was no more a melting pot than it had ever been. 
114Biber 3 Nacizem i nemci, pp. 23-41, 426. 
115c. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: ~History of Modern 
Hungary, 1929-1945 (2 volumes, New York, 1956-1957), Vol. I, p. 478. 
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In this hostile environment, the German movement in the Voivodina 
grew rapidly between the wars. Many celebrations to commemorate the 
foundation of German settlements were arranged as one indication of the 
heightened German consciousness. In 1936 alone, thirteen Batschka 
connnunities observed their 150th anniversaries. 118 In November, 1940, 
a great all~day rally for the Germans in the northern Banat was held, 
complete with speeches and a parade featuring a thousand youths in 
119 German dress. This event was typical of many others, undoubtedly 
spurred by the well-organized Kulturbund. The Germans of the Voivodina 
looked increasingly to Berlin, as did the Germans of Slovenia. 
In Bosnia, the Volksdeutschen as a whole continued the struggle to 
win the barest subsistence from the land and to retain their national 
heritage. In 1931, they numbered 15,500, only a fraction of one per 
cent of the total population (2,323,555). Their major settlements were 
at Nova Topola, Petrovapolje and Glogavoc, but in none were their 
numbers higher than 2,500. In a private report compiled by the Evan-
gelical priest in Glogovac, Ferdinand Sonnner, the plight of the Germans 
of Bosnia was made known in 1929. Sommer intimated that the need for 
help was desperate in many outlying connnunities where the struggle for 
national survival was critical. He cited one village where volks-
deutsche children said their catechism in Serbo-Croat! He called for 
more German teachers, leaders and legal advisors, as well as buildings, 
to end this pernicious destruction of German life. Significantly, his 
118 Der Auslandsdeutsche, Vol. XX (1937), p. 121. 
119 A, W., December 5, 1940 from Deutsche Zeitung (Novi Sad), 
November 28, 1940. 
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plea was directed toward institutions within the German homeland, 120 
Within interwar Yugoslavia, then, the German minority enjoyed sub-
stantial rights. Their interests were actively espoused by Berlin, 
particularly after Hitler's rise to power. Their demands were increas-
ingly satisfied as Berlin grew in strength. By 1940, the Kulturbund, 
recast along Nazi lines, was a vital organization. Strides made in the 
Kulturbund were mirrored in other enterprises. More German schooling 
was procured for German children, and the German press was expanded, 
as cases in point. Although restrictions were still confining to 
Slovenia, even there conditions were tolerable. The Yugoslav Volks-
deutschen in the interwar years were quite successful, because of their 
tenacious hold on the land, experience in business and the professions, 
close-knit organizations, and strong national feeling. 121 Unfortu-
nately, these Germans were well aware that their good fortune ulti-
mately was secured in Berlin, not Belgrade. 
Part III: The Volksdeutschen Within 
Interwar Hungary 
When the Nazis partitioned Yugoslavia in April, 1941, the Baranja 
triangle, Batschka and the Upper Mur area were returned to Hungary. 
Since the fortunes of the Volksdeutschen there once again merged with 
those of the Hungarian Volksdeutschen as a whole, a brief sketch of the 
latter group between World War I and World War II is appropriate. As 
in Yugoslavia, this German minority received increasingly favored 
12°F d. d s II D h 0 B . II 1929 er inan ommer, Das eutsc tum in osnien, . T-81/Roll 
444/5195467-76. 
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59 
treatment in direct proportion to Germany's increasing prestige. 
A period of confusion in Hungary immediately after World War I 
ended early in 1920 with the assumption of power by Admiral Nicholas 
Horthy as Regent. For a quarter of a century thereafter, Horthy re-
mained at the head of the Hungarian state. The official policy of his 
era, which was forged by a long row of prime ministers, was based in 
. d . . s . . d . b 1 h . 122 irre entism, anti- emitism an anti o s evism. By the Treaty of 
Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, Hungary lost seventy-one per cent of 
its territory (including Croatia-Slavonia) and sixty per cent of its 
population. No wonder that grievance for lost lands of the Crown of 
St. Stephen characterized so much of Hungarian history in the interwar 
years. 
The Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia marked the entrance of the Magyar 
state into World War II on the Axis side. The Hungarians had adhered 
to the Tripartite Pact on November 20, 1940, but had nonetheless con-
tinued their struggle to remain neutral in the war. They even conclud-
ed a Treaty of Friendship with Yugoslavia during the next month, But 
the promise of coveted Yugoslav spoils was too much for Budapest, 
Berlin demanded Hungarian military aid in the Yugoslav invasion, and 
the Hungarians complied. Despairing over the abrogation of the 
Hungarian-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship, Prime Minister Paul Telecki 
committed suicide on April 2. The next day, Horthy sanctimoniously 
explained to Hitler1 that "the conflict of conscience confronting us., .. _. 
compels us to request that the German Army Command assign to our troops 
122 
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only such tasks as are reconcilable with our conscience, 11123 Composure 
was quickly regained, however, and Horthy issued a manifesto on April 
11 affirming his duty to reclaim former Hungarian territories in 
124 Yugoslavia in the interests of the Hungarians living there. Between 
April 11 and 13, the manifesto was carried out. 
In the interwar period, the German minority in Hungary was only a 
fraction of its former strength. Before 1914, about two million 
Germans resided in the Transleithanian half of the Dual Monarchy. The 
drastically reduced borders of Hungary in 1920 excluded many of them 
from the Magyar state. Their areas of residence were incorporated into 
Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria. The 1920 census, 
showed 550,000 Volksdeutsche to be living within Hungary. In the 1930 
census, this figure was reduced to 479,000. The loss was attributable 
to assimilation caused by the traditional Magyarization policies 
125 
followed by Budapest, 
In general, the position of the Germans in Hungary was inferior 
to that of their counterparts in Yugoslavia until 1938. Although their 
rights were protected in the Trianon Treaty, those Volksdeutsche dedi-
cated to their German heritage were dissatisfied with the treatment 
they received from the government. They felt that their cultural 
association was unfairly repressed and that the schools for German 
children were deficient. Only as Hitler became intimately involved 
123 
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with Hungarian Volksdeutschen did matters appreciably improve, 
In the interwar years, the Hungarian Germans organized a society 
on the same lines as the Yugoslav Kulturbund. Called the Hungarian 
German Folk Educational Association (Ungarl:ndisch-Deutscher Volks-
bildungverein, UDV), it was formed in 1920 to take the place of the 
UDVP. Its leader was the much respected Professor Jacob Bleyer of the 
University of Budapest, who felt that its members should engage only 
in non-political cultural activities on the local level. He believed 
that the unity of Hungary could thus be reconciled with an honest 
recognition of the German nationality within Hungarian borders. Even 
the modest objectives of Bleyer were frustrated by Budapest. Con-
cessions made to the group were constantly whittled away. 126 One of 
Bleyer's critics angrily charged in 1932 that the UDV's policy of 
awaiting justice from the Hungarian government was hopeless. As far 
as he was concerned, there was a standstill in Hungary over minority 
. h 127 rig ts, Just before his death the next year. Bleyer admitted that 
h . f . h d b f . 1 128 is course o action a een ruit ess, The association lingered 
on until the late 1930's without noteworthy accomplishments, 
Among the special concerns of the Hungarian Volksdeutschen was 
minority education, A law of 1923 provided that parents of minority 
children should be able to choose among three kinds of schools: 1) A-
type~ with instruction in the mother tongue and Magyar as a subject, 
126Ibid,, pp. 69-72. 
127 Guido GlJndisch, Landpost (Pt°cs), May 29, 1932. (Typed copy), 
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2) B-type, with mixed language instruction, and 3) C-type, with instruc-
tion in Magyar and the mother tongue as a subject. Charges were made 
that the Hungarian government did not respect the decisions of parents 
and dictated types of school. In 1928, of the 463 schools for German 
children, only 49 were of the A-type, 98 of the B-type and fully 316 
129 
of the C-type. 
Under these repressive conditions, the Volksdeutschen moved in a 
radical direction as the 1930's progressed. An illegal committee with-
in the UDV led by Franz Basch split with the mother organization in 
1935. Basch, a young man of Danube Swabian parentage, held a doctorate 
in political science from the University of Budapest. For several 
years, his group fluorished without official recognition. Finally in 
1939, this Nazi organization, the German Ethnic League in Hungary 
(Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn, VDU) was accepted as the sole rep-
. b d f h G . . l 30 resentative o y o t e erman minority. The Nazification of the 
Hungarian Germans was completed, and the stage set for the redress of 
grievances. 
Concern for the Volksdeutschen in Hungary reached the highest 
quarters in Nazi circles. Hitler himself was aware of the policies 
practiced by Budapest toward them. He reminded Hungarian diplomats of 
his determination to protect Volksdeutsche from denationalization just 
131 
as he had reminded their Yugoslav colleagues. His protection did 
129Guido G~ndisch, Neues Politisches Volksblatt (Budapest), 
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not confine itself purely to legal channels, apparently, for Budapest 
bitterly complained in 1937 that Reich German agitators were causing 
unrest among the Volksdeutschen and that the minority was receiving 
132 
funds from Germany. 
Between 1938 and 1940, events in Hungary took a course which re-
63 
sulted in the increase of the volksdeutsche population. On November 2, 
1938, Hitler accorded to Hungary portions of southern Czechoslovakia. 
By this First Dictate of Vienna and its aftermath, 13,200 Germans were 
returned to Hungary. Nearly two years later, on August 30, 1940, the 
,, 
Second Dictate of Vienna was arranged by the Fuhrer. Under its terms, 
Rumanian territory, chiefly in Northern Transylvania, was returned to 
Hungary along with 60,000 Germans. 133 These new citizens swelled the 
1930 Volksdeutsch count in Hungary above 550,000. 
The January 31, 1941 census not only confirmed this iqcrease, but 
also the devitalization of ethnic German life under Magyar rule. As 
would be anticipated, 550,000 people identified themselves as German 
under the rubric in which they were asked to declare their nationality. 
However, the census also included a rubric in which respondents listed 
their mother tongue. Here 740,000 people, roughly five per cent out of 
the close to fifteen million in Hungary, were categorized as Germans. 
The 1941 figures thus measured the effectiveness of the Magyarization 
policies of Budapest under the Habsburgs and throughout the interwar 
years. The trend is even more pronounced, if one bears in mind that 
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G . h d . . 134 erman in t. e re-annexe territories. The losses to Germandom 
occurred in Hungary proper, not in Czechoslovakia nor Rumania. 
As a compensation for his largesse in awarding territory to the 
Hungarians, Hitler demanded that the Hungarians grant far-reaching 
rights to the Hungarian Volksdeutschen. A German Hungarian Protocol 
on this matter was signed on the same day as the Second Dictateo 135 
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By its clauses, the German way of life was to be preserved and expanded 
in Hungary. A Volksdeutscher was defined as one who professed his 
German nationality and was recognized by the VDU, The minority was 
accorded the right to have schools, representation in government, news-
papers, cooperatives and free cultural intercourse ;E~h Germany, In 
areas where Germans formed at least one-third of the population, 
Germans could be utilized as the language of official business, The 
Hungarian Germans had come a long way from Bleyer to Hitler, 
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Macartney, October Fifteenth, Vol, II, p, 153, 
135The text of this protocol can be found in: DGFP, Series D, 
Vol, X, pp, 584-586; and Margaret Carlyle, ed,, Documents on Inter-
national Affairs, 1939-1946. Vol, II, Hitler's Europe (London, 1954), 
pp, 322-324, 
CHAPTER II 
THE NAZIS AND THE YUGOSLAV VOLKSDEUTSCHEN: 
THE IDEOLOGY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION TO 
THE SUMMER OF 1941 
Why did the growing connection between the Nazi leadership in 
Germany and the German minority in Yugoslavia pose a threat to the 
South Slav state in the interwar years? The party symbols and organ-
izational plans adapted by volksdeutsch groups appearep innocuous 
enough at first. Even Berlin's intercession on behalf of the Volks-
deutschen, which resulted in unusual concessions to them, could be 
tolerated by the state without undue damage to its integrity. The rad-
ical commitment to the German nationality inherent in Nazism did not 
necessarily preclude loyalty to the Yugoslav state. In point of fact, 
however, Nazi ideology harbored concepts which cast Volksdeutsche as 
sinister figures in their host countries. In shimmering visions, Nazi 
thinkers planned the construction of a Teutonic hegemony over the non-
Germanic nations of the Continent. Southeastern Europe, composed of 
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, R'-lnania and Yugoslavia, formed a particular-
ly important part of this grandiose scheme. Wherever they lived, the 
Volksdeutschen would fulfill a pivotal role as agents of destiny. 
Never clearly formulated nor categorically expressed in the interwar 
years, these visions nonetheless had a profound impact upon Yugoslavia 
and its ethnic German citizens, 
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A succinct statement of Nazi ideology as it affected Southeastern 
Europe and the Volksdeutschen there can best be presented by first 
identifying the various strands which went into its making. Nothing 
that Hitler or his followers proposed in this regard sprang full-blown 
from their minds. They owed heavy debts to the past: the legacy of 
the Habsburg Empire, nineteenth century German thought, and speculation 
on the post-World War I era in Vienna and Berlin. Interwar historical 
scholarship in Germany and Austria as well as organizations on behalf 
of the minorities abroad also contribute to the formulation of the 
particular aspect of Nazi ideology under scrutiny here. Part One of 
this chapter will trace the design for German expansion in Southeastern 
Europe and the utilization of its German minorities to its roots. 
Typically, Nazi ideology was "a catch-all, a conglomeration, a hodge-
podge of ideas. 111 For this reason, it is very nearly impossible to 
isolate at what point a vague reference became a stated goal in Berlin. 
Yet, despite the abundant ambiguities, it is possible to trace certain 
broad outlines of Nazi purpose and to assess those theories Hitler held 
on this subject until the time of the invasion of April, 1941. 
Since the Nazi ideology which affected Yugoslavia and its German 
minority contained subversive components, the implementation of that 
ideology after Hitler's rise to power in 1933 was dualistic. On the 
one hand, Berlin followed accepted diplomatic practices for the benefit 
of the Germans in Yugoslavia, as has been discussed in Chapter One. On 
the other hand, strong evidence exists that the Nazis used these people 
1Martin Broszat, German National Socialism, 1919-1945, tr. Kurt 
Rosenbaum and Inge Pauli Boehm (Santa Barbara, 1971), p. 32. 
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to undermine the status quo, As the reality of German military might 
drew closer and closer toward Yugoslavia, the Volksdeutschen were swept 
down as helpless pawns into the Nazi vortex. Various possibilities for 
their future were bandied about in Berlin without any concern for their 
wishes or those of Belgrade. Once Hitler decided to destroy Yugoslavia 
as a political entity after the Simovich coup i'(tat of March 27, 1941, 
they were no longer a people with a voice in their fortunes, This 
condition, however, does not gainsay the observation that on the whole 
they submitted willingly to the F~hrer and with great expectations for 
material rewards, The treason in which they engaged mushroomed from 
sporadic manifestations in the early years of Hitler's rule i.nto total 
involvement with furtive Nazi aims by the late 1930's, His clandestine 
machinations succeeded in converting these people into outright, if 
often unconscious traitors to their state. How Hitler spun a web 
around the Germans who held Yugoslav citizenship will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Part I: The Ideology 
Because the Habsburg Empire had extended deeply into Southeastern 
Europe, it is not surprising that the earliest German preoccupation 
with this area emanated from Vienna rather than from Berlin, Certain 
Habsburg policies contributed to myths which could be readily developed 
to give historical precedent for German expansion there, In addition, 
the Germans of the Empire, who can be loosely called Austrian Germans, 
had already by the mid-nineteenth century, seized upon ideas which 
justified the attachment of non-German territory in the Southeast to 
the German heartland, As regards this part of Europe, the Nazi 
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heritage was more richly colored by the Austrian Germans than by the 
Germans of Germany proper, or Reich Germans. 
The introduction of colonists to fortify frontiers against the 
Turkish danger had been a hallmark of Habsburg imperialism" The 
Grenzer of the military border in Croatia-Slavonia and Southern Hungary 
became legendary in European history" They projected a romantic image 
of peasant-soldiers (Wehrbauern) organized into regimental communities 
for the defense of the state" That they were non-Germans serving the 
interests of a Germany dynasty did not tarnish their image" In point 
of fact, however, the loyalty of the Grenzer to the Habsburgs was prob-
ably seriously damaged by the national movements of the nineteenth 
century, and the success of their institution was consequently much 
2 
less than had been popularly supposed. 
The Schwabenzug of the eighteenth century also represented an 
ingenious use of human beings on the part of Vienna to extend control 
over a territory tenuously held. This enormous project to colonize 
Southern Hungary with German peasants was associated from its inception 
with the great Habsburg military leader, Prince Eugene of Savoy" That 
he was born a Frenchman of Italian parentage made his service to the 
Habsburgs no less heroic, and for most, no less German" His triumphs 
against the Turks at the Battle of Petrovaradin (Peterwardein) on 
August 5, 1716, and at the Battle of Belgrade on August 16, 1717 sur-
rounded his name with luster. No wonder that his support of coloniza-
tion projects was so widely.heralded" Eugene was interested in the 
2 
Gunther E, Rothenburg, "The Croatian Military Border and the Rise 
of Yugoslav Nationalism," Slavonic and East European Review, VoL XLIII 
(1964), p, 340 
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settlement of Germans in and around Belgrade, although he contributed 
only marginally to the plan for an Imperial Fortress at Belgrade, pro-
mulgated around 1720. 3 The proposed military garrison at the strategic 
Serbian capital to serve as a vanguard for the Empire never left the 
drawing-board stages. Nonetheless, it was among the many facets of the 
Habsburg legacy in the Danube, Sava and Drava valleys for which the 
prestigious ghost of Prince Eugene could be invoked in later centuries. 
Since the large-scale resettlement policies of the Habsburgs were 
not conceived to forward the German race ~ ~' they lacked the unmit-
igated German purpose found in a much smaller endeavor in Slovenia. 
The Grenzer were non-German, so the military border could hardly be 
characterized as German institution. The Swabians were only one of 
several ethnic groups invited to settle on Hungarian territory, so 
their history does not bespeak a single-minded German policy at the 
Hofburg. The need for settlers, regardless of what blood coursed 
through their veins, forced the administration of Vienna to follow the 
policies it did after the Turkish wars. But this was not true of a 
largely unknown settlement project of the S~dmark organization in Ipwer 
Styria. Its leaders began planning in 1890 to strengthen systematically 
the German element in the vicinity of Maribor. Between 1906 and 1914, 
they succeeded in purchasing nearly 2,500 acres (1,000 hectares) from 
Slovenes to accommodate 430 members of 75 German families imported from 
4 Austria and Germany. The project remained modest, despite the efforts 
3Hans Ulrich Wehler, "'Reichsfestung Belgrad': Nationalsozialist-
ische 'Raumordnung' in S~dosteuropa," Vierteljahrshefte f~r Zeitges-
chichte, Vol. II (1963), p. 78 fn. 
4Pock, Grenzwacht im S~dosten, pp. 8-9, 32-33; Matras, "Leistungs-
schau deutscher Volkstu;arbeit:"'T-81/Roll 559/5336040-45. 
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of its chief architect, Karl Fraiss. His goal of making Maribor a 
closed German settlement continguous to the main German settlements in 
Styria proper was thwarted by dissention among the members of the 
,, 5 
Sudmark. But a genuine precedent within the Habsburg Empire for pop-
ulation transfers in the interest of racial purity is contained in this 
venture, small though it was. 
The Habsburg Empire bequeathed to its successors not only histor-
ical models for German expansion into the Southeast, but also important 
intellectual antecedents to the concept of German living space there. 
At the Frankfurt National Assembly of 1848-1849, the Austrian Germans 
opposed the Reich Germans on the problem of which territories should be 
included in a unified Germany. Many Reich Germans espoused the 
kleindeutsch (little German) view that any consolidated German state 
should exclude Austria, with its close ties to non-Germanic populations. 
The Austrian Germans, on the other hand, advocated the grossdeutsch 
(great German) view that a new Germany should include at least the 
German lands of the Habsburg Empire. Much sentiment in this school 
supported the inclusion of all lands within the confines of the former 
Holy Roman Empire, despite the Slavs found dwelling there. Of the 
Yugoslav territories, Slovenia would thus be attached to Germany proper. 
According to this scheme, the excluded Habsburg lands, m~inly in Trans-
leithania, would somehow be associated with the German state in a con-
federation. Under the influence of Prussia, the kleindeutsch view 
prevailed at Frankfurt. Although the grossdeutsch view was defeated, 
it served as the inspiration for innumerable plans for the creation of 
5 h Pock, Grenzwacht im Sudost, pp. 47-48. 
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a unified Central Europe brought forward in the next century. 
How the grossdeuts,eh mentality was echoed in the Habsburg Empire 
after 1848-1849 is a topic too extensive for treatment here" The most 
renowned plans for the reorganization of the Empire and surrounding 
territories came from two influential statesmen of the post-
revolutionary decade. Both Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg and Baron 
Karl von Bruck expressed interest in a middle European economic union, 
for which the entire Habsburg Empire would provide the essential frame-
work and which would include all German lands" The merger of non-
German territory in Southeastern Europe with the German heartland re-
ceived early sanction in yet another form from Austrian German figures, 
As can be seen by their attitude at Frankfurt, most Reich Germans 
were in general disinterested in Southeastern Europe throughout the 
nineteenth century. Nonetheless, they evolved a pernicious ideology 
supporting German expansion to the East, which could easily be extended 
southward if political conditions so warranted. Further, two Reich 
German scholars, Friedrich List and Paul de Lagarde, towered over their 
Austrian German counterparts in anticipating the importance of the 
Danube basin to the German living space (Lebensraum), and their ideas 
did not fall on barren ground" The goals of the Pan-German League 
(All-deutscher Verband) attest to this judgment. Weighty contributions 
to Nazi ideology, which would in time touch the Volksdeutschen of 
Yugoslavia, were made within Germany in the pre-World War I era. 
On the crest of the national movement after the Napoleonic wars, 
many Reich Germans adopted a v~lkische philosophy which emphasized not 
only their uniqueness but which fused it inextricably with a sense of 
historic mission in the East" 
u 
Volkische ideas began with the romantic 
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notion that the union of a group of people was based upon an essence 
bound to man's nature. 6 All men of the same race and blood constituted 
an organic whole on the strength of their primeval origins, Once 
accepting the tenet that they formed a highly integrated and homage-
' neous ethnic community, some Germans proceeded to believe that they 
were superior to other ethnic elements, particularly the Slavs, Since 
they were paramount, they had a duty to carry culture to their less 
civilized neighbors, particularly those of Slavic Europe, The Drang 
nach Osten (Drive to the East) was thus clothed with an ethical imper-
ative, and the term "East" came to connote Polish areas bordering upon 
Germany, Up to 1914, the notion of a distinct German character coupled 
with a uniquely German mission remained latent as a "harmless" 
bourgeois-patriotic conviction. But from isolated roots, it could 
sprout with abandon under proper circumstances, 7 
If most Reich Germans neglected Southeastern Europe in the dis-
covery of their mission in the East, List and Lagarde did not, List, 
who published important works in the 1840's, was the oldest prophet of 
Mitteleuropa (Middle Europe), the vision of a political federation and 
economic union in the center of the European continent, 8 Including 
Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, it would be organized under 
German leadership. Lagarde, whose productive scholarship dates around 
the 1880 1s, was an advocate of extreme grossdeutsch views, but he 
6 George L. Masse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual 
Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1964), p, 4, 
7 Broszat, German National-Socialism, pp. 33-34. 
8 Meyer, Mitteleuropa, pp, 11-16, 
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exceeded their limits by suggesting that Germans had a right to colonize 
and reorganize Central Europe because they were "better men" than the 
others there. 9 Both Lagarde and List embarked upon an aggressive pol-
icy of German colonization along the Danube river in order to protect 
German interests. 
Among the few in pre-World War I Germany who heeded admonitions 
that the German future demanded a push toward the Southeast were mem-
hers of the Pan-German League, Organized in 1890, the small but influ-
ential group was dedicated to v~lkische ideals and the enlargement of 
German territory. The thrust of the League seemed to have been over-
seas and toward Poland, with little interest in the Habsburg Empire and 
Mo 1 10 itte europa. Nonetheless, the first president of the organization, 
Ernst Hasse, was inclined to include even Hungary within a qreater 
11 Germany. By 1914, others within the League favored expansion in the 
Danubian region. 12 The ideas of List and Lagarde were gaining ground. 
During World War I, the aims of Germany and Austria never crystal-
lized as to the fate of Southeastern Europe in the event of their 
victory. A 1914 program of the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann 
Hollweg was representative of German goals on the European continent. 
It called for a Mitteleuropa under the domination of the German Empire, 
the basis for which would be a customs and economic union between 
9 
Robert W. Lougee, Paul de Lagarde (1827-1891), ~Study of 
Radical Conservatism (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 184-193. 
10 
Meyer, Mitteleuropa, pp. 52-53, 109. 
11zwitter, Les probl~mes nationaux, p. 139. 
12William L. Langer, "When German Dreams Come True," Yale Review, 
Vol. XXVII (1937/1938), p. 686. 
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Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany would add territories in the West 
(Belgium and Lorraine) and in the East (Lithuania, Courland and Central 
Poland). A residual Polish state and Rumania would be attached to this 
superstate as satellites. Berlin seriously considered population re-
settlements in annexed Polish regions. Slavs would be expelled and 
Auslandsdeutsche from isolated outposts in the East settled there to 
build a "protective wall" of Germandon at the new eastern frontier. 13 
The government in Vienna also entertained proposals for expansion into 
Serbia and collided with Germany over the future of Poland. But its 
war aims remained basically defensive, since the very survival of the 
14 
monarchy was threatened. There was lively interest in Mitteleuropa 
in many circles of the Habsburg Empire, but the idea never achieved 
predominance in official policy. 15 By 1918 and especially after the 
victory over Russia, Germany became engrossed with her annexations in 
the East. Mitteleuropa with its projection of Reich German influence 
into the Habsburg area and beyond receded in importance, In the larger 
scheme, the future of Southeastern Europe formed only a minor facet in 
the postwar planning of the Central Powers. 
Although nothing came of it under the duress of war, the flurry 
over Mitteleuropa had a lasting effect on German intellectual history. 
The most popular version of the idea was presented in a book by 
Friedrich Naumann, which appeared in 1915. 16 Since it represented the 
13Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 
1967), passim. 
14rbid., pp. 310-311. 
15 Meyer, Mitteleuropa, pp. 150, 191, 
16Friedrich Naumann, Central Europe, tr. C. M. Meredith (New York, 
1917) 0 
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culmination of all prewar talk on the subject, it precepts took on un-
usual significance. Naumann envisioned a vaguely defined superstructure 
over existing states in Central Europe. His Middle Europe contained 
a German nucleus, but it guaranteed rights to non-Germans. His sup-
position that a political entity based upon German supremacy could be 
formed by free agreements among the various nationalities involved was 
. . h 17 naive in t e extreme. Naumann's ideas may have been the outpouring 
of a misguided liberal, but they were potent. In October, 1918, on the 
eve of his abdiction, Wilhelm II spoke of the inevitability of a 
C t 1 E d G . d l" . 1 1 18 en ra urope un er erman economic an po itica ru e. That the 
Emperor himself paid homage to the Mitteleuropa concept pointed clearly 
to the attraction which it would hold for many other Germans in the 
postwar decades. 
In the interwar years, the views of the Austrian Germans and the 
Reich Germans on Southeastern expansion merged. Both stood amid the 
ruins of their empires in truncated and economically endangered states, 
Because the Habsburg Monarchy with all of its non-German inhabitants 
was destroyed, the old rivalry between the kleindeutsch and grossdeutsch 
positions had become irrelevant. What mattered now was that all Ger-
mans should band together in search of a common destiny, The restless-
1 
ness which accompanied the Paris Peace Settlement gave the Drang nach 
Osten deeper meaning. The Germans of both Germany and Rump Austria 
needed to form new political and economic ties to rebuild their 
17Kann, Multinational Empire, Vol. II, p. 248. 
18 
Gregory F. Campbell, "The Kaiser and Mitteleuropa in October, 
1918," Central European History. Vol. II (1969), p. 378. 
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shattered world. 19 The concept of survival was grafted onto that of 
supremacy in regard to German expansion eastward. The heritage of the 
defunct Habsburg Empire as well as the ideological strides made by the 
Reich German thinkers in the pre-war and wartime years mingled with 
the realities of defeat. It became axiomatic that the term Ost implied 
the "Southeast" as well as "East" in German political thought, and it 
became increasingly difficult to separate its Austrian and Reich 
German strains. 
The eclipse of the German position in Europe was accentuated by 
an intensified interest in the German minorities abroad. The focus was 
toward Eastern and S.outheastern Europe, since fully seven million 
Auslandsdeutsche lived there in close proximity to the Fatherland. In 
reconstituted Poland and the successor states of the Habsburg Empire, 
many Germans found themselves under non-German regimes for the first 
time. Feeling oppressed, they reciprocated the warm professions of 
brotherhood extended to them from the German homeland. Studies on the 
Auslandsdeutschen were published in prodigious quantities, and work on 
their behalf (Volkstumarbeit) was undertaken by numerous organizations. 
Whether the acceleration of ethnic concern was consciously directed 
toward a specifically political end or not, it served to tie regions 
inhabited by Germans outside Germany and Austria to dreams for the 
German future. The frenzied efforts to identify and heighten German 
consciousness among the Volksdeutschen of Southeastern Europe buttress-
ed that ideology which had long justified German expansion into Danubia. 
19Felix Gilbert, "Mitteleuropa - The Final Stage," Journal of 
Central European Affairs, Vol. VII (1947), pp. 60-61. 
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The sheer mass of publications and organizations involved precludes a 
definitive review, A cursory consideration of the major historic-
graphical trends and of the principal agencies which engaged in Volks-
tumarbeit must suffice to indicate the German intellectual climate of 
the 1920's and 1930's. 
In the interwar years, a school of history which emphasized that 
the subject of German history should not be confined to the German· 
national state, but be expanded to include the German people wherever 
they lived gained prominence, At the very least, this approach re-
quired the recognition of a common national experience for Austrian 
and Reich Germans. Even kleindeutsch historians, who defended the 
Prussian solution to German unification, made this concession, Their 
concomitant approval of a union of Germany and Austria was generally 
20 seen as a move toward the grossdeutsch camp. Since so many varia-
tions of the grossdeutsch view were then extant, considerable confusion 
. 21 
over its meaning developed. Recognizing that the terms Grossdeutsch 
and Kleindeutsch brought up old, useless arguments, Heinrich Ritter 
von Srbik proposed calling the new historical school gesamtdeutsch 
(whole German), Under its precepts, which were amplified by Srbik, the 
German minorities in Eastern and Southeastern Europe have a dynamic 
function in the development of German history, For gesamtdeutsch 
historians, studies on German settlements everywhere were their 
20stanley Suval, "Overcoming Kleindeutschland: The Politics of 
Historical Mythmaking in the Weimar Republic," Central European History, 
Vol, II (1969), pp, 326, 330, 
'. :/ 
21 
Paul Sweet, "Recent German Literature on Mitteleuropa," Journal 
of Central European Affairs, Vol, III (1943), p, 14, 
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proper concern, 
In the wake of this elevation of the Volk over the state, histori-
cal studies on German minorities abroad multiplied, Even under the 
Weimar Republic, institutes and publishing houses dealing exclusively 
with these people were established. 22 By the beginning of the Nazi 
era, production surged into a veritable flood. One of the most impres-
sive works in the new German scholarship on the Volk was the Concise 
,, 
Dictionary of Germans at the Border and Beyond (Handworterbuch des 
23 
Grenz-und .Aus landsdeutschtums), Research for the project, which was 
scheduled to appear in five volumes, began in 1926 and involved 800 
employees, 24 Publication of the Handw~rterbuch was terminated with the 
outbreak of World War II, and it was completed only through the third 
volume. 
Another indication of the increasing preoccupation with Auslands-
deutschen can be gleaned from a perusal of the scholarly and highly 
respected journal, Historische Zeitschrift. Although little, if any-
thing, appeared on its pages about German minorities prior to 1937, a 
sudden shift toward gesamtdeutsche historiography is noticeable in that 
year, Possibly, a deliberate change in editorial policy was operative, 
" since Karl A, van Muller had succeeded Friedrich Meinecke as editor the 
year before, Srbik heralded the new direction with a defense of the 
gesamtdeutsch approach, It was followed with many contributions, 
220, J, Hammen, "German Historians and the Advent of the National 
Socialist State," Journal of Modern History, Vol. XIII (1941), p. 185, 
23carl Petersen et al,, eds. Handw~~terbuch des Grenz-und 
Auslanddeutschtums (3 vols., Breslau, 1933-1940). 
24Kleo Pleyer, "Ein Standbild aller Deutschen," Historische 
Zeitschrift, Vol. CLVIII (1938), pp. 541-549, 
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ranging from highly specialized articles on specific German communities 
abroad to theoretical surveys which touched on the role of the Auslands-
25 
deutschen in expansion to the East. Written with a strong national-
istic bias, most of these studies and the myriad others like them did 
d h h . d 26 not eserve t e notice t ey receive . 
A branch of the gesamtdeutsche school was devoted to the German 
minorities in Southeastern Europe, Austrian German historians, such 
as Srbik, R, F, Kaindl and Ha~old Steinacker, were the guiding spirits 
in the work undertaken in this direction. ,Especially after 1933, 
numerous research agencies and publications dedicated to Volkstum in 
. 27 
the Danubian region were formed. Among the notable organizations in 
support of such scholarship were the Southeast Institute (S~dost-
" Institut) in Munich and the Southeast-German Institute (Sudostdeutsch 
Institut) in Graz. An overview into the voluminous publication result-
ing from the inclusion of the Southeast in the gesamtdeutschen tradi-
tion can be found in a bibliography published by Anton Scherer on works 
appearing on the Danube Swabians between 1935 and 1955. The biblio-
graphy, which was abridged because of lack of space, lists fully 6770 
25H, von Srbik, "Zur gesamtdeutschen Geschichtsbetrachtung," 
Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. CLVI (1937), pp. 229-262; Pleyer, "Ein 
Standbild aller Deutschen," pp. 541-549; Valjavec, "Das .1:hteste 
Zeugnis," pp. 315-325; Hans Haussherr, "Verfassungstypen deutscher 
Volksgruppen im Auslande," Vol. CLX (1939), pp. 35-78; Pfitzner, "Die 
Grenz-und Auslandsdeutsche Bewegung," pp. 308-328; H. J. Beyer, "Haupt-
linien einer Geschichte der ostdeutschen Volksgruppen in 19, Jahr-
hundert," Vol, CLXII (1940), pp, 509-539; G. Krueger, "Um den 
Reichsgedanken," Vol. CLXV (1942), pp. 457-4i-71. 
26Fe lix Gilbert, "German Historiography during the Second World 
War," American Historical Review, Vol. LIII (1947), p. 56. 
27 Schechtman, "The Elimination of German Minorities," pp, 153-
154. 
. 1 28 tit es. 
covered. 
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Most of the entries date to the earlier of the two decades 
A fascinating sidelight to the gesamtdeutschen saga in the South-
east was the veneration of Prince Eugene of Savoy. A spate of publica-
tion on the Habsburg figure rolled from academic presses and cast him 
in the role of pioneer for the German national cause along the Danube. 
Although Eugene's Savoyard background made him a dubious symbol for 
the ideal, this fact did not deter the historical myth-making. 29 This 
trend was reflected in the pages of Historische Zeitschrift, where 
Eugene's chief biographer, Max Braubach, hailed him as a German nation-
al hero in 1936. More space was allotted to him in 1937 and 1940. 30 
The gesamtdeutsche school of historiography also made an ingenious 
attempt to solve the very practical problems posed by the widely voiced 
claim that Slovenia, more than any other region in the Southeast, 
rightfully belonged within Greater Germany. Although admitting that 
Slovenes were technically non-German, the propagandists attempted to 
convert them into Volksdeutsche of sorts. Theorists speculated that 
many of them could be counted as part of the whole German ethnic body 
because they were indifferent to their slavic blood and had a 11German 
outlook." These Slovenes formed a distinct race, called Wendish 
28 u 
Scherer, Donauschwabische Bibliography, pp. ix-x. 
29Paul R. Sweet, "Prince Eugene and Central Europe, 11 American 
Historical Review, Vol. LVII (1951), pp, 49-50, 52. 
30Max Braubach, "Prinz Eugen von Savoyen," Historische Zeitschrift, 
VoL CLIV (1936), pp. 17-31; Theodore Schieder, "Prinz Eugen und 
Friedrich der Grosse im gegenseitigen Bilde," Vol. CLVI (1937), pp. 
263-283; Max Braubach, "Der Lebensausgang des Prinzen Eugen, 11 Vol. 
CLXI (1940), pp. 42-61. 
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(Windisch), The pro-German or half-germanized Wends might be viewed 
as members of a dying Slavic nation. Martin Wutte first brought the 
distinction among Germans, Wends and Slovenes to the attention of the 
world in 1929. Throughout the thirties, German nationalistic propaganda 
was filled with references to the Wends and their eligibility for in-
clusion in the German realm. 31 If it was difficult ·to separate Germans 
from Slovenes, as in the census of 1910, it was even more awkward to 
separate Wends from Slovenes, for both spoke the same tongue. Scholars 
subsequently repudiated the spurious Windisch race theory, As Fran 
Zwitter has written, "One cannot objectively talk about any so-called 
32 
'Wends' ... for the Wends never existed as a definite ethnic group." 
But despite the drawbacks, Slovenes were given thoughtful consideration 
in the relentless ideological German drive to the Southeast, If they 
were not totally acceptable as Germans, at least they were on the 
fringes of the gesamtdeutschen tradition. 
The victory of the grossdeutschen and Mitteleuropa doctrines was 
implicit in the rage for gesamtdeutsche historiography. Beyond the 
union with Austria, many scholars of this school believed that the whole 
of eastern Europe was an area for possible German expansion on the 
foundation of the Auslandsdeutschen there. These authorities even 
accepted political responsibility for the preparation of future German 
annexations and argued that their studies would help to stimulate 
31John A. Arnez, Slovenia in European Affairs (New York, 1958), 
p, 87; Thomas M, Barker, The Slovenes of Carinthia (Washington, 1958), 
pp, 2-3, 41, 173, 275. 
32zwitter, "The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy," p. 171. 
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t . 1 . d d l" t t ' 1 b · · 33 I common na iona consciousness an e inea e na iona o Jectives, n 
their general scheme for the German future, they accorded a place for 
former Habsburg lands, The views of Srbik were both influential and 
representative on this score. Proclaiming that the Germans were the 
only people capable of uniting Middle Europe, Srbik assigned them a 
mission beypnd the traditional German living space. While allowing 
the Germans a nation-state, he denied this to other ethnic groups in 
the area. How Germans scattered widely among Magyars, Rumanians and 
Slavs could be united with the mainstream of Germandom remained the 
1 f 1 . 34 rea m o pure specu ation. Srbik and his followers were playing a 
variation on a theme long after its chords had first been struck by 
List, Schwarzenberg, Bruck, Lagarde and Naumann. 
Direct connections cannot be drawn from all the organizations 
engaged in Volkstumarbeit to the formulation of Nazi ideology, However, 
if they did not contribute to the emerging new outlook per ~ these 
groups served in its dissemination and acceptance, particularly through 
their publications. Note can be taken here of only the principal 
agencies for the propagation of German consciousness abroad which 
functioned under the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, and it must 
be remembered that these represent merely the tip of the iceberg, 
Interest in the German minorities abroad was keen among Weimer 
leaders, Three of the most important organizations for Volkstumarbeit 
were inaugurated under their auspices, The German Forei·gn Institute 
33Ronald J. Ross, "Heinrich Ritter von Srbik and 'Gesamtdeutsch' 
history," Review of Politics, Vol. XXXI (Jan, 1969), p. 100; Hammen, 
"German Historian8;11 pp, 183, 185. 
34rbid,, pp. 91-92, 105. 
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(Deutsches Ausland - Institut, DAI) had been formed in 1917 to counter-
act allied propaganda unfavorable to Germans and to promote trade. 
Excellently organized, this huge institute employed almost 700 people. 
The DAI's monthly journal, Der Auslandsdeutsche, later renamed 
Deutschtum im Ausland, carried scholarly articles on Germans abroad 
as well as news of contemporary affairs. The Association for Germandom 
Abroad (Verein fJ'r das Deutschtum im Ausland, VDA), in addition to pro-
meting unity between Germans in the Reich and abroad, was principally 
concerned with German schools in areas of mixed nationality. The 
Union of German National Groups in Europe (Verband der deutschen Volks-
gruppen in Europa) was formed secretly in 1922 with the approval of the 
German Foreign Ministry to agitate for cultural autonomy and legal 
equality for the German minorities. Its journal, Nation und Staat, 
b d . b d f 1 . b h . 35 came to e a soun ing oar or comp aints a out t eir treatment. 
When Hitler came to power, these organizations were rapidly Nazi-
fied. By 1934, the DAI had become a Nazi instrument under the leader-
ship of President Karl Strglin, the Nazi burgomaster of Stuttgart, and 
Secretary General Richard Csaki. Thereafter, it was widely regarded 
as a major source of Nazi propaganda. No student can have a complete 
view of volksdeutsche patterns before and during World War II without 
bearing in mind the role and significance of this institution. 36 Its 
efficient interoffice communication can be seen in the mimeographed 
weekly newsletter, Aussendeutscher Wochenspiegel, which was edited 
35MacAlister Brown, "The Third Reich's Mobilization of the German 
Fifth Column in Eastern Europe," Journal of'Central European Affairs, 
Vol. XIX (1959), p. 130. 
36Paikert, The Danube Swabians, pp. 109-110, 112-113. 
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under a "Confidential" stamp for its employees. The VDA, renamed the 
.. 
Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im.Ausland, also moved in a Nazi direction 
after 1933, although there was controversy as to whether its new bear-
37 ing was radical enough. The organization began publication of a 
monthly journal for its office holders, Volksdeutscher Ruf, which 
pretentiously prohibited the reproduction of its articles. Under Nazi 
pressure, the Union of German National Groups in Europe adopted an 
extreme platform demanding full autonomy for the German minorities 
abroad. Significantly, those who had helped to found the Union ceased 
to participate in it. 38 
The conversion of existing agencies to Nazi ends did not satisfy 
Hitler's lieutenants in charge of the Auslandsdeutschen. New ones were 
opened on their initiative. Two, which .became prominent, were the 
Liaison Office for Ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, VOMI) 
and the Foreign Organization of the National Socialist German Workers' 
Party (Auslands-Organisation der National-Sozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiter-Partei, AO der NSDAP). VOMI was a secret semi-party, semi-
state structure for coordinating activities relating to German minor-
ities. From 1938 to 1940, VOMI occupied a position on national minority 
questions superior to all government agencies, including the Foreign 
Office, Thereafter, it became an apparatus of the Elite Guard 
39 (Schutzstaffel, SS) of the NSDAP. The AO specifically dealt with 
German citizens abroad and, after the Anschluss of 1938, Austrian 
37 Brown, "Third Reich's Mobilization," p. 130. 
38rbid. 
39Ibid., pp. 130-131, 133, 135, 148. 
citizens abroad, but had nothing to do with Volksdeutschen. Created 
to impose Nazi orthodoxy upon the Reichsdeutschen outside Germany and 
to utilize them for national ends, its efficacy was muted by its sub-
ordination to the Foreign Office, at least until 1941. 40 
The appeals to Germans everywhere in the post-World War I world 
to maintain their ethnic unity were reinforced by the activities and 
propaganda of the numerous auslandsdeutschen organizations. Although 
they were based chiefly in Germany, they embraced all members of the 
German minorities abroad, even those who had formerly owed allegiance 
to the Habsburgs and who might properly consider Austria as their 
Fatherland, In picking up the fallen Habsburg standard, these groups 
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would of necessity absorb the prejudices of the Austrian Germans. The 
merger of the Austrian and Reich German opinions concerning the 
Danubian living space was given additional impetus for its final con-
summation, which occurred with the Anschluss, 
Well before the invasion of Yugoslavia in April, 1941, the Nazi 
position on Southeastern Europe had crystallized. In the first 
• 
instance, it was recognized that the Volksdeutschen there belonged to 
the German Volk. The gesamtdeutschen historians and the organizations 
for ethnic heritage made this maxim clear beyond a shadow of a doubt, 
In the second instance, it was understood that the area of their 
residence lay within the German living space, Here the Naxi obliga-
tion to the past became ponderous. Historical images such as Prince 
Eugene, the Schwabenzug and the Grenzer were invoked as symbols for the 
40rbid., pp. 129-132; Dietrich Orlow, The Nazis in the Balkans 
(Pittsburgh, 1968), pp. 131-133. 
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German future in the Southeast; while the grossdeutsche arguments at 
the Frankfurt National Assembly, the old watchword Drang nach Osten and 
the recent conceptions of Mitteleuropa were trotted out to give an 
aura of legitimacy to the Nazi aims, The assertion by the late Percy 
Ernst Schramm rings true for the entire Nazi perspective on the 
Southeast: 
Hitler's plans for the East reveal that he had no conception 
of the new realities 'which had been taking shape since the 
end of the First World War beyond the frontiers of the Reich, 
and that his dreams of territorial expansion were still 
completely dominated by nineteenth century conceptions,41 
The dual loyalties of the Volksdeutschen to both the state in 
which they lived and to their Fatherland suspended them between two 
worlds, Harold Steinacker expressed their dilemma poignantly: nsuch 
h 1 1 b 1 1 .. 42 men ave not on y two anguages, ut a so two sous.,. Nazi con-
cepts tended to swing the balance of this delicate equilibrium toward 
the German side, They taught that citizenship in a non-German state 
was but a secondary affiliation for Germans living outside the Reich, 
All Germans living outside the Reich, regardless of what passports they 
carried, were to consider themselves as Germans first. 43 The extreme 
danger which this approach posed to the Volksdeutschen of Southeast 
Europe can be seen no more clearly than in the recruitment drives for 
the Waffen-SS, This fully militarized division of the SS was begun in 
1939 and opened its ranks to Volksdeutschen, even though they were 
41Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader, 
tr, Donald S, Detwiler (Chicago, 1971), p, 102. 
42s ' k A H . 302 teinac er, ustro- ungarica, p. . 
43 F, Elwin Jones, The Attack from Within (London, 1939), p. 90, 
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citizens of other countries, As "Himmer's European Army," it was 
44 designed to forge one allegiance among all Germanic peoples. The 
Nazis invited the Volksdeutschen to move in a direction which could 
easily be interpreted as traitorous to the state in which they lived, 
Just exactly how the Germans of Southeastern Europe would be tied 
to the Cerman state was never decided. The first step of the Nazi 
blueprint for a New Order in Europe, according to the First Article 
of the Nazi party platform of 1920, was an extension of the frontiers 
of Germany to include all Germans, In a conference with his generals 
on November 5, 1937, Hitler declared that the German people had a 
right to greater living space than other peoples, In outlining his 
plans for Central Europe in considerable detail, he explained, however, 
that Germany would not expand in territory beyond the numerical 
45 
strength of the German people. Isolated islands of Auslandsdeutschen, 
which would serve as outposts of the Reich, would be included in its 
organization, According to guidelines for a Nazi training course of 
early 1938: 
Greater Germany is a racial concept, not a section of state 
frontiers,, ,It will embrace all areas of Central Europe 
which by language belongs to the German-speaking area, and 
beyond this the German cultural region and all areas formerly 
settled by Germans.46 
Portions of land along the Danube from Belgrade to the Black sea fit 
into this category, Strategic-geographic considerations increased the 
44Hans A, Schmitt, European Union: 
(New York, 1969), pp, 27-28, 
From Hitler to de Gaulle 
45 
Rossbach Memorandum, November 10, 1937, DGFP, Series D, VoL I, 
pp. 29~39, 
46Quoted in Jones, Attack from Within, p, 63, 
88 
likelihood that they would be given the status of Reich territory, 
The rest of the Balkans would be delegated to satellite states which 
would be economically exploited and dominated by Berlin in cooperation 
with Rome, 
Through a radical readjustment of the geographic and demographic 
map of Europe, German blood was to be consolidated, From within the 
limits of Greater Germany, all non-Germans would be expelled to build 
an ethnically homogeneous state, Although the Nazis would tolerate 
sites for German settlement which were non-contiguous with the Reich, 
they would so so selectively. In his Reichstag speech of October 6, 
1939, Hitler said: 
The most important task (is) to establish a new order of 
ethnographic conditions, that is to say, resettlement of 
nationalities in such a manner that the process ultimately 
results in the obtaining of better dividing lines than is the 
case at present ... The east and south of Europe are to a large 
extent filled with splinters of the German nationality, whose 
existence they cannot maintain. 
In their very existence lie the reason and cause for con-
tinual international disturbances, In this age of the principle 
of nationalities and of racial ideals, it is utopian to believe 
that members of a highly developed people can be assimilated 
without trouble, 
It is therefore essential for a far-signted ordering of 4 7 
the life of Europe that a resettlement should be undertaken, 
In other words, Hitler advocated moving widely scattered Germans into 
the Fatherland in the interest of peace, They would fill the places 
vacated by the expelled non-Germans, Resettlement plans made in Berlin 
during World War I were clearly revitalized, 48 Precisely which Germans 
would stay in the Southeast to fulfill the historic German mission and 
47Hitler, ~New Order, pp. 737-738. 
48Hajo Holborn, "Origins and Political Character of Nazi Ideology," 
Political .Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX (1964), p. 552, 
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which would return home to the Reich (Heim ins Reich) was not 
specified. 
Part II: The Implementation of the Ideology 
The aspects of Nazi ideology which involved the Volksdeutschen of 
Yugoslavia in a far-reaching realignment of the political and economic 
structure of Southeastern Europe did not remain in the realms of 
abstract thought between January, 1933 and April, 1941. Berlin's 
double-tracked policy provided for illegal, undercover elements working 
for the eventual dismemberment of the South Slav state. Although the 
pervasiveness of the Nazi doctrines among the Volksdeutschen was by no 
means complete, the ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia abetted this subver-
sion, if only by silent acquiescence. They had no real power to oppose 
Berlin, and voices raised against the Nazis were few and far between 
even in the beginning. Although they were uncertain as to just what a 
German hegemony in the Balkans might bring them, the majority of the 
Volksdeutschen became docile accomplices to Nazi aggression at the 
moment of truth when German troops entered their country. They were 
amply rewarded for their loyalty to the Fatherland in Hitler's arrange-
ments for Yugoslav territory. They were dealt with in a manner totally 
in accord with .J'olkischen principles, and they were delighted by this 
solicitude in the spring of 1941. Berlin engineered the implementation 
of Nazi ideology in Yugoslavia, but the Volksdeutschen there were 
responsible in part for Nazi success. 
Until the coup £'{tat in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, Hitler stead-
fastly maintained that he wanted to preserve the integrity of Yugoslav-
'' ia. In a conference with Stoyadinovich in early 1938, the Fuhrer 
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avered that his territorial aims ended at the Austro-Yugoslav border as 
bl . h d b h . f S G ' d T · 49 esta is e y t e treaties o t. ermain an rianon. Hitler re-
affirmed this resolve to the world on October 6, 1939, before the 
Reichstag: 
Immediately after the @schluss _beqi.ine· an accomplished 
fact I informed Yugoslavia that the frontier in common with 
that country would henceforth be regarded as unalterable by 
Germany and that we wished only to live in peace and friend-
ship with that country.SO 
In a brief for the Hitler-Stoyadinovich interview, a Foreign Office 
official spoke of "efforts made by the German government since 1933 to 
develop systematically economic and thereby also political relations 
51 with countries of Southeastern Europe." For the time being, Germany 
would be satisfied to include Yugoslavia in its sphere of influence on 
an economic basis, 
Despite his pronouncements to leading statesmen and the world at 
large, Hitler had other plans for Yugoslavia. That Nazi agencies with-
in the Reich intruded boldly into internal Yugoslav affairs can be seen 
in the complaints by von Heeren that this agitation was complicating 
his work" Between 1925 and 1937, he returned money and propaganda 
material received by diplomatic mail from the DAI and other agencies, 52 
In April, 1939, the German minister indignantly objected to distur-
bances perpetrated by the Renovators, who hinted that they were acting 
49Minutes by von Heeren, January 17, 1938. DGFP, Series D, Vol, 
v, pp, 228-229, 
SOHitler, ~New Order, p. 743. 
51Brief for Hitler-Stojadinovich talks, January 7, 1938. DGFP 
Series D, Vol. V, pp. 217-218. 
52Paikert, The Danube Swabians, p. 274. 
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on instructions from Berlin. Stirring up the Volksdeutschen was polit-
ically undesirable, he counselled.s3 Berlin's orchestration of v'olks-
deutsch agitation is conclusively seen in a Foreign Office note issued 
two days after von Heeren's complaint. VOMI would heed orders to keep 
the German national groups in Yugoslavia quiet.s4 Von Herren could be 
judged as an honorable diplomat properly concerned with the integrity 
~ 
of his ministry, were it not for recommendations he made after the 
change of premiers in Belgrade in February, 1939. He advised the 
German Foreign Office to reassess its attitude toward the Croatian 
question. By replacing Stoyadinovich with Cvetkovich, von Heeren post-
ulated, Prince Regent Paul had significantly weakened the Yugoslav 
government. Because of the instability in Belgrade, Berlin should 
watch out for its own interests and begin a press campaign in Croatia 
advocating self-determination of nations.SS Hitler's words that he 
wished only to live in peace and friendship with Yugoslavia sound 
hollow in view of the intrigue which not only surrounded but enveloped 
the German diplomatic mission in Belgrade. 
The culpability of the Volksdeutschen in these perfidious develop-
ments ultimately rests on the extent of their involvement with the Nazi 
movement. Since the Kulturbund was the foremost volksdeutsche organ-
ization, how it was received by the German population after Nazifica-
tion in 1939 becomes a question of overriding importance. One 
s3Dispatch from von Heeren, April 13, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
VI, pp. 234-23S. 
s 4Note by Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department, April 
15, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. VI, p. 2S6. 
SSPolitical report by von Heeren, March 7, 1939. DGFP, Series D, 
Vol. V, pp. 411~412. 
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indication of its reception is the resistance to the pro-Nazi Reno-
vators by the older generation of Kulturbund leaders. When the Nazi 
era opened, the rank and file members apparently supported their duly 
constituted officers. At the annual assembly of the Union held in 
December, 1934, the Renovators received only ten votes of the 75 cast 
in elections. Keks affirmed that if all 129 Ortsgruppen had been rep-
56 resented at the meeting, the vote would have been 119 to ten. Recent 
German scholars of distinction have maintained that this diffidence 
toward radical Nazi infiltration was characteristic of the Kulturbund 
f h . . . d 57 or t e entire interwar perio . But such a position is untenable in 
view of the fact that its membership soared after Nazification. 
Possibly, as Wuescht argues, there was a substantive difference between 
the national socialism followed by the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen and the 
the Reichsdeutschen. The former were too religious to follow whole-
heartedly the doctrines of the latter; they only paid lip-service to 
58 Nazi slogans. Yet, in the two years immediately prior to the in-
vasion, the vast majority of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen prostrated 
themselves before the Behemoth in Berlin. They accepted the essence of 
the Nazi movement, and for this they must be held accountable. 
The Nazi infiltration of ethnic German life encountered little 
resistance in the German community. Only the Catholic weekly, Die 
Donau, engaged in open combat with the new ideas from the Teutonic 
North. An article in its August 24, 1940, issue, under the heading 
56 Letter of Keks, February 14, 1935. T-81/Roll 444/5196363-6. 
57schieder, Dokumentation der Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 38E-41E. 
58wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, pp. 254, 257-259; 
Beitrag zur Geschichte, pp. 49-50. 
"Catholics! Think this over Once Calmly," indicates the tenor of its 
position. Written in a simple style to appeal to peasants, it warns 
them against the neo-pagan wolves at their doors. The Renovators are 
specifically attacked, but the implications involve the whole Nazi 
world view. 
One certainly need not demonstrate to you further that 
the so-called Renovators aspire with all earthly means to 
undermine the prestige of the priests, to make the people 
mistrustful of their priests and to separate the people 
from their priests as far as possible. Must that be so? 
Yes. From the standpoint of the so-called Renovation Move-
ment, which confesses to the so-called ''new German world 
view", there is no other way. They will stamp Christianity 
root and branch out of the soul of the German people, for 
only on the ruins of the Christian world view can this 59 
movement build up the neo-pagan world view in our people. 
The article proceeds to denounce the imprisonment of the Protestant 
pastor, Martin Niemoller, for his political convictions. Had more 
German language newspapers in Yugoslavia followed such editorial 
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policies, the evidence that the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen were insincere 
in their attachment to the Nazified Kulturbund would be much more con-
elusive, 
The commitment to Nazi ideology increased "fifth column" activ-
ities among members of the German minority as World War II began. The 
incessant propaganda reminding the Volksdeutschen of their German her-
itage could hardly help but stir them to aid the embattled Fatherland. 
The Yugoslav government seemed incapable of combatting espionage, which 
was particularly prevalent in Slovenia. There Kulturbund members re-
ported on the Yugoslav economy, the administration, the armaments 
industry, the army and the police to German intelligence headquarters 
59nie Donau, August 24, 1940. 
in Graz, Klagenfurt, Salzburg and Vienna. 60 
Charges of treason against the Volksdeutschen centered on their 
military affiliations. After the Waffen-SS was organized, many young 
men of ethnic German blood were reputed to have illegally crossed the 
Yugoslav border to join its ranks. 61 Further, the Volksdeutschen 
formed local para-military units known as German Companies (Deutsche 
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Mannschaften, DM) well before April, 1941. This militia, modeled after 
the Storm Troops (Sturm Abteilung, SA) of the Nazi Party in Germany, 
was concerned not only with self-defense but with goals contrary to the 
62 
interests of the Yugoslav state. Men over 21 years of age and some-
times younger served in these alarm units in emergencies; otherwise, 
they fulfilled their usual civilian duties. Before April, 1941, these 
armed groups in the Banat were called Sports Teams (Sportmannschaften). 
63 Later they received the DM label. After Hitler resolved to destroy 
the South Slav state on March 27, 1941, volksdeutsche males of draft 
age were placed in an exceedingly precarious position. The next day 
an order from Hitler instructed them to evade the Yugoslav draft, and 
the majority of them did so. 64 If volksdeutsche enlistments in the 
Waffen-SS and the DM do not clearly constitute treason to the Yugoslav 
60Biber, Nacizem i Nemci, pp. 229-251, 434; Ferenc, "Le Syst)me 
d'occupation des Nazis-en Slov(nie," pp. 52-53. 
61Paikert, The Danube Swabians, p. 276. 
62schieder, Dokumentation der Vertreibung, Vol. V, p. 47E; Biber, 
Nacizem i Nemci, pp. 251-267, 434-435. 
63sandor Vegh, "Le Syst~me du Pouvoir d'Occupation Allemand dans 
le Banat Yougoslave 1941-1944," tr.-Madeleine Stevanov-Charlier, in 
Brajovich, Les Syst~mes i'Occupation en Yougoslavie, pp. 547-548 fn. 
64schieder, Dokumentation der Vertreibung, Vol. V, p. 46E. 
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state, obedience to a foreign head of state in defiance of the draft in 
the last ten days before the German invasion does. 
Before April 6, 1941, the future of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen in 
the Nazi New Order was uncertain. Hitler's speech of October 6, 1939, 
by which he introduced his program of mass transfers of population, 
sent the Yugoslav Germans into an uproar. 65 Baron van WeizsHcker, 
State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, hastily sought to reassure the 
Yugoslav Germans that no immediate population exchanges were imminent. 
Only voluntary repatriates were wanted in Germany, he explained, and 
minority problems in Yugoslavia were not acute enough at the present 
' 1 66 time to warrant resett ement. The German press in Yugoslavia moved 
energetically against speculation involving the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen. 
The Deutsches Volksblatt of Novi Sad differentiated between German 
minorities which were too small and scattered to survive on their own 
and those amenable to a solution of the national question. The Yugo-
slav Germans belonged to the latter type. The Weisskirchner Volksblatt 
of Bela-Crkva attributed rumors that the Yugoslav Germans would be re-
settled to anti-German troublemakers. 67 The Gottscheer Zeitung denied 
that the Kor.evje Germans would be transferred from their homes. 68 It 
would be two more years before Hitler's program would directly affect 
the ethnic Germans of Yugoslavia. 
65 Report from van Heeren, October 22, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol, 
VI II , p . 3 3 2 . 
66 II 
Weizsacker to von Heeren, October 28, 1939. DGFP, Series D, 
Vol. VIII, p. 352. 
67sl/dost-Pressebericht, November 12, 1939. T-81/Roll 322/2453465. 
68 ti 
Sudost-Pressebericht, November 20, 1939. T-81/Roll 322/2453506. 
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Despite the reassurances, rumors were reinforced by Hitler's 
progress in the realignment of Europe. The construction of Greater 
Germ~ny had been carried to virtual completion by the summer of 1940. 
Additions to the German Lebensraum included: Austria, fully amalga-
mated in 1938; Bohemia and Moravia, associated as a Protectorate in 
1939; the western section of Poland, incorporated in 1939; and Alsace, 
Lorraine and Luxembourg, occupied in 1940 and scheduled for incorpora-
tion. Further, by 1941, extensive resettlement had been undertaken in 
the annexed Polish areas. A wholesale clearing of the non-German 
population had been accomplished there, and confiscated property was 
being distributed to people of German blood brought into the Reich from 
the Baltic states, Italy, Russia and the Balkans. Moreover, Volks-
deutsche from Southeastern Europe traveled through Yugoslavia toward 
sorting camps in Germany. There were Bessarabians and North Bukovinans 
resettled by the Soviet-German treaty of September 5, 1940 and South 
Bukovinans and residents of Northern Dobruja resettled by the Rumanian-
German treaty of October 22, 1940. They were visible portents to the 
Yugoslav Germans of what Hitler might have in mind for them. 
For this massive rearrangement of human material, an enormous ad-
ministrative network was required. It was proyided by the Reich 
Commission for the Consolidation of the German Ethnic Heritage (Reichs 
Kommissariat £tr die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, RKFDV). Created by 
decree on October 7, 1939, the day after Hitler's proclamation on re-
n 
settlement, the Commission was entrusted to Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich 
Himmler. Himmler was charged with the triple responsibility for organ-
izing the return to Germany of Reichsdeutschen and Volksdeutschen from 
various European countries, for eliminating harmful foreign national 
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splinter groups within the Reich, and for creating new German colonies 
by resettlement. His RKFDV system came to have unlimited authority in 
designating areas of resettlement and in screening populations to 
determine who might be German, who might be reeducated to Germandom, 
and who would be relegated to the status of "helots. 1169 
The organizational lines of the RKFDV gradually emerged as SS 
officers were assigned by Himmler to carry out the provisions of the 
October 7 decree. On June 11, 1941, the Main Staff Office (Stabshaupt-
amt) was formally constituted in Berlin under the leadership of SS-., 
Obergruppenfuhrer Ulrich Greifelt. Greifelt became in effect Himmler's 
executive officer for the whole proliferating RKFDV system. His office 
was divided into six main departments (Hauptabteilungen): (I) Alloca-
tion of Human Resources (Menscheneinsatz), (II) Administration of 
Resettler Installation, (III) Indemnity Payments, (IV) Finances, (V) 
Central Land Office and (VI) Colonization Activities. 70 
Many organizations cooperated with the RKFDV in resettlement work 
with the understanding that Himmler was the final authority on all 
Volkstum questions. VOMI was pressed into service on behalf of the 
colossal project, The Central Immigration Office (Einwandererzentral-
stelle, EWZ) was a multi-agency processing organization for incoming 
resettlers. Its special train was in effect a transportable office for 
carrying out the extensive paper work involved in mass population 
69Robert L. Koehl, RKFDV, German Resettlement and Population 
Policy, 1939-1945 (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 31-33. The text of the decree 
appears on pp. 247-249. It is also found in Carlyle, Documents, 1939-
1946, Vol. II, pp. 2-4. 
70 Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945 
(New York, 1946), p. 272. 
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transfers, Other branches of the SS played prominent roles in the re-
settlement program. Involved in the brutal work of deporting undesir-
able foreign elements were the Race and Settlement Main Office 
(Rasse-und Siedlungshauptamt, RuSHA); the Security Service (Sicher-
heitsdienst, SD) and the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicher-
heitshauptamt, RSHA). The German Resettlement Trustee Company 
(Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft, DUT) was a bank formed by 
Himmler to provide resettlers coming into the Reich with property 
equivalent to that left behind. The multitudinous organizations under 
the RKFDV umbrella undoubtedly led to the complications which were the 
hallmark of the entire institution. 71 
Fears on the part of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen that they were 
not exempt from resettlement were partially justified, A memorandum 
dated June 27, 1940, written by the chief of VOMI and found in the 
f 1 d f h f h ' l' 72 Foreign Of ice fi es, slate certain o t em or t is eventua ity, 
It was envisioned that Slovene areas bordering on Styria and Carinthia 
would be incorporated into the Third Reich, should Yugoslavia disinte-
grate. These would be attached to Styria and Carinthia, both 
Reichsgaue since the Anschluss had dissolved Austria. Volksdeutsche to 
the South of the new Reich borders would probably fall into the Italian 
sphere of influence. These people, located in the Ko'tevje district, 
Croatia and Bosnia, could be resettled, according to the memorandum. 
71 Helmut Krausnick, et al,, Anatomy of the SS State, tr, Richard 
Barry, Marion Jackson, Dorothy Long (New York, 1968), p, 278. 
72schieder, Dokumentation der Vertreibung, Vol. V, p. 4E; Wuescht, 
Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 250. An extract of the memorandum 
appears in Wuescht, pp, 288-289. 
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For the numerous Yugoslav Germans in the Voivodina, Srem and Slavonia, 
another solution seemed possible. Rumors had run rife since the end 
of 1939 that their settlements qualified for elevation as Reich terri-
tory outside the Reich. They were to remain in the environs of 
Belgrade to form a state under German protection along with neighboring 
German minorities in Hungary and Rumania. This state was variously 
called the Prince Eugene Province (Prinz Eugene-Gau) and the Danube 
73 State (Donaustaat). The Hungarians feared this utilization of 
Danubian land, which they claimed as their own. Before his suicide, 
Telecki wrote about his anxiety over a German state carved out of the 
Batschka, the Banat, portions of Transylvania and possibly Baranja. 74 
Unquestionably, Nazi officials seriously considered a German protector-
ate around Belgrade, Plans along these lines were developed by the AO 
and VOMI. 75 The June 27, 1940 memorandum spoke of a "uniform arrange-
ment" for the Volksdeutschen there, who were then divided among Yugo-
slavia, Hungary and Rumania. 76 The ideas of List and Lagarde for 
German colonization along the Danube were resurrected for the twentieth-
century Volksdeutschen of the Voivodina, Srem and Slavonia. 
As the future of the Yugoslav Germans was contemplated in Berlin 
with little concern for their wishes, so was the use made of them to 
justify the German invasion of Yugoslavia. In a rapid mobilization of 
journalistic talent between March 27 and April 6, the Germans filed 
73wehler, "Reichsfestung Belgrad," pp. 73-74, 
74R, V, Burks, "Two Telecki Letters," Journal of Central European 
Affairs, Vol. VII (1947), p. 72. 
75wehler, "Reichsfestung Belgrad," pp. 73-74 fn, 
76 Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 289. 
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innumerable news stories about "Serbian terror" against the Volks-
deutschen. The tactic was an exact replica of the German campaign of 
vilification against the Poles in the final days of August, 1939. 77 In 
" a March 31 issue, Volkischer Beobachter described outrages 
against the Volksdeutschen of Maribor and Novi Sad. The so-called 
excesses in Maribor seemed harmless enough, since they merely involved 
78 spitting on a rock marked "Germany" and trampling on Swastika bands. 
According to V~lkischer Beobachter four days later, anti-German mani-
festations in Slovenia deteriorated dramatically. Volksdeutsche 
settlements in Carniola were reported burned down and Volksdeutsche 
' . d ' . 79 imprisone in concentration camps. The implications of the article 
was clear: Hitler would have to rescue the German minority in Yugo-
slavia. 
The accuracy of these reports cannot be confirmed. The belief 
/'' 
that the Volksdeutschen were endangered by the anti-German aspects of 
~ the March 27 coup i'etat was probably justified, but only to a slight 
degree, An eye-witness reported that it was no longer possible for 
Volksdeutsche to speak German on the streets in the Banat and that 
80 
Germans had been murdered by Serbian terrorists there. As a conse-
quence of such harassment, WeizsRcker ordered the Reich German colony 
77Leigh White, The Long Balkan Night (New York, 1944), p. 216. 
78 •• 
Volkischer Beobachter (Berlin), March 31, 1941. 
79 ,, 
Volkischer Beobachter (Berlin), April 4, 1941. 
80 Report of evacuee, who fled from Banat into Germany on March 31, 
1941, no date (April, 1941?). T-81/Roll 544/5315585. 
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81 to depart from Yugoslavia on March 31, However, Berlin's accusation 
of large-scale atrocities was fabricated. Even the German Counsul-
General in Ljubljana objected to the maneuvers of his government, 
Dr. Hans Broch denied radio reports from Germany that the situation of 
the Germans in Slovenia was critical and expressed appreciation for 
the protection extended to them by the Slovene authorities, 82 
When the Germans attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, the German 
minority in Yugoslavia was disposed to support the invaders, They had 
' 
given tacit approval to Nazi doctrines earlier by joining the Kultur-
bund and German military formations, If a few were apprehensive that 
they would be resettled in some distant corner of Europe, most believed 
that they would remain in their homes and prosper under Reich auspices, 
In the days immediately prior to the invasion, with the press campaign 
emphasizing the South Slavic hatred for them, the Volksdeutschen turned 
more resolutely toward Berlin than ever before. They were frankly 
. d h ' 1 f G ' h ' · · 83 I overJoye at t e arriva o erman troops int eir communities. n 
h B h k . d d l' 84 t e anat, t e attac ers were receive as e iverers. 
Evidence exists that DM or other volksdeutsche formations gave aid 
to the advancing German army, even to the point of seizing control of 
certain districts before its arrival. The most famous volksdeutsche 
81order of Weizs~cker, March 31, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
p, 425. 
82 Der Bund (Bern), April 7, 1941. (Typed copy). T-81/Roll 544/ 
5315789;.White, The Long Balkan Night, p. 216. 
83 Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 263. 
84 Report of Friedrich Becker, July/August, 1941. T-81/Roll 544/ 
5316589-93, 
1Q2 
action was the seizure of the military airport at Zemun outside 
Belgrade on April 12 by men from nearby Franztal. Those whd bel:j..eve 
that the DM was formed after the German-Yugoslav war was over explain 
this accomplishment as a holding operation by a few armed men organ-
ized spontaneously for self-defense who took custody of the airport 
after Yugoslav troops had evacuated. 85 This interpretation is· incon-
sistent with a report made for the DAI shortly after the event. 
86 
Al-
though no DM unit was mentioned, the Franztal Volksdeutschen were not 
organized spontaneously when the war broke out. For several months 
before, v~lkische renovation had made great strides in the community. 
A World War I veteran, Fritz Runitzky, had drilled the youth in an 
athletic corps. In order to secure the safety of Franztal so close to 
a major military target, Runitzky led the assult on the airport with 
between 200-300 men. Facing armed Serbians at the ratio of one to 
fifteen, these men seized the installation and took 4,500 captives. 
The German troops arrived sixteen hours after the fighting had begun 
and eight hours after it was completed. The Zemun airport incident and 
similar ones were not decisive in the unconditional surrender of Yugo-
slavia on April 17, but they placed the Volksdeutschen on the winning 
side for the time being. 
On April 12, Hitler circulated a directive for splitting up 
Y 1 . 87 ugos avia. Although various clauses were adjusted in the next 
85 Wuescht, Betrag zur Geschichte, pp. 69-70, 83-86. 
. -
86 Report of Karl Goetz delivered by Dr. Nollau, May 19, 1941. 
T-81/Roll 544/5316317-22. 
87 Carlyle, Documents, 1939-1946, Vol. II, pp. 329-331. 
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months, it was authoritative in establishing new territorial lines. 
(See Map 7). The most important feature of the political reorganiza-
tion was the newly-established Independent State of Croatia. Further, 
Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary were rewarded for their participation or 
cooperation in the war against Yugoslavia with grants of land which 
they had either ruled in the past or claimed. Germany itself extended 
its borders into Slovenia and assumed power in Rump Serbia. 88 
Although much of Slovenia was absorbed into the Third Reich, both 
Hungary and Italy received portions of it. (See Map 9). Lower Styria, 
increased to the south by a strip of about ninety kilometers in breadth 
and ten to fifteen kilometers in depth, was reincorporated into 
Reichsgau Styria. The addition comprised land in Lower Carniola 
(Unterkrain, Basse-Carniole). The parts of Carinthia lost in 1919 
v 
(the Meza Valley, D~~vograd and the Commune of Jezersko) and Upper 
Carniola (Oberkrain, Haute-Carniole), were placed under the administra-
tive control of Reichsgau Carinthia. Because the various Carinthian 
gains in 1941 were administered as a unit, for purposes of simplifi-
cation the term Upper Carniola will henceforth include them, unless 
specified otherwise. The line delineating Upper Carniola from that 
part of Carniola awarded to Italy, called the Province of Ljubljana 
(Lubiana) by the Italians, ran to the south of the upper course of the 
Sava river, but north of Ljubljana. Hitler re~tored the Upper Mur area 
to the Hungarians. 
The directive specified that Croatia would become an independent 
state "within its ethnographical boundaries." Much negotiation was 
88circular of the Foreign Ministry, May 17, 1941. DGFP, Series 
D, Vol. XII, pp. 842-844. 
105 
undertaken among the Croats, Italians, Germans and Hungarians to estab-
lish just what these would be. By mid-May, agreement seemed to have 
been reached, although Eastern Srem remained under Germany military 
occupation until October 10, 1941. To the disappointment of the Croats, 
a large portion of Dalmatia and some of the Croatian littoral went to 
the Italians, and the Lower Mur region reverted to Hungary. Nonethe-
less, Croatia-Slavonia, largely as it existed in Habsburg days, was 
augmented considerably by the addition of some of the Dalmatia and all 
of Bosnia. (See Map 8). The dreams of the most extreme Croatian 
nationalists were substantially fulfilled. 
Not all of the Yugoslav territory which they had held under the 
Habsburgs was returned to the Hungarians. In addition to the Mur 
regions, they received the Baranja triangle and the Batschka, but not 
the Serbian Banat. Here complications posed by the Rumanians, who 
were also allied to Hitler, precluded Budapest's acquisition of this 
region. The Hungarians were furious because Hitler had reversed him-
self on the issue. 8~ On April 3, he had directed that Hungary should 
occupy the Serbian Banat in preparation for its re-incorporation into 
90 the Magyar state. Yet in the April 12 directive, he stipulated that 
the area east of the river Tisa would be placed under German protection. 
The next day, he admonished Horthy to keep Hungarian troops out of the 
89German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to Erdmannsdorf, 
April 14, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, p. 551. 
90Hitler's Directive of April 3, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
p. 440. 
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91 Serbian Banat and ordered the German army into the area, The Germans 
were forced into this action to keep peace, since a clash of Rumanian 
92 
and Hungarian troops seemed imminent. 
The Foreign Office in Berlin was flooded with communications from 
Budapest and Bucharest over the Serbian Banat. The Rumanians demanded 
the area as a geographic, ethnic, historic and economic unit of their 
93 country. The Germans had no intention of granting this request and 
felt that the claim that 130,000 Rumanians lived there was grossly 
94 exaggerated, The persistence of the Hungarians in asserting their 
right to the Serbian Banat finally wore out the diplomats of the Third 
Reich, In September, Budapest was told to drop its suit for the time 
The Hungarian-Rumanian imbroglio caused the attachment of the 
Banat to what remained of Serbia or the so-called Old Serbia. Under a 
German military commander, this political unit would be governed by 
existing Yugoslav laws as a residual state. Other territorial awards 
made on April 12 in Southern Yugoslavia did not affect the Volks-
deutschen, since few resided there. 
91Hitler to Horthy, April 13, 1941, DGFP, Series D, Vol, XII, 
p. 538, Hitler's Directive of April 13, 1941, DGFP, Series D, Vol, 
XII, pp. 538-539. 
92 Report of Erdmannsdorf, April 14, 1941, DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XII, p, 548, 
93Foreign Office Memorandum, April 23, 194L DGFP, Series D, 
Vo1. XII, pp, 616-617. 
94Foreign Office Memorandum, April 21, 1941, DGFP, Series D, 
Vol, XII, Po 592, 
95M d b W . 11 k S b 18 1941 emoran um y eizsac er, eptem er , , DGFP, Series D, 
Vol, XIII, pp, 528-529. 
107 
At the time of the Yugoslav capitulation, the Nazis carefully con-
sidered the fate of the German minority in the Danube valley. Between 
April 16 and 19, talks were held in Vienna by representatives of the 
RKFDV, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Interior. Some of the 
ideas discussed were eventually recorded in a memorandum dated July 15 
and sent from the Ministry of the Interior to the Foreign Office. 96 
The construction of a Reichsfestung Belgrad, allegedly inspired by the 
1720 plan attributed to Prince Eugene, was recommended. Although the 
limits of this German fortress were not specified, it was to be sur-
rounded by German settlements. The Nazi planners further decided to 
strengthen the position and influence of the Danube Swabians as members 
of a master race. This would necessitate wide-ranging grants of auton-
omy to them by the states in which they lived. 97 Reichsfestung Belgrad 
encircled by a network of autonomous German settlements extending into 
Croatia, Hungary, Rumania and the Serbian Banat created in essence a 
98 Donaustaat. Long-cherished dreams entered the realms of the possible 
in the spring of 1941 under the auspices of three important Reich 
agencies. 
But illusions of a fortress at the Serbian capital were quickly 
dispelled, much to the disappointment of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen. 
In the Batschka, the appearance of Hungarian troops shattered expecta-
tions that the ethnic Germans there would be liberated by German 
96 Extracts of the July 15, 1941 memorandum are published in Wehler, 
"Reichsfestung Belgrad," pp. 81-83. 
97Jovan Marjanovich, "The German Occupation System in Serbia in 
1941," tr" Zvonimir Petnicki, in Brajovich, Les Syst~es i'Occupation, 
pp. 265-266. 
98 Wehler, "Reichsfestung Belgrad," p. 79. 
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soldiers and included in an "independent German province. 1199 Kultur-
bund members in the Banat cherished similar hopes for the construction 
of a Danubian state at the time of the invasion. They were told that 
the project was aborted, because war developments and diplomatic rela-
tions with Germany's allies had become stumbling-blocks.lOO Popular 
interest in the Donaustaat lingered throughout the summer. In June, 
the Hungarians accused members of the German minority in the Banat of 
attempting to bring their area into the Reich in some form or the 
101 other. A festive celebration of the 225th anniversary of Eugene's 
victory at Petrovaradin, held in August, was attended by three thousand 
Volksdeutschen from Srem and Batschka. Leaders of the Volksdeutschen 
now under Croatian and Hungarian rule spoke of the indestructible 
solidarity of the Germans in the region. 102 A demonstration of unity 
in the name of Prince Eugene had political overtones, but these were 
obscured by news now coming from the Russian front. 
Indeed the entire concept of a German enclave along the Danube 
suffered a severe set-back in July. Apparently, sometime in that month 
Hitler had elected to transfer all the German national groups of 
99unsigned DAI memorandum, no date (June, 1941?). T-81/Roll 
553/5328664-6. 
100 ... , Vegh, "Le Systeme du Pouvoir d 'occupation Allemand dans le 
Banat Yougoslave," p. 507. 
lO~emorandum by Weizslcker, June 26, 1941. DGFP, Series D, 
Vol. XIII, p. 28. ~-Editor's note, p. 28. 
102A. W., Se~tember 4, 1941, from Christliche Volkszeitung 
(Osijek), August 21, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317139. 
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h E . h R . h 103 Sout eastern urope into t e eic . Preparations had already been 
underway for several weeks on the resettlement of the Ko~evje Germans 
from the Italian-held province of Ljubljana into German-occupied 
S 1 . 104 ovenia. On Augus~ 2, Hitler postponed the resettlements from the 
105 
Southeast until the end of the war. Himmler explained that the 
Southeast meant the Balkans, and indicated that the Ko~evje action 
106 would proceed as scheduled. Talks on the Donaustaat would continue 
in the next years, even by such a highly placed dignitary as Himmler. 
Hitler, who was not above impetuous behavior, apparently reversed his 
decision to remove the Danube Swabians. He determined in 1943 that the 
German ethnic groups in the Balkans should remain in their host 
countries. 107 But the fact remains that entrenchment of Volksdeutschen 
around Belgrade was in grave jeopardy at the highest level of the Third 
Reich at almost the same moment when it was given sanction at lower 
levels in the July 15, 1941 memorandum. The uncertainty hovering over 
the fate of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen was never dispelled. 
Regardless of whether or not they would stay on their soil 
after the war, the Yugoslav Germans were cast in the role of superior 
Volk in the new political units in which they found themselves. In the 
103Foreign Office Memorandum, July 24, 1941. DGFP, Series D, 
Vol. XIII, pp. 212-213. 
104 Memorandum by Benzler, May 6, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
p. 726. 
105Foreign Office Memorandum, August 2, 1941. DGFP, Series D, 
Vol. XIII, p. 296 
106Foreign Office Memorandum, August 7, 1941. ~' Series D, 
Vol. XIII, pp. 295-296. 
107 Orlow, Nazis in the Balkans, pp. 126-128. 
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Independent State of Croatia, in Hungary, in the Banat attached to Old 
Serbia, and in the Slovene areas annexed to the Reich, they were given 
citizenship status which elevated them over their neighbors of differ-
ing ethnic backgrounds. The following chapters will study in detail 
the history of each of the four segments of the former German minority 
from April, 1941, until the end of World War II. Already in 1938, an 
astute observer of the Balkan scene sensed the dangers inherent in the 
Nazi ideology for these people: 
The far-sighted may dread lest the racial doctrine, when 
brashly asserted"by minorities remote from German territory 
and less prolific than the majority peoples around them, 
recoil upon its own zealots with tenfold violence.l08 
The way toward the ultimate destruction of the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen 
was cleared by the arrangements made for them in the war years, 
108 Moseley, "Hitler and Southeastern Europe," p. 257. 
CHAPTER III 
THE VOLKSDEUTSCHEN WITHIN THE INDEPENDENT 
STATE OF CROATIA 
Among the many questions generated by Hitler's hasty decision to 
dismember Yugoslavia on March 27, 1941, two were of particular signifi-
cance: how would Croatian territory be organized and what would be the 
fate of the German minority living on Croatian soil? Regarding the 
former question, the Nazis made an attempt to recreate the Croatian 
kingdom of the Middle Ages under a puppet regime. In response to the 
latter question, the German population of Croatia was welded into a 
virtually autonomous unit within the new state .. They enjoyed a legal 
position second to none outside the Third Reich through their organi-
zation, the German Ethnic Colony in Croatia (Deutsche Volksgruppe in 
Kroatien, DVK). 1 In the first year after the Nazi inva~ion, they made 
enormous progress in developing German cultural life. But Utopia can-
not exist during wartime, let alone during a war which contained within 
it several civil wars. On top of the Axis-Allied conflict, which was 
never really stilled, Croatia was the scene of Croatian persecution of 
Serbian civilians and Partisan-Chetnick rivalry. Life ~Xi¥l~me an un-
relieved series of miseries for the Volksdeutschen in the Croatian 
1Rudolph Emting, Kroatien im Spiegelbild der Landesgruppe der 
Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, June 1941-June 1942, July 1942. T-81/ 
Roll 136/172982-173059. (Hereinafter Emting Report, 1942). 
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state. They were implicated in the gross misrule of the government in 
Zagreb; they were so harrassed by dissident elements in the state that 
groups of them were resettled in the Reich, despite Hitler's staying 
order of August 2. They sacrificed their men on the front which drew 
ever closer to their own hearths. The brave new world which Nltgayer 
and his followers conceived for them disintegrated amidst blood baths 
and horror. This inferno which engulfed the Croatian Volksdeutschen 
I 
can be understood more clearly if one reflects upon the forces which 
molded the bizarre state in which they lived and the course of these 
forces in the next four years. 
In the first place, autonomous Croatia was not so much a product 
of Croat desires as the results of Italo-German rivalry. Any German 
excursions into Croatian lands quickly ran head-on into Italian aspira-
tions. Long before April 6, 1941, Rome had been desirous of splitting 
up the South Slav state for Italian gain and had blatantly encouraged 
Croatian revisionism. A series of communications over the Croatian 
question were exchanged between Italian and German dipolmats in March, 
1939, Mussolini had becorre worried about rumors that Dr. Vladimir 
v 
Macek, the most powerful voice of the Croatian people at that time, 
intended to set up an independent Croatia under German protection. 
Indeed, the liquidation of Czechoslovakia during the month had given 
the autonomy movement in Croatia great impetus. 2 The German Foreign 
Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, hastened to assure the Italians 
2 
Report from Hans Georg von Mackensen, German Ambassador in Italy, 
March 17, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. VI, pp. 15-16. 
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3 that Hitler was completely disinterested in the Croat problem. Capit-
ulating to Mussolini, the Nazis circulated an order stating that "our 
attitude regarding all national community and minority problems in the 
Mediterranean countries must be adjusted to meet the wishes of the 
Italian government" and that all connections with Croat organizations 
must cease. 4 
Although Hitler had thus tried to assuage Mussolini's fears over 
German interests in Yugoslavia in 1939, the incontrovertible fact was 
that the Nazis were much more powerful than the Italians there two 
years later. When Hitler had to decide suddenly how Croatian territory 
would be organieed, he could afford only token condescension toward the 
Duce. He entrusted the task of negotiating with Croatian leaders for 
d 
the creation of an independent Croatian state to SS-Standartenfuhrer 
Edmund Veesenmayer. Arriving in Zagreb at the beginning of April, 
Veesenmayer aided the German Counsul General, Alfred Freundt, in the 
hurried and delicate diplomatic maneuvers. 
Recognizing the immense prestige of Ma'tek, the Nazis desired at 
first to establish the state under his leadership. As head of the 
Croatian Peasant Party, he represented the vast majority of the 
Croatians. Further, he was not insensitive to the power of Germany. 
Immediately after the Simovich coup d'~tat, Ma~ek sent out feelers to 
Berlin as to what attitude he should take toward the new regime. He 
was instructed not to cooperate with Belgrade, because the Nazis were 
3Ribbentrop to Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, March 20, 
1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. VI, pp. 63-64. 
4Memorandum by Ribbentrop, March 25, 1939. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
VI, pp. 113-114. 
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contemplating an "independent Croatia within the framework of the new 
order for Europe. 115 To the Nazis' chagrin, Ma~ek showed interest in 
the continued existence of Yugoslavia. 6 By April 4, he categorically 
rejected any discussion of an independent state. 7 
Unable to procure the cooperation of Ma~k, the Nazis turned to 
radical Croat nationalists in the Ustashi. This small, but sinister 
political movement had demanded the outright dissolution of Yugoslavia 
during the interwar years. Its leader (Poglavinck), Dr. Ante Pavelich, 
lived in exile in Italy as a protege of Mussolini, and members of this 
disreputable group had been incriminated in the assassination of 
Alexander I. By April 5, Vessenmayer had obtained the necessary sig~ 
natures of these extremists on a manifesto proclaiming the independence 
f C . 8 o roati.a. The bargaining was concluded at the last possible moment. 
Under German direction, the Independent State of Croatia (Neza-
visna D~ava Hrvatska, NDH; Unabhlngige Staat Kroatien) was proclaimed 
on April 10 by a follower of Pavelich, Colonel S.lavko Kvaternik. 9 On 
5Ribbentrop to Freundt, March 31, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XII, pp. 424-425. 
6 Report by Freundt, April 2, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
p. 430. 
7 Report by Freundt, April 4, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
pp. 448-449. 
8 Report by Freundt, April 5, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
pp. 461-462. 
9 For works on the Independent State of Croatia, see: Tudman, 
"The Independent State of Croatia. Ladislaw Rory and Martin Broszat, 
Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941-1945. No. VIII Schriftenreihe der 
Vi:'erteljahrshefte fffr Zeitgesc~t~Stuttgart, 1964). Gert Fricke, 
.Kroatien 1941-1944. Der "UnabhHngige Staat" in der Sicht des deutschen 
Bevollmlchigten Generals in Agram, Glaise von Horstenau. (Freiburg, 
1972). 
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the same day, German troops marched into Zagreb. The Croats gave them 
no resistance and in some cases even assisted in the takeover. One 
Croatian brigade surrendered to a German bicycle company without sp 
10 
much as a token struggle. On April 16, Pavelich made a triumphant 
entry into the Croatian capital and proceeded to organize the new state 
within the boundaries delineated in the previous chapter. A series of 
totalitarian decrees were issued to regulate the Ustashi-dominated 
regime, 11 The country was divided into twenty-two Great Districts 
(Veliki Zupama, Grossgespanschaften) in addition to the capital. 
Despite all the fanfare about an independent Croatia, the state 
was nothing more than a vassal of Germany and Italy. Axis troops were 
present on Croatian soil during the entire war, Since the Italians 
were extremely jealous of German influence in Zagreb, they were allowed 
to occupy nearly half the state. The line which separated the Italian 
zone of interest on the Adriatic from the German zone in the rest of 
Croatia ran roughly from Zagreb through Banja Luka and Sarajevo. 12 
(See Map 8). Once the work of forming the state was completed, Hitler 
determined to give the Italians a preponderant position in its political 
development. Mutual hostility between Croatians and Italians, however, 
precluded the success of this arrangement. After a year, the Italian 
troops withdrew from most of their zone of interest. By the time 
10 Jacob B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941 (New York, 
1962), p. 288. 
1 ~any of these laws may be found in Rafal Lemkin, Axis Rule in 
Occupied Europe (Washington, 1944), pp. 606-627. 
12Foreign Office Memorandum, April 23, 1941, DGFP, Series D, 
Vol. XII, pp. 618-619. 
Districts of the Deuts'che Volksgruppe 
in Krootien with local headquarters 
I. Eastern Srem ( lndjija) 
II. Sova-Danube ( Vinkovci) 
m. Lower Drova (Osijek) 
Ill. Middle Drava-Ilova ( Virovitico) 
Ill. Scattered settlements of Middle Bosnia (Sarajevo) 
~. Zagreb-Bosnia (Zagreb) 
Map 8. The Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945 
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Mussolini fell in July, 1943, the Italians were but a negligible factor 
in Croatia. The Poglavnik remained in power until 1945 solely on the 
sufferance of Berlin. 
Among the many problems which the Ustashi state confronted was 
its ethnographic composition. Of the more than six million people 
within its confines, only a bare majority of Croats, according to 1931 
census figures. About thirty per cent were Serbs and twelve per cent 
Mohammedans. The 150,000 Volksdeutschen represented less than one per 
cent of the total population. In a reckless attempt to forge a homo-
genous citizenship, Ustashi military units began a ruthless program of 
forced conversion of the Serbs. A pravoslavnik (Pravoslawe), that is~ 
a member of the Orthodox church within the Croatian state, had to 
accept Catholicism or risk death. If he converted, a Serb officially 
became a Croat. In this manner, the age-old ethnic problems of Bosnia 
and Srem would be resolved in favor of Croatian hegemony. Jews and 
gypsies were also attacked in the interests of consolidating Croatian 
blood. The Poglavnik obviously understood radical approaches to racial 
problems as well as did his Nazi patrons. 
The Ustashi policy, along with those of the Partisans and Chetniks, 
resulted in wholesale blood-letting on Croatian soil during the war. A 
Yugoslav historian of note described the Ustashi formations as "a wild 
horde fanatically wielding the cudgel and the knife, incited by most 
primitive chauvinist or religious ideas or merely for the sake of 
brutality and plunder. 1113 One estimate concludes that 750,000 Orthodox 
Serbs, 60,000 Jews and 26,000 gypsies were exterminated in the 
13Tudman, "Independent State of Croatia," p. 177. 
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carnage. It is important to note, however, that the Partisans and 
Chetniks also committed unspeakable crimes against innocent people. In 
the hell which Croatia became between 1941-1945, it is impossible to 
tell who bears the ultimate guilt for the atrocities. 15 
In such an atmosphere of terror, the government in Zagreb could 
never win popular support. Although the Croatians had been passive 
enough at the arrival of German troops, they gave very little support 
to Pavelich. As Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, German Plenipotentiary 
General in Croatia (Deutscher BevollmA~htiger General in Kroatien), 
observed: "The Croatian revolution is to a great extent a revolution 
of old men and former Habsburg officers. 1116 The communist Partisans 
made tremendous inroads into the country, despite initial rivalry with 
the Serbian Chetniks. By late 1943, they had liberated most of Bosnia 
17 and Srem. The Germans tenaciously held on to the Sava valley until 
the end in the spring of 1945, since it was the most important center 
of their communications in Yugoslavia. 18 Outside Zagreb and the Sava 
valley, the Croatian state no longer existed after 1943, because most 
of its territory by then was in enemy hands. 
If the Croatian state was a cauldron of discord, unity did not 
14Edmond Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia 1941-1945. A Record 
of Racial and Religious Persecutions and Massacres, tr. Lois Perkins 
(Chicago, 1961), p. 211. 
15Rudolf Kiszling, Die Kroaten; Der Schicksalsweg eines " -- -- -Sudslawenvolkes (Graz-Cologne, 1956), p. 205. 
16Quoted in Fricke, Kroatien 1941-1945, p. 28. 
17 D 1 · ~ Y 1 . . h S d W ld W 132 133 on agic, ugos a via in ~ econ or ar, pp. - . 
18Ibid., pp. 95, 187, 192. 
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prevail among representatives of the Third Reich stationed there 
either. General Glaise and SA-ObergruppenfM:irer Siegfried Kasche, the 
German Minister, both of whom arrived in Zagreb immediately after the 
invasion, viewed the Ustachi government from fundamentally different 
positions. As a prot~g( of Ribbentrop, Kasche was appointed to bolster 
the Foreign Office in its battle with the SS for control over foreign 
1 . 19 po icy. He possessed none of the qualifications for the diplomatic 
post he held. On the other hand, Glaise was an army officer with con-
siderable political experience in Habsburg and Republican Austria. 
While Kasche innocently saw the Pavelich regime as the best of all 
possible worlds, Glaise feared that its corruption would besmirch the 
reputation of the German army and urged its reform. 20 Another jarring 
note was added with the appearance of SS-Brigadefi~rer Konstantin 
Kammerhofer on the scene in the spring of 1943. As Himmler's deputy, 
he attempted in a high-handed way to create an SS-dominated police 
force in the beleaguered land. With the army, the Foreign Office and 
the SS at loggerheads, a rational German policy for Croatian affairs 
was impossible. The counsels of Glaise were ignored, and the incom-
petent Pavelich kept in office. 
Within the puppet state, the Nazis procured extensive special 
privileges for the German minority. In the first months after the 
German invasion, Altgayer proceeded to organize the DVK with dispatch 
and to regularize its legal status. Initially, arrangements for the 
19 • ' Heinz Hahne, The Order of the Death's Head, The Story of Hitler's 
SS, tr. Richard Barry (New York, 1970), pp. 291-292. 
2°Fricke, Kroatien 1941-1944, pp. 69-70, 117-120. 
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Croatian Volksdeutschen were hampered by confusion over their future. 
Whether they were to be resettled or maintained in their present loca-
tions had consequence for practical questions such as labor recruit-
21 
ment. Nonetheless, planning seemed to be animated from the very 
' beginning by the assumption that the Germans of Croatia would remain 
in their homesteads and fulfill their historic mission as a bastion of 
Germandom in southeastern Europe. On August 2, as has been seen, this 
supposition was confirmed for the duration of the war, 
Altgayer .as the ranking Kulturbund leader in the state consoli-
dated his forces within the German community with consummate skill. He 
immediately took precautions to quencj1 any "typical revolutionary 
phenomenon" which the chaotic conditions might generate among the 
22 
Volksdeutschen. Possibly, his concern extended to Josef Meier, a 
Kulturbund official, who proclaimed his leadership of the minority in 
the new Croatian state on April 13. 23 Pavelich acknowledged Altgayer 
on April 19 as the represantative of the ethnic Germans within the 
Croatian borders. The provisional organization of the DVK was formed 
on May 8 and announced in the first issue of its Official Gazette 
(Verordnungsblatt), which was published in Osijek on May 14. Through-
out June rallies were held to instill a spirit of unity among the 
Volksdeutschen. The German Day (Deutscher Tag) in Osijek) when 15,000 
21Foreign Office Memorandum, July 24, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XIII, pp. 212-213. 
22 
Hans Karl Andras, Weltwacht der Deutschen (?), no date. T-81/ 
Roll 545/5317006. 
23A, W. May 19, 1941. Eine Plakatbekanntmachung aus Kroatien, 
April 13, 1941. T-81/Roll 544/5316416. 
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men paraded in formation, was typical of these events. The Germans 
were molded into an organic whole with apparent ease. 
Following Nazi lines, the Deutsche Volksgruppe in Kroatien was 
based on the leadership principle (F'Jhrergrundsatz). " As Fuhrer, 
24 
Altgayer was accorded supreme power. The seat of the organization 
was established in Osijek. Its functions were carried out through six 
main offices: for staff ~ffairs, for financial affairs, for political 
affairs, for culture, for health, and for economic affairs, In addi-
tion, an office was opened in Zagreb to enable Altgayer to maintain 
contact with Croatian officials. 25 
The DVK was divided into districts (Kreise). (See Map 8). Since 
an attempt was made to apportion the German population equally among 
them, the districts covered areas of vastly different size. District 
I, Eastern Srem (Ost-Syrmien), was the smallest, but it contained the 
greatest number of Volksdeutschen. According to the 1931 census, 46,124 
lived there. This administrative unit included not only the eastern 
portion of Srem, but a Bosnian strip to the south of the Sava as well. 
Its headquarters were located in Indjija. District II, Sava-Danube 
(Save-Donau), sprawled through a corridor of Slavonia flanking the 
northern bank of the Sava and into northern Bosnia. With its officials 
stationed in Vinkovci, District II incorporated 30,818 ethnic Germans. 
The environs of Osijek to the south of the confluence of the Drava and 
24 ' Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenfuhrung der deutschen Volks-
gruppe im UnabhMngigen Staate Kroatien (Osijek), May 14, 1941. T-81/ 
Roll 544/5316398-406. (Herein after Verordnungsblatt DVK). 
25 
Volksdeutscher Ruf, November, 1941, T-81/Roll 545/5317113-5. 
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Danube formed District III, Lower Drava (Unterdrau). With 37,072 con-
stituents, this section had its offices in Osijek. The area south of 
the Drava encompassing the basin of the Ilova (Ilowa) river comprised 
District IV, the Middle Drava-Illova (Mitteldrau-Ilowa). Within its 
borders were 13,790 Volksdeutsche, and its seat was at Virovitica. The 
rest of the German population, totalling 23,363 people, was scattered 
throughout most of Croatia and Bosnia. 26 Districts V and VI, Middle 
Bosnia (Mittel-Bosnien) at Sarajevo and Zagreb-Bosnia (Agram-Bosnien) 
at Zagreb respectively, cared for their concerns. 
'The minority flourished in the first year after the destruction of 
Yugoslavia. Volksdeutsche would be guaranteed treatment as honored 
citizens with minority rights, Altgayer declared in the May 14 
27 
Verordnungsblatt. Accordingly, opportunists who had assimilated with 
Slavs in the past returned to the German fold in vast numbers. For 
example, there were 400 members of the Petrovaradin Kulturbund in March, 
1941. By August, 1,500 men in the community called themselves German. 28 
A twenty-nine per cent increase in the German population of the Croa-
tian state occurred between 1931 and 1941. The total rose from 151,167 
in the former years to 196,042 in the latter. 29 Because Volksdeutscher 
status within the Croatian state could only be attained through the 
DVK, its ranks must also have swelled. 
Between June, 1941 and January, 1942, the privileged position of 
26 Report of VOMI, May 26, 1942. T-81/Roll 307/2434886. 
27 Verordnungsblatt DVK, May 14, 1941. T-81/Roll 544/5316398-406. 
28 
A. W., August 8, 1941, DAI Report. T-81/Roll 545/5317120. 
29 
Report of VOMI, May 26, 1942. T-81/Roll 307/2434886. 
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the Volksgruppe was clarified in Croatian law. The provisional legal 
position of the minority was outlined by Pavelich on June 21, 1941. 30 
In a decree, he stipulated that all Germans under the DVK F&'h.rer pos-
sessed the right to cary out political, cultural, economic and adminis-
trative work. Further, he recognized the DVK as a juridical person 
with rights. Until a final edict was published, representatives of 
Altgayer would supervise all communities with Volksdeutschen residents. 
The Nazi outlook was permitted, as well as unhindered contacts with 
Germany. A commission was appointed to work out a permanent arrange-
ment for the status of the minority. Consisting of three Volksdeutschen 
and three Croatian members, it was under the chairmanship of a Reich 
31 German. 
Four months later, on October 30, the status of the Volksgruppe 
32 
was finalized by three decrees. In the first, the leader of the 
Volksgruppe was named a state director. In six Great Districts, where 
the German population was concentrated, special advisors for volks-
deutsche affairs would be appointed as state officials. These would ,, 
answer to the Volksgruppe Fuhrer. The second decree authorized use of 
the German language, flag, and symbols. In communities with more than 
twenty per cent Volksdeutschen, both Croatian and German would be 
official languages and place names rendered in their German forms, In 
30 
The text of the decree may be found in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol. V, pp. 135-137E. 
31A. W., August 11, 1941, from V~lkischer Beobachter (Vienna), 
August 6, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317107. 
32 
The text of the decrees may be found in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol. V, pp. 135-137E. 
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communities with more than ten per cent Volksdeutschen, Germans were 
permitted to use the German language to conduct government business. 
Members of the minority were allowed to display symbols of their own 
choosing. These would be protected by the state against descration. 
Finally, rules convering volksdeutsche employees of the Croatian govern-
ment were spelled out in the third decree. In communities with a 
German majority, it was. specified that the mayor must be German. The 
importance which the Ustashi regime accorded the minority was under-
scored by the composition of the Croatian Council of State, which 
Pavelich formed on January 24, 1942. All members of the Council were 
Croats, with the sole exception of volksdeutschen representatives. 33 
In sum total, the Volksgruppe of Croatia was accorded wide-ranging 
cultural autonomy and substantial influence in government on both the 
local and national levels. 
In Srem, the ascendancy of the Volksdeutschen was elevated to un-
usual heights for reasons of diplomacy. Since the district contained 
a Serb majority and portions of it had been governed within a Serbian 
province from 1929, the Croats feared that it might be awarded to Old 
Serbia. Indeed, German army officers in Belgrade considered the region 
strategic and retained occupation troops in its sections adjacent to 
the Serbian capital after the invasion. To strengthen their claims in 
German circles, the Croatians established Dr. Jacob Elicker, a local 
volksdeutschen lawyer, as governor (Zupan, Grossgespan) of the Great 
District Vuka, which coincided with historic Srem. The appointment of 
33Text of the decree establishing the Council may be found in 
Carlyle, Documents 1939-1946, Vol. II, pp. 331-332, and in Rafal 
Lemkin, Axis Rule i;-Occ~d Europe (Washington, 1944), pp. 608-609. 
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this former member of the Erneuerungsbewegung was announced on May 14, 
Kasche fought on behalf of Zagreb for Croatian annexation of Eastern 
34 
Srem. On October 10, 1941, his intervention was crowned with success. 
Although the Volksdeutschen accounted for only fifteen per cent of the 
total population of Srem, one of their numbers was given the highest 
office in the district. For this, they could thank the complexities of 
the boundary dispute. 
The privileged position of the Volksdeutschen within Croatia led 
to friction with Berlin. A visit by Himmler in June, 1941, publicized 
Reich German concern for the minority in Croatia. The Reichsf8hrer-SS 
received volksdeutsche leaders in Zemun at that time and heard their 
35 reports. Nonetheless, these leaders subsequently ignored the National 
Socialist German Fellowship in Croatia (National-Sozialistische 
36 
Deutsche Gefolgschaft in Kroatien, NSDGK) formed by VOMI for them. 
The head of the Auslands-Organisation in the Croatian state, Rudolf 
Emting, noted this independence in a 1942 report. He explained that 
under Yugoslav rule the Volksdeutschen had been severely repressed, 
The sudden change to preferential treatment in Croatia transformed 
37 their inferiority complex into an unwarranted arrogance, Enjoying 
the .confidence of Zagreb, the volksdeutschen leaders were unwilling to 
34Marjanovi(, "German Occupation Sys tern in Serbia," pp. 269-270; 
Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte.Reich, p. 267. 
35A, W,, July 11, 1941 from S~dostdeutsche Tageszeitung 
(Timisoara), June 18, 1941, T-81/Rtill 544/5316387. 
36wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, pp. 268-269; Schieder, 
Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 50-54E. 
37Emting Report, 1942, 
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follow directives from SS-officers, whom they probably scorned as in-
experienced in Croatian affairs. 
Even before legislation on the minority's status was completed, 
the Volksgruppe chiefs proceeded to construct a German paradise in 
Croatia. In so doing, they penetrated into every facet of ethnic 
German life. One of the first orders of business was the orderly dis-
semination of information. In May, Slawonischer Volksbote was desig-
nated as the official organ of the colony. All Germans in Croatia were 
obliged to subscribe to this weekly, in order to keep up with the latest 
d 1 . 38 news an regu ations. The Verordpungsblatt also continued to appear, 
but on an irregular basis. 
The Volksgruppe worked strenuously to consolidate its strength on 
the local level. Each DVK district was broken down into smaller units 
(Ortsleitungen), formed around the smaller towns. Already in June, 
orders were circulated that mayors of communities with a German majority 
had to give priority to the interests of the German citizens. If he 
were not actually leader of the local branck of the DVK (Ortsleiter), 
the mayor would have to work in harmony with this individual. In towns 
with a Slavic majority, the Ortsleiter was instructed to keep in close 
touch with the local branch of the Ustashi. 39 The introduction of ad~ 
ditional Slavic elements in German communities was hindered through the 
Croatian Ministry of Interior. An order of July 23 forbade Slovenes, 
who were forced out of German-annexed Slovenia into Croatia, to settle 
38Rundschreiben Folge 1, DVK, Propaganda und Presseamt, June 20, 
1941, T-81/Roll 306/2434425-6. 
39nienstanweisung, No. 3, DVK, Kreisleitung Save-Donau, June 11, 
1941, T-81/Roll 306/2434408. 
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. G h d ·11 4o in erman ouses an vi ages. Where German majorities existed they 
would be protected. 
Attention was also immediately directed toward the development of 
the volksdeutschen school system. The DVK Office for Educational 
Affairs (Amt f!Jr Schulwesen) established the following goals for 1941; 
two secondary schools with eight classes, a teacher's training insti-
41 tute, a trade school with four classes and more elementary schools. 
The Croatian government cooperated in this planning by promulgating a 
decree on September 20, 1941. By its liberal provisions, the Germans 
were accorded autonomy for their schools. Within the Croatian Ministry 
of Education, an office for volksdeutsche schools was opened. If a 
lack of German teachers developed, Germans without Croatian citizenship 
could be admitted into the country to teach for five years. Further, 
the Croatian government agreed to pay just as much for the education 
of a German child as for a Croatian one. Volksdeutsche children were 
required to study for eight years, two years more than other children 
. h 42 in t e state. As a consequence of the September decree, eight new 
schools began to serve German children in the fall of 1941. Secondary 
schools were established in Ruma and Osijek, as well as a teacher's 
training institute in Osijek. Five elementary schools also commenced 
operation. In none of these were non-German teachers permitted, even 
40 
A. W., October 1, 1941, from Verordnungsblatt DVK, August 25, 
1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317133. 
41Rundschreiben, Folge 5, DVK, Amt f9r Schulwesen, no date. T-81/ 
Roll 306/2434443-4. 
42 The text of the decree may be found in Volksdeutscher Ruf, 
November, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317113-5. 
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43 
in the face of a staff shortage. As the volksdeutschen schools on 
Croatian territory were previously only on the elementary level, this 
progress was truly remarkable. 
The Office for Educational Affairs worked to build the student 
body and to encourage teachers. Planners were anxious that vol~s-
deutsche parents realize that their children could go to German schools, 
even if they couldn't speak German. In addition, they wished to assure 
parents that non-German speaking children would be advanced despite any 
1 b . 44 anguage arn.er. Recruitment for the new schools would thereby be 
eased. On September 14, a conference was held in Osijek to form a 
h I • • (V lk=-1 h L h b d . K . ) 45 teac er s association o .,...eutsc er e ~ers un in roatien . An 
esprit de corps among the German teachers would benefit German instruc-
tion in the Ustashi state. 
The enormous strides in education made in 1941 continued in the 
next year. German language instruction was given during the sunnner of 
1942, in order to correct language deficiencies among both students and 
teachers, For example, a two-week course in German language and liter-
ature, paid for in part by the Croatian government, was conducted for 
middle school teachers. 46 Also, fifty boys and gkls who knew little 
or no German were given a month-long course in the language. This was 
43Rundschreiben, DVK, Amt " fur Schulwesen, October 3, 1941. T-81/ 
Roll 545/5317485-6. 
44Rundschreiben, Folge 5, DVK, 
,, 
Amt fur Schulwesen, no date. T-81/ 
Roll 306/2434443-4. 
45 u 
Announcement, DVK, Amt fur Schulwesen, no date. T-81/Roll 306/ 
2434442 :' 
46neutsche Zeitung in Kroatien (Zagreb), July 31, 1942. (Typed 
copy), T-81/Roll 559/5335456. 
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intended to compensate for the lack of a volksdeutschen school in their 
isolated connnunity. 47 The school year began in the fall with evidence 
of expansion and improvement. Eight new volksdeutsche schools opened 
h . d 48 t eir oors. The teacher's training institute in Osijek, which 
entered its second year, had 600 more books for instructional purposes, 
h 'f f h C 1 P d ' L'b · v· 49 t e gi t o t e entra e agogic 1 rary in ienna. Special arrange-
ments were made to defer candidates for teaching certificates from war 
service. Provision was made that these young men could perform military 
duties in installments during summer holidays. 50 Planning for an agri-
cultural school for peasant boys between the ages of 17 and 18 seemed 
to be well underway. Property was acquired for its construction near 
0 .. k 51 S1Je . Although the shadow of war fell over the volksdeutschen 
schools in the second half of 1942, they still enjoyed a.high priority. 
Not only volksdeutsche education, but volksdeutsche economic 
affairs were also well organized under DVK auspices. A central union 
of German agricultural and industrial cooperative societies was formed 
on July 14, 1941, by the main office for economic affairs. 52 While it 
47 Deutsches Volksblatt (Novi Sad), August 25, 1942. (Typed copy). 
T-81/Roll 559/5335443. 
48 
Grenzwacht (Osijek), October 9, 1942. (Typed Copy). T~81/Roll 
559/5335429. 
49neutsche Ukraine-Zeitung, November 14, 1942. (Typed copy). 
T-81/Roll 559/5335368. 
50 
Verordnungsblatt DVK, August 10, 1942. (Typed copy). T-81/ 
Roll 559/5335450. 
51 . 
Krakauer Zeitung (Cracow), July 28, 1942. (Typed copy). T-81/ 
Roll 559/5335457. 
52vnA Informationdienst, September 22, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/ 
53i7355-6. 
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undoubtedly assumed the role of the defunct Agraria for the volks-
deutsch peasant within the Croatian state, the union also gave increas-
ed protection to the urban laborers. The National Office for the 
Industrial Economy (Landesamt fgr gewerbliche Wirtschaft) exemplifies 
well how the DVK guarded the interests of German industrial workers. 
All were registered through this agency and indoctrinated in "the 
spirit of the new time." If an employee had a grievance against an 
employer who lacked a Nazi outlook, the office would support the 
employee. At all costs, provisions were made to give the German work-
h b "bl 53 ers t e est possi e treatment. 
Groups were formed by the DVK for all members of the minority. A 
Deutsche Mannschaft was organized in May, 1941, for men between the 
ages of 18 to 45 to protect volksdeutsche settlements. The favor ex-
tended to the militia went so far as to enable members to travel on 
state railways with a fifty per cent discount, if they were going to 
. 1 54 specia events. It soon became obvious, however, that the chaotic 
conditions within the state required more than part-time military pre-
paredness. In July Pavelich granted approval for the creation of a 
Standing Guard (Einsatzstaffel, ES) of the DM. For men between the 
ages of 18 and 28, it was administered within the framework of the 
Ustashi. In addition, there was a women's division (Frauenschaft). 
Among its concerns was aid for mothers-to-be. In 1942, for example, 
lying-in rooms were planned in cities and larger villages for German 
53Report of DVK, Landesamt ftlr gewerblich Wirtschaft, July 2, 
1941. T-81/Roll 306/2434399, 
54nienstansweisung No. 3, DVK, Kreisleitung Save-Donau, June 11, 
1941. T-81/Roll 306/2434407. 
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women from surrounding communities without access to mid-wives or 
55 
doctors. A youth group (Deutsche Jugend, DJ) was also organized for 
boys between 10 and 18 and girls between 10 and 21. 
The DVK leadership used all resources at its command to mold the 
German minority into a reliable vanguard for the Nazi movement in the 
Balkans. The Propaganda and Press Office (Propaganda-und Presseamt) 
offered a wall plaque to the populace which shows perhaps better than 
anything else its indoctrination program. Formed in the shape of a 
swastika, the plaque bore the command: 
Trittst Du hier als Deutscher ei~, 56 
Soll Dei;;-G~ 'Heil Hitler' sein. 
Anti-semitism was also encouraged. The Propaganda and Press Office 
obligingly distributed posters bearing the legend: "Fight against 
57 
Jews." Complete allegiance to Nazi doctrines was encouraged among 
the Germans in Pavelich's state. 
The DVK launched upon an elaborate program to appraise its members 
of their cultural heritage. German centers were opened in important 
cities. The first German House (Deutsches Haus) in Croatia was estab-
lished in the fall of 1941 in Banja Luka for Bosnian Volksdeutsche and 
G ld . . d . h 58 erman so iers statione in t e area. At the same time, construction 
55 
Report of DVK, Deutsche Volkshilfe Landesleitung, August 20, 
1942. T-81/Roll 559/5335472. 
56The poem is translated: "If you enter here in German style, 
Your greeting should be '!Heil Hitler"'. DVK, Kreisleitung Mitteldrau-
Ilowa, August 13, 1941. T-81/Roll 306/2434419. 
57Rundschreiben, Folge 2, DVK, Propaganda und Presseamt, July 12, 
1941. T-81/Roll 306/2434460. 
58A. W., November 11, 1941 from Donauzeitung (Belgrade), November 
1, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317236. 
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work was undertaken. for a Deutsches Haus in Osijek. Since the edifice 
would hold 4,000 people, it was to be the largest hall in the new 
nation. 59 Built with voluntary labor, this showplace was dedicated a 
60 year later. Osijek was also the site of a German Museum, which 
opened in a converted patrician house during the summer of 1942. Arti-
61 
facts of Danube Swabian life in Croatia were to be preserved here. 
In Zagreb, the local DVK chapter established a German theatre in late 
1941. A high cultural plane can be detected in the choice for its first 
production: 
62 
Lessing's Minna YQg Barnhelm. In view of the grave 
political situation in Croatia, the effort and expense placed upon 
German culture had an unreal quality. 
Along with the Volksdeutschen, there was a ReichsdJeutsch colony in 
Croatia. In 1942, it numbered 3,300, of whom 418 were members of the 
Croatian division of the AO under Emting. 63 One s~holar has suggested 
that the AO expanded to impressive proportions in Croatia although the 
evidence seems confined to Empting's 1942 report already cited. 64 
The picture of a beautiful volksdeutsches life in Croatia created 
by the many DVK endeavors in 1941 and 1942 was not altogether 
59A. W., November 1, 1941 from Chistliche Volkszeitung (Osijek), 
Oc~ober 16, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317237. 
60Grenzwacht (Osijek), September 18, 1942. 
61 Grossdeutscher Pressedienst Wochenbrief August, 1942. T-81/ 
Roll 559/5335395. 
62 . " A. W., November 19, 1941 from Kulturbericht Sudosteuropa, 
October 27, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317231. 
63Emting Report, 1942. 
64 Orlow, Nazis in Balkans, p. 132 fn. 
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representative. Members of the German minority were not immune to the 
unrest which surrounded them in several ways. In the first place, 
their involvement in military actions outside their immediate surround-
ings gradually increased. The DM and its ES formations were originally 
conceived for self-defense purposes. But on September 16, 1941, a 
German-Croatian agreement was signed establishing volksdeutsche units 
within the Croatian army. On February 19, 1942, Zagreb authorized use 
of these units within Reich German divisions engaged in the pacifica-
. f B . 65 tion o osnia. Still, military participation on the part of the 
Volksdeutschen remained modest during their first year in the Ustashi 
state. 
The Croatians of German ethnic background were also confronted 
with the atrocities committed by the Ustashi on the Orthodox Serbs in 
their midst. Many Volksdeutsche attempted to aid their sorely pressed 
neighbors. In the summer of 1941, the DVK command admitted that it was 
receiving many requests to intervene in non-German affairs in the state 
and that some office holders had done so without authorization. Any 
efforts on behalf of non-Germans were strictly forbidden. If a non-
German had served the Volksgruppe, a written plea could be addressed to 
the leader for help in his case. However, feelings of friendship or 
sympathy could not be involved. The interests of the Volksgruppe as a 
66 whole would not benefit thereby. The Croatian government denied 
Serbs the right to join a Protestant church, presumably a means of 
65 The text of these agreements may be found in Schieder, 
Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 159-166E. 
66 A. W., September 23, 1941 from Verordunungsblatt DVK, August 25, 
1941. T-81/Roll 545/5317118. 
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circumventing forced conversion to Catholicism. Bishop Popp, who re-
mained in Croatia during the war as head of the Lutheran Evangelical 
Church, protested this legislation in the fall of 1941. Kasche advised 
. h d. 67 against sue issent. The good will of the Volksdeutschen for the 
Serbs was frustrated at the highest levels of their leadership. 
In Srem, where a volksdeutscher governor was installed, the Volks-
deutschen were in a particularly sensitive position regarding Ustashi 
misrule, Elicker was credited with the relative peace which reigned in 
his province in the fall of 1941, He would not tolerate the wanton 
killing pf Serbs, which was the order of the day in other parts of the 
68 
country. Elicker's insistence upon legal formalities prevented the 
practice of outright genocide. The Ustashi was forced to open emergency 
courts under the direction of Victor Tomi~ in order to justify execu-
tion of Serbs. 69 Simulation of judicial process could not cover up the 
terrible blood bath, the so-called Tomi~ Action, which took place in 
Srem throughout the summer of 1942. For this catastrophe, which cost 
thousands of Serbian lives, the local Volksdeutschen shared the blame, 
Perhaps only a few of them were directly involved. However, the offic-
ial "hands off" attitude here, as in other situations through Croatia, 
was tantamount to condonation. 
Although surrounded by bloodshed, the Volksdeutschen were by and 
large exempt from it until the summer of 1942, This general truth did 
not hold in Bosnia. Already by the fall of 1941, the volksdeutschen 
67Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia, pp. 186-187. 
68A, W., October 8, 1941 from Wso (Wehrmacht s9dost?) Report, 
September 25, 1941, T-81/Roll 545/5317079. 
69p . aris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia, pp, 180-191, 
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peasants of Glogovac were no longer able to work in their fields. The 
70 danger of guerrilla attack in the Banja Luka area was too great. In 
Petrovapolje, two Volksdeutsche were murdered in November. Because of 
deprivation and fear for their lives, many German citizens fled from 
this village by the Drina. The younger generation went to Germany, 
h ·1 h ld d h s . s 71 w i e t e o er crosse t e ava into rem. Apparently, the vil~ 
lagers had renamed their settlement Schgnborn too precipitously in the 
flush of the German victory over Yugoslavia. When they were delivered 
from Serbian rule by Count von Sch~nborn and his squadron, they had 
expected peace and prosperity. Only a few months later, they were dis-
gusted with the Croatian regime and felt that the Serbian government 
72 had been one hundred per cent better than the current one in Zagreb. 
By the summer of 1942, conditions for the Germans of Bosnia were des-
perate. A letter from one of their number in August spoke of a severe 
lack of both food and wood for the coming winter. There was hardly 
enough milk and bread and no sugar with which to cook fruit. 73 The 
residents of Glogovac, who were experiencing hunger, demanded to be 
74 evacuated. 
70 Report of Pastor Ferdinand Sommer in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol. V, pp. 37-63. 
71 ,, 
Report to DAI by Josef Schossler, November, 1941. T-81/Roll 
545/5316950. 
72 Report to DAI by Jack Merkle, December, 1941. T-81/Roll 545/ 
5316952. 
73 
Auszug aus einem Brief aus Bosnien, August 26, 1942. T-81/ 
Roll 559/5335167. 
74 Report of Pastor Ferdinand Sommer in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol. V, pp. 37-63. 
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Berlin came to the rescue of the distraught Bosnian Germans in 
late 1942. On September 30, an agreement was reached between Germany 
and Croatia providing for the resettlement in Germany of Volksdeutschen 
from specified areas of the Croatian state, generally to the south and 
f h S . 75 west o t e ava river. This would include all of Bosnia and the 
western half of Croatia. Only Bosnian Germans of four villages were 
excluded from the resettlement action: Nova Topola, Alexandrovac 
(Rudolfstal, renamed Adolfstal during World ~ar II), Tros°':lje and Br~ko. 
These volksdeutschen communities just south of the Sava were kept in-
tact, because they formed a closed group with Slavonia and Srem and 
because they could still provide agricultural produce for the German 
76 army. On October 2, Altgayer issued a call for the resettlement. He 
challenged the departing Volksdeutschen to recognize their German bonds 
within the Reich. 77 
The Reich German agencies for massive population transfers, backed 
by two years of experience, completed the move out of the Croatian 
state with dispatch. Registration by the EWZ was carried out between 
November 2, 1942 and January 10, 1943. After examinations, SS admin-
istrators judged the racial worth of the prospective resettlers, In 
the EWZ registration report, two final figures and racial assessments 
appear. Out of a total of 17,367 Volksdeutschen, about seventy-five 
per cent were rated as good Germans. These received an Ost (KYrnten) 
75 The text of the agreement may be found in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol. V, pp. 153-158E. 
76 ,, 
SS-Obersturmfuhrer Gradmann of EWZ to Lutz of DAI, May 15, 1944, 
T-81/Roll 307/2435191, 
77 Grenzwacht (Osijek), October 9, 1942, 
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or O(K) rating, which meant that they were deemed reliable enough to 
settle in Upper Carniola, which had become a frontier area of the Third 
Reich after its annexation to Carinthia. As shall be seen in Chapter 
6, Carinthian officials did not view these Bosnian Germans in the same 
favorable light. About twenty-five per cent of those registered were 
given the Altreich (A) rating, for eventual relocation in Germany. 
These were deemed less dependable as Wehrbauern at the border charged 
with fending off foreign influences. Another report gives a total of 
18,211 persons, about sixty-three percent of whom were classed as pure 
volksdeutsche. This apparently meant that they were free of foreign 
features or influences. Despite irregularities in the tabulation, it 
can be concluded that around 18,000 people were registered and that 
about two-thirds of these were acceptable Germans. Most were from 
78 
Bosnia, with only a few scattered in the vicinity of Zagreb, 
The collection point for the resettlers was at Bosanski Brod 
(Bosnisch-Brod) on the Sava river. The SS officers in charge of the 
operation experienced great difficulty in transporting the Volks-
deutschen to the trains headed for Germany. Partisan and Chetnik raids 
harrassed the caravans. Because of the dangerous condition~, speed was 
79 
of the essence. A few resettlers were killed, but this did not 
78Abschlussbericht ~ber die Erfassung der Deutschen aus Bosnien 
durch die Einwandererzentralstelle, no date. T-81/Roll 306/234624-781 
and T-81/Roll 307/2434782-877. 
79ss-Hauptsturmf~hrer Lachmann, Abschlussbericht ~ber die Umsied-
lung der Deutschen aus Bosnien, December 10, 1942. T-81/Roll 307/ 
2435161-8. 
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80 discourage most during the ordeal. · By early December, between 
16,000 and 17,000 of these Germans were placed in relocation camps near 
Lodz (Litzmannstadt) in the newly incorporated Polish territory. 81 The 
expertise of the SS agencies was clearly evident in the Bosnian re-
settlement. In three months, the registration and removal of 18,000 
people was accomplished under the most trying circumstances. 
By the time the situation of the Bosnian Germans had become unten-
able, other Volksdeutsche within Croatia began to feel the war. The 
terrorizing of peasants in Eastern Srem by the Partisans was reported 
in the summer of 1942. Many Volksdeutsche were murdered and crops 
bnrned. One stunned observer on the scene plaintively asked, "When 
82 
will there be peace?" But peace was not to come for nearly three 
years, and not before most of the Volksdeutschen of Croatia had been 
wrenched from their homes and transported into Germany in the wake of 
the retreating German army. 
The name change of Slawonischer Volksbote to Grenzwacht (Border 
Watch) in August, 1942 heralded the coming crisis. The editor-in-chief 
of the paper struck a new note in the August 25 issue: 
We must now wear in spirit the field gray jacket of the 
front soldier and fulfil in the same degree our duty.83 
Thoughts could no longer linger on correct German usage in schools or 
SOFerdinand Sakar, Volksdeutscher Ruf, Folge 1, 1943. T-81/Roll 
322/2453382. 
81Report of SS-Untersturmf'uhrer Poll, December 9, 1942. T-81/ 
Roll 307/2434885. 
82 Report of F. Renz to DAI, October 1942. T-81/Roll 559/5335239-
10. 
83Grenzwacht (Osijek), August 25, 1942. 
139 
classical German dramas, but must turn to war. The great dream of the 
DVK. had come to an end. 
Volksdeutsche men were called to military duty in earnest in the 
fall of 1942. As Partisan pressure gained in strength, evasion of war 
service by able-bodied men could no longer be tolerated. On September 
21, 1942, a verbal note between Germany and Croatia was exchanged per-
mitting the recruitment of Volksdeutschen between the ages of 17 and 
35 in the Waffen-Ss. 84 On October 2, Altgayer issued a call for 
volksdeutsche enlistment in this force. Since the military capabil-
ities of the Croatian Volksdeutschen had not been tapped to the fullest, 
he urged eligible men to join their Reich German comrades at the front. 
The home guard would be manned by men between the ages of 35 and 50. 
The Volksgruppe leader pledged all efforts for a German victory and 
admonished the minority in Croatia to prove itself a worthy branch of 
h G f ·1 85 t e great erman ami y. The age limit for military service, accord-
ing to the standards set by the DVK in 1941, had been revised downward 
from 18 to 17 and upward from 45 to 50. By late 1943, 17,538 Volks-
deutsche from Croatia were enlisted in the Waffen-SS and another 7,510 
86 in milita units within the Croatian state. Many of these soldiers 
were attached to the 7th SS Prince Eugene Division, formed in the Banat. 
By 1944, Volksdeutsche were conscripted directly into the Waffen-Ss. 87 
84rhe text of the verbal note may be found in Schieder, Vertrei-
bung, Vol. V, pp. 159-166E. 
85Grenzwacht (Osijek), October 9, 1942. 
86schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 72-75E; George H. Stein, The 
Waffen-SS (Ithaca, 1966), p. 173. 
87 Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 273. 
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Undoubtedly, many raw recruits from the German minority of Croatia 
were pressed into the ugly fighting which dragged on until May 15, 1945 
on Croatian soil, even after Germany had signed the terms of uncondi-
tional surrender on May 9. 
The decisions which Hitler made on Croatia culminated in complete 
tragedy. By creating an indefensible state under the leadership of a 
lunatic fringe, he unleashed a destructive fury throughout Croatia. In 
the process, Hitler destroyed forever Germandom in Croatia. Members of 
the Croatian minority were too strongly identified with the Nazi move-
ment and its corrupt puppet regime to survive the wrath of the perse-
cuted. More than that, they deluded themselves in believing Nazi 
ideology which maintained that a German master race could exist in self-
contained outposts along the Danube. The imagination and resolve of 
Altgayer and his associates in building a German Utopia perhaps was un-
matched in Eastern Europe. For a brief span between April, 1941 and 
August, 1942, they brought the concept of Mitteleuropa very close to 
reality in their area. But their failure also proved in part that 
nineteenth century ideas could never work in the twentieth century. 
They laid the ghost of Prince Eugene to rest throughout the Danube, 
Sava and Drava valleys. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE VOLKSDEUTSCHEN OF YUGOSLAVI~ WITHIN HUNGARY 
- Compared to the German minority in the Independent State of 
Croatia, those Germans in the Yugoslav territories reincorporated into 
Hungary saw little to rejoice about in their new status. On the whole, 
these Volksdeutschen were unhappy about their renewed connection with 
Budapest. They felt repressed, although the privileges granted to them 
through the Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn were substantial. The 
Hungarian government refused to grant them the complete autonomy which 
Nazi propaganda had led them to expect:~ Worse yet, there was so much 
internal dissention within the volksdeutschen ranks that it weakened 
their demands vis-~-vis the Magyar state. From the beginning, they 
were denied the visions of glory which for a short while inspired their 
fellow Volksdeutschen in Croatia. And, in the end, the Germans of the 
Baranja triangle, the Batschka and the Upper Mur Region shared the 
same disasterous fate of their brothers within Croatia. They were im-
plicated in the abuse of their Serbian neighbors, they sacrificed their 
sons to the Waffen-SS, and they were forced to flee their homes at the 
conclusion of the war and suffer terrible privation and persecution. 
For all that, the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen were comparatively well 
off for most of the war years, because Hungary had a relatively stable 
government until 1944. After having been dragged into World War II on 
April 11, 1941, through their part in the invasion of Yugoslavia, the 
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Hungarians subsequently attempted to maintain a certain distance from 
Berlin. As their value to the Axis was based not so much on military 
support but on their industrial and agricultural potential, they sue-
ceeded in this policy for nearly three years. Growing alienation 
within Hungary toward Nazi Germany forced the Germans to occupy the 
Magyar state on March 19, 1944. Under a collaborationist regime, a 
vicious anti-Semitic program was begun. On October 15, Horthy made an 
ill-fated effort to conclude a separate peace with the Allies. The 
Nazis deposed him and placed the fascist Arrow Cross party in.power 
under the leadership of Ferenc Sz,lasi, who was in accord with 
Berlin in the final months of Hungary's wartime ordeal'',"which ended 
in April, 1945. But not only was th~ country de.va~-t51ted l)y: the · · 
advancing Russian army but also by the retreating Germans and fascist 
Hungarians. 
But in April, 1941, Hungary was satiated with territorial gains 
made at the expense of Yugoslavia, which increased its volksdeutsche 
1 population by 190,300. (See Map 7). To the 740,000 inhabitants of 
Hungary who acknowledged German as their mother tongue in the January, 
1941 census were added the 173,058 ethnic Germans from the Batschka, 
the 15,751 from the Baranja triangle and the 1,500 from the Upper Mur 
Region. The grand total of Hungarian Volksdeutschen now came to around 
930,000 out of a total of less than sixteen million. With their usual 
penchant for exaggeration, Nazi propaganda agencies boasted that the 
German minority in Hungary included 1,200,000 members and that it was 
1 For a brief history of the Hungarian Volksdeutschen in the inter-
war period, see pp. 58-64 supra. 
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the largest in Europe. 
Hungarian rule in the Batschka, the Baranja triangle and the Mur 
regions, collectively labeled the Southern Territories (D~lvidfk) by 
Budapest, was regularized in three stages between April 11 and December 
27, 1941. The guidelines for the military occupation of these areas, 
which commenced with the arrival of Hungarian troops, were established 
in the Secret Directive Number One. Its precepts can be said to form 
2 
the basis of the occupation policy for the entire war. Two categories 
of citizens were outlined: l)"old residents" or those settled in the 
Southern Territories as of October 31, 1918, and 2) "immigrants or 
colonists" who had arrived. since that date, most of whom were 
Dobrovolzen of Serbian origin. The colonists were to be expelled from 
their homes forthwith. Harsh restrictions were placed upon any remain-
ing Serbs, but a benign attitude was adopted toward the Croats pending 
an evaluation of their behavior toward the Magyar regime. 
among the Croatian population were the So~i and Bunyevci. 
Counted 
The Volks----
deutschen were to enjoy the same rights granted to their German 
brothers throughout the rest of Hungary in accordance with the Protocol 
of August 30, 1940. 
Under the military authorities, work to cleanse the Southern Ter-
ritories of undesirable non-Magyar elements proceeded throughout the 
spring and summer of 1941. The Serbs who had settled in Batshcka or 
the Baranja triangle after October 31, 1918, fled into Serbia in vast 
numbers or were placed in internment camps. Their vacated properties 
2Iosip Mirnich, "Vengerskii Rezhim okkupatsii v Iugoslavii," tr. 
Valentiy Romanovoi-Devich, in Brajovich, Les Syst'"emes d'Occupation en 
Yougoslavie, p. 430. 
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were divided among Magyar peasants, many of whom were brought into the 
area from Bukovina, Bosnia and Moldavia. 3 In June, 14,000 of these re-
settlers arrived from Bukovina to strengthen the Magyar element in 
. 4 
Batshka. In the environs of Subotica, where seventy per cent of the 
fields were in non-Magyar hands before April, 1941, some 2,300 Magyar 
families were settled on the land within three months. 5 The Hungarians 
borrowed techniques from Hitler in building a homogenous ethnic wall 
along their new southern frontier. 
In August, 1941, civilian government replaced that of the military 
in the Southern Territories. The Yugoslav regions were reincorporated 
into the governmental units to which they had formerly belonged under 
the Habsburgs. The Baranja triangle returned to the County of Baranja, 
, 
and Batschka became once again part of Bacs-Bodrog. The Upper Mur 
Region was divided between the counties of Vas and Zala, as it had been 
before 1920, and the Lower Mur Region was attached to Zala. 
This faithful reconstitution of the lands of the Crown of St. 
Stephen was formally completed on December 27, 1941 with the passage 
6 of Law 20. By its articles, parli:'lmentary government and citizenship 
requirements were established for the Southern Territories. Until 
ele~~ions could be held, representatives to the Hungarian Parliament 
3Ibid., pp. ~433-436. 
4!!1 Magyars(g (Budapest), June 18, 1941. (German synopsis). 
T-81/Roll 553/5328215. 
5!!j_ Magyars!$ (Budapest), August 24, 1941. (German translation). 
T-81/Roll 554/5329672. 
6 The text of the law may be found in Lemkin, Axis Rule in Europe, 
pp. 631-633. 
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for these new areas would be chosen by officials in Budapest. A maxi-
mum of 26 delegates, selected by the Prime Minister and approved by 
both houses of the Parliament, could be sent to its Lower House. Fur-
ther, four delegates would be sent to the Upper House upon proposal by 
the cabinet and appointment by the Regent. Hungarian citizenship was 
confer11ed upon those who had been Hungarian subjects before the Treaty 
of Trianon had assigned them to Yugoslavia in 1920. 
Since they were considered a part of the entire Volksgruppe in 
Hungary, the Protocol of August 30, 1940 became operative for the 
Yugoslav Volksdeutschen once Hungarian troops crossed the Yugoslav 
border. Accordingly, they were organized within the UDV, which was 
recognized as the only representative organ of the minority. Basch 
appointed local officers for the new Batschka-Baranja district, made 
up of the additions from the Yugoslav Voivodina, in May, 1941. 7 Leader 
for the district with headquarters in Zombor (Sombor) was Josef "Sepp" 
Spreitzer. 
The former Yugoslavian Volksdeutschen, whose political experience 
in the interwar period had made them more aggressive than the Hungarian 
Volksdeutschen, radicalized the VDU. Basch, who was not a convinced 
Nazi and who was unpopular with leading officials in the Reich, was 
pushed into an extreme position by the newcomers. 8 Indeed, they consti-
tuted a formidable force within the organization already in the fall of 
1941. Batschka was ahead of all other areas in membership, with fully 
7Paikert, Danube Swabians, p. 176. 
8Ibid., pp. 200-202; Macartney, October Fifteenth, Vol. II, p. 41. 
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ninety-seven per cent of its Germans enrolled. 9 At the annual meeting 
of the association held in Budapest on October 19, 1941, these Volks-
deutschen were conspicuous for their solidarity. Since they had enjoy-
ed such superior achievements in the field of ethnic advancement, it 
was predicted by observers at the time that they would serve as a model 
10 for all Germandom in the Magyar state. Under pressure from these new 
members, the VDU expanded in grand style until it reached its peak in 
the middle of the war. 11 It supported not only a plush Deutsches Haus 
in Budapest but three newspapers as well. In addition to the Deutscher 
Volksbote, which appeared every wee~ in Budapest, the VDU published the 
daily Deutsche Zeitung there. It also took over publication of the 
daily Deutsches Volksblatt of Novi Sad in October, 1941. 12 
Besides enjoying effective representation through the VDU, the 
former Yugoslav Volksdeutschen received unusual privileges under the 
1940 protocol. They were exempt from the general policy of denational-
ization to which other minorities in their area, principally Serbs, 
were subjected. They were permitted their own flags, organizations, 
13 newspapers and schools on an equal basis with the Magyars. Indeed, 
the German school system in Batschka was actively expanded during the 
war years. A secondary school and a teachers' training institute were 
9 . 
A. W., November 1, 1941, from Deutsche Zeitung (Budapest), 
October 21, 1941. T-81/Roll 553/5329230-1. 
10 
DAI Report, A. W., November 19, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329642-5. 
11Paikert, Danube Swabians, pp. 122-128. 
12 
A. W., October 16, 1941, from Berliner B~rsenzeitung (Berlin), 
October 1, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329617. 
13M. . h irnic , "Vengerskii Rezhim okkupatsii," pp. 430-431, 459. 
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reported in Novi Vrbas, a secondary school in Apatin, and three ele-
14 
mentary schools throughout Batsckha. This represented at least an 
increase of two elementary schools over those existing in April, 
1941. 15 
Within the Lutheran Evangelical Church, the Yugoslavian Volks-
deutschen in Hungary were freed from Hungarian control. In the summer 
of 1941, Bishop Popp, who had led the church in Yugoslavia and was now 
its chief representative in Croatia, and Bishop Alexander Raffay, head 
of the church in Hungary, came to an impasse over the organization of 
the church in Batschka and the Baranja triangle. Popp named Heinrich 
Meder, a pastor in Novi Vrbas, provisional leader of the church there. 
Indignant at this invasion of his authority, Raffay rejected the 
appointment. 16 He argued that Meder and his associates were following 
17 
political, not religious goals. In August, for mysterious reasons, 
18 Raffay withdrew his objections to Meder. Subsequently, Meder was 
elected president of the independent German Evangelical State Church 
. " 19 of South Hungary (Deutsch-Evangelische Landeskirche Sudungarns), It 
seems reasonable to assume that Berlin intervened on behalf of Popp, 
whose loyalty to the German cause was well known. Raffay, as a 
14Ibid., p. 463. 
15 
DAI Report, A. W., November 19, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329642-5. 
16Das Evangelische Deutschland, June 15, 1941. T-81/Roll 533/ 
5328416-7. 
17A. W., July 11, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329663. 
18A. W!> August 8, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329662. 
19 Report of Steyer, December 15, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329659. 
Hungarian patriot of note, would not have been sympathetic to the 
20 
development of German consciousness within his church. 
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The favor shown to the German minority in former Yugoslav terri-
tory extended also to governmental appointments. When the civil 
administration was organized, the VDU presented lists of German candi-
dates for various offices with the categorical demand that these be 
21 
accepted. In this connection, the Volksgruppe leadership in 
Batschka won the concession that notaries had to be German in communi-
ties with a volksdeutsche majority. 22 Of the 26 members of the Lower 
House of Parliament appointed in 1942 to represent the Southern Terri-
. 23 
tories, three were volksdeutsch. The Germans were acknowledged as 
a ruling class, along with the Hungarians. 
Despite the benefits they enjoyed, many Germans of the Southern 
Territories were dissatisfied with Hungarian rule. They received 
Hungarian troops without enthusiasm, as has been seen. The antipathy 
of the Magyars for the Volksdeutschen, noted in the Voivodina in the 
interwar period, continued in Batschka and the Baranja triangle through-
out the war. Serious trouble had errupted during the invasion of 
Yugoslavia itself. Excesses committed by Hungarian troops against 
Volksdeutsche in Novi Vrbas infuriated Hitler. 24 Throughout 1941, 
20 
Macartney, October Fifteenth, Vol. I, p. 32. 
2 ~irnich, "Vengerskii Rezhim okkupatsii," pp. 462, 467. 
22 " . Volkischer Beobachter (Vienna), September 27, 1941. 
23 
Macartney, October ·Fifteenth, Vol. II, p. 78. 
24Memorandum on conversation between Hitler and the Hungarian Min-
ister in Berlin, April 19, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, pp. 581-
586; Ribbentrop to Erdmannsdorf, April 23, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XIII, pp. 621-623. 
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embittered Volksdeutsche reported that they were constantly harrassed. 
The Hungarians warned them to speak Magyar, not German, since they ate 
Hungarian bread. 25 The mayor of Apatin actually had his ears boxed 
be cause he could not speak Hungarian. 26 Further, the Magyars made it 
clear that they intended to keep Batschka forever and had no use for 
27 ;' 
followers of Hitler in their holy land. Even Szalasi, the Arrow 
Cross leader who would collaborate with the Nazis in 1944-1945, exco-
riated the Volksdeutschen of South Hungary in the summer of 1941. He 
claimed in a fiery speech that their activities were disastrous for the 
48 unity of the Magyar state. Things came to such a pass that Horthy in-
formed Hitler in 1943 that the Swabians were completely detested because 
of their behavior and suggested their repatriation within Germany at 
29 
the end of the war. 
In this atmosphere of mutual hatred, Budapest discriminated 
against Germans in various ways. The German minority in Batschka and 
the Baranja triangle struggled against alleged infringements of their 
rights. Some Volksdeutschen dedicated to their German heritage lost 
their jobs as teachers and government office-holders to Magyars or 
. 'l d G 30 assimi ate ermans. A meeting of the VDU in Novi Sad was forbidden 
25 Report of Johann Abel from Batschka, May, 1941. T-81/Roll 553/ 
5328651. 
26 Report of Steyer, June 17, 1941. T-81/Roll 553/5328401. 
27 Letter of Barbara Beiler from Batschka, November 26, 1941. 
T-81/Roll 554/5329534-7. 
28 A. W., September 4, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329709. 
29 Macartney, October Fifteenth, Vol. II, pp. 150-151. 
30 DAI Report, A. W., October 24, 1941. T-81/Roll 553/5328963-7. 
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shortly after the invasion because of an inflammatory speech made by 
S . 31 preitzer. German names were erased and rendered in their Magyar 
f . . b k f . . 32 orms in register oo s o many communities. In an important speech 
made in late 1942 before the Hungarian Parliament, a volksdeutscher 
deputy from Batschka, Josef Trischler, evaluated the situation of his 
constituents. He spoke of the acute danger that Germans might be dis-
possessed in the current land reforms within his province. 33 Wuescht, 
who was employed by VOMI in Budapest during the war, was active in 
focusing attention in Berlin on the numerous deficiencies of the 
Hungarian occupation in Batschka as far as the Volksdeutschen were 
34 
concerned. 
Not all members of the minority, however, shared in the opinion 
that the Hungarian rule was oppressive. A Fidelity Movement (~ 
Mozgalon) was begun in 1941 by the Hungarians for those Volksdeutschen 
whose loyalty to the state superceded their loyalty to the Volk. Fear 
of reprisal kept membership low. 35 . Apparently attempts were made to 
entice the Volksdeutschen of former Yugoslavia into its ranks. Reich 
officials were aware of the presence of George Steuer in Batschka in 
the summer of 1941. An opponent of Bleyer in the interwar years, 
Steuer was suspected of trying to infiltrate the German minority on 
31 
Report of Volksdeutsch women from Batschka, September, 1941. 
T-81/Roll 554/5329540-1 . .. 
32 
A. W., July 21, 1941. T-81/Roll 554/5329584. 
33Die Zeit (Reichenberg), December 3, 1942. 
34Paike'rt, Danube Swabians, p. 175. 
35rbid., pp. 128-129. 
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36 
behalf of Budapest, Die Donau, while continuing to blast Nazi ideal-
ogy, urged the Volksdeutschen to support the Hungarian government, It 
warned them not to exaggerate problems with Budapest, as this course 
f . ld 1 k h . . . 37 o action wou on y wea en t eir position, The newspaper roundly 
criticized the VDU policies in Batschka, which antagonized Magyar 
authorities. Spreitzer and his company only brought discredit on the 
38 German word, the editors charged. In 1942, Die Donau was reportedly 
organizing the Volksdeutschen to succeed from the Volksbund, 39 After 
the Germans occupied Hungary on March 19, 1944, the weekly was sup-
pressed, 
The tug of war between Berlin and Budapest over their allegiance 
was not the only dilemma facing the Volksdeutschen, They were also 
accused of persecuting the Serbs in Batschka and the Baranja triangle, 
While wholesale slaughter in the province did not match that in 
Croatia, a blood bath of ugly proportions occurred early in 1942, The 
Hungarian army was responsible for this massacre in which several thou-
sand Serbs and Jews were killed, principally in Novi Sad, Volksdeutsche 
were said to have taken part, but direct proof of these allegations was 
40 
never uncovered, Leopold Rohrbacher, who served on the editorial 
staff of Die Donau during the war years, testified that native Germans 
36 
Report of Steyer, June 6, 1941. T-81/Roll 553/5328213-4. 
37 DAI Report, August 8, 1941, T-81/Roll 554/5329580, 
38 
Report of Steyer, September 5, 1941, T-81/Roll 554/5329578, 
39Paikert, Danube Swabians, p. 176. 
40 
Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 267, 
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of Batschka often interceded for the terror-stricken Serbs.41 Never-
the less, their uneasy alliance with the Magyars worked to the disad-
vantage of the Volksdeutschen when it came to settling accounts with 
the Serbs later. 
Like their ethnic brothers in other parts of the splintered 
Yugoslav state, volksdeutsche men of the Southern Territories were soon 
called to arms. On February 24, 1942, an agreement was reached between 
Germany and Hungary over the recruitment of volksdeutschen men between 
the ages of 18 and 30 into the Waffen-Ss. 42 By its terms, able-bodied 
men of the minority could choose between serving in the Hungarian army 
or the Waffen-SS. If they chose the latter, they forfeited their 
Hungarian citizenship and became Reich Germans. The recruitment cam-
paign was carried out under "fire and sword." Since recruiters distin-
guished between Germans and non-Germans among the enlistees, 
Volksdeutsche who felt themselves to be German with conviction were 
forced to choose the Waffen-SS under restraint of conscience. 43 Of the 
27,000 so-called volunteers, mostly from Batschka-Baranja, 18,000 were 
accepted into SS units. 44 More Volksdeutsche were made available to 
the German war machine by two additional German-Hungarian agreements. 
On May 22, 1943, Budapest freed Germans between the ages of 18 and 35, 
even those enrolled in the Hungarian army, for the Waffen-SS. Again, 
41 
Rohrbacher, Ein Volk ausgeloscht, p. 119. 
42 
The text of the agreement may be found in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol. V, pp. 169-176E. 
43 Report of J. H. in Schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 74-78. 
44M. . h irnic , "Vengerskii Rezhim okkupatsii," p. 468. 
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on April 14, 1944, the Hungarian government gave up all right to 
mobilize Hungarian Volksdeutsche over 17 years of ageo These were to 
be recruited solely by the Germans. The inductees would acquire 
G 0 . h" b 1 h . H . . . h" b f 45 erman citizens ip ut not ose t eir ungarian citizens ip as e oreo 
Under these agreements, an untold number of Volksdeutschen from 
the Southern Territories served in German military formations during 
the war. Many of them were enrolled in the 8th SS Cavalry Division, 
known as the Florian Geyer Divisiono SS-officers who wished to appeal 
to peasant recruits in Hungary were apparently inspired by Gerhart 
Hauptmann's famous play, Florian Geyer, in choosing this nameo Geyer 
had led the Peasant Rebellion in the sixteenth century, and the 8th SS 
Cavalry Division was presumably acting in the great tradition under 
Nazi guidance. Formed in the fall of 1942, the Division was neither 
~lite nor well-trained. It was used as an occupation force in Batschka 
after March 19, 1944, 46 and destroyed before Budapest in the winter of 
1944-1945 0 
The Yugoslav Volksdeutschen reincorporated into Hungary between 
1941 and 1945 expected to be treated as a superior peopleo From the 
Hungarian viewpoint, the 1940 protocol accorded them no less than extra-
territorial rightso From the Reich German viewpoint, however, the 
concessions were inadequateo Because Hungary enjoyed an unusual 
measure of independence for an Axis partner, Berlin could not dictate 
to Budapest on internal matters with as much force as elsewhereo The 
45 
The text of the agreements may be found in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Volo V, ppo 169-176E. 
46 Macartney, October Fifteenth, Vol. II, p. 2580 
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VDU leadership would have done well to heed the editorial advice of 
Die Donau and accept Magyar administration, however flawed, with grace. 
Instead, continued Volksgruppe agitation ensured that the Volksdeutschen 
of the Southern Territories would remain one of those untenable 
"splinters of the German nationality" of which Hitler had despaired in 
1939. 
CHAPTER V 
THE VOLKSDEUTSCHEN OF YUGOSLAVIA WITHIN 
BANAT/OLD SERBIA 
In the summer of 1941, a volksdeutscher informant complained to 
the DAI that the Serbian Banat was really a no-man's land, in which the 
German authorities were too preoccupied to pay much attention to the 
members of his ethnic group. 1 This assessment summarizes well the 
position of the German minority in the eastern half of the Yugoslav 
Voivodina during 1941-1945. (See Map 7). Despite repeated assertion 
that the Volksdeutschen of the Banat ruled the region as their own 
autonomous province, ,in actual· fact they enjoyed power for less than 
a year and even then under tight supervision. These Germans native to 
the soil could not cope with the chaotic conditions nor live up to the 
high expectations which Nazi ideology held for them. After all the 
paper of an unbelievably complex series of legal actions is cleared 
away, it becomes obvious that the ~anat was governed during the war 
chiefly by the German military and police apparatus stationed in Old 
Serbia. For their complicity in this oppressive police state, the 
Banat Volksdeutschen would pay the same ruinous price exacted from 
their counterparts in the Independent State of Croatia and the Yugoslav 




regions reincorporated into Hungary. 
Throughout the entire occupation, the Volksdeutschen were acknowl-
edged, if only nominally, as the ruling class in the Serbian Banat. 
They represented about twenty per cent of the 585,549 inhabitants of 
\ 
the province recorded in the 1931 census .. Among the 120,000 Germans 
there lived about 274,000 Serbo-Croatians, 96,000 Magyars, 62,000 
Rumanians and splinters of various other ethnic groups. The 1941 
census showed an increase in the total population since 1931, but the 
nationality distribution remained proportionately the same. The occu-
pation may be divided into two periods according to the degree of 
volksdeutscher participation in the actual governing of the Banat: 1) 
from April 9, 1941 to January 31, 1942, when the Volksdeutschen were in 
control of the civilian administration within the framework of the 
German military occupation of Old. Serbia, and 2) from February 1, 1942 
to October 2, 1944, when the Volksdeutschen became mere figureheads in 
2 
an SS-dominated state. 
When the German troops entered. the province on April 9, the local 
volksdeutschen leaders under Janko were caught off guard. They had 
expected that the Germans would occupy all o.f the Voivodina and had pre-
pared to receive them at the seat of the Kulturbund in Novi Sad. 3 But 
the diplomatic problems posed by Hungarian and Rumanian claims to the 
area necessitated the partition of the Voivodina between Hungarian and 
German forces and the aborting of plans for a Donaustaat under Berlin's 
2These two periods are based on four identified by Vegh, "Le 
Syst~me du Pouvoir d'Occupation.Allemand dans le Banat Yougoslave," 
pp. 496-545. 
3rbid, , p, 498. 
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protection. 4 Consequently, the Volksdeutschen seized power without 
uniform direction in the joyous days immediately after the invas·ion. 
Anti-Semitism was strongly in evidence as they proceeded to take over 
key posts in all eleven districts and five municipalities of the 
Banat. 5 In vrYac, for example, all Jewish businesses were marked with 
a red star of David and a sign reading "Jewish business," and Jews 
6 were put to work cleaning the streets. 
Janko and his associates met the urgent need for organization 
among the minorit~ members in the Banat by forming the German Ethnic 
Colony in Banat and Serbia (Deutsche Volksgruppe in Banat und Serbien). 
All former Kulturbund members of the Banat and Serbia were included in 
this group, which extended its authority also into Eastern Srem until 
that area was awarded to Croatia late in 1941. Its pattern was identi-
cal to the Deutsche Volksgruppe in Kroatien: six main offices at the 
seat of the organization in Petrovgrad (Veliki Be~kerek, Gross-
Betschkerek, Zrenjanin), six districts, and Official Gazette (Verord-
nungsblatt), and auxiliary branches for men, women, and youth (Deutsche 
7 
Mannschaft~ Frauenschaft and Deutsche Jugend). The German minority of 
Serbia, numbering about 12,000 members and chiefly found in Belgrade, 
4 
For a review of factors involved in the partition of the 
Voivodina and of expectations for a Donaustaat, see pages 105-108 
""' ffiipra. 
5 ' Vegh, "Le Systeme du Pouvoir d 'Occupation Allemand dans le Banat 
Yougoslave," pp. 498, 548. 
6s~dostdeutsche Tageszeitung (Timisoara), April 26, 1941. 
7vegh, "Le Syst~me du Pouvoir d'Occupation Allemand dans le Banat 
Yougoslave," p. 508. 
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formed the Prince Eugene District (Prinz Eugen Kreis) of the Volks-
gruppe. 
Tf).e volksdeutsche assumption of power in the Banat was consummated 
within the authority of the German occupation forces. Shortly after 
the Yugoslav capitulation, the Commander in Chief of the Army issued a 
series of proclamations and ordinances to the residents of the Old 
Serbia and the Banat. 8 They established draconian guidelines for the 
German rule. On April 20, a Commanding General in Serbia (Milit~r-
befehlshaber in Serbien) was named. With his headquarters in Belgrade, 
this officer was entrusted with complete responsibility for the occupied 
Yugoslav territories. His headquarters were divided into two executive 
offices: one for military affairs to insure safety and ord~r and 
9 another for civil administration to govern the country. The following 
month, Hitler gave the Commanding General all necessary power to carry 
out his mission independently. 10 Incumbents of this high office 
included General Helmuth von FYrster, General von Schrffder, General 
Heinrich Danckelmann and General Felber. The German military command 
communicated to the citizenry through its Verorduriungsblatt. 
The Banat was officially incorporated into this occupation system 
with elaborate bureaucratic machinery. Of the four military commands 
in occupied Yugoslav territories, it was placed within Field. Command 
8The text of these proclamations and ordinances may be found in 
Lemkin, Axis Rule in Europe, pp. 591-602. 
9Marjanovi~, "German Occupation System in Serbia in 1941," 
277-279. 
PP· 
lOHitler's Directive of May 17, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. XII, 
pp. 846-847. 
610, which encompassed Banat and a district directly to the south on 
the other side of the Danube. Within this Field Command, the Banat 
formed Command.District 823 with headquarters in Petrovgrad. The 
office there took charge of both police and civil administration on 
11 
the local leve 1. 
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Alongside this occupation structure was imposed a Serbian puppet 
regime on May 1. A Council of Commissars was established under Milan 
Airnovie', and the organs of the provinces (banovinas), which had been 
in use in Yugoslavia before the war, were restored. With certain 
boundary changes necessitated by the partition of the South Slav state, 
three provinces were thus reactivated: ~he Danube (Dunavska), the 
Drina (Drinska) and the Monrava (Moravska). (See Map 6). The Banat 
fell within the Danube Province. Under the Council of Commissars, the 
Minister of the Interior performed the most essential business of the 
state, but the whole government was subordinated to the administrative 
headquarters of the Commanding General in Serbia. 12 On August 29, 
1941, General Milan Nedi( assumed the position of head of the Council 
of Commissars. 
In this maze of r~d tape, the Volksdeutschen succeeded in regular-
izing their de facto rule of the Banat on June 14, 1941. An ordinance 
by the Ministry of the Interior stipulated that the Banat, without 
Pan~evo, would form a district administrative region within the Danube 
11 ' Vegh, "Le Systerne du Pouvoir d 'Occupation Allemand dans le Banat 
Yugos lave," pp. 506-507. 
12Marjanovi~, "German Occupation Sys tern in Serbia in 1941," pp. 
28'2-2830 
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Province, 13 It would be administered by a Vice-Governor (Vize-Banus) 
with a seat at Petrovgrad. This official had to be a German nomi~ated 
by the Minister of the Interior after consultation with the leader of 
the Volksgruppe. Office-holders in the Banat were to be appointed by 
the Minister of the Interior upon recommendation of the Vice-Governor, 
The Volksdeutschen were thus assured domination of the governmental 
agencies in the Banat. German and Serbian were designated as official 
languages. On December 18, the three provinces of former Yugoslavia 
were dissolved and replaced by fourteen regions. One of these com-
prised the Banat, in which the Vice-Governor was renamed the Chief of 
the Region. 
14 
Otherwise the June 14 ordinance was unchanged, Follow-
ing the chain of command outlined above, the volksdeutschen authorities 
in the Banat were responsible to the following organs in ascending 
order of importance: the Serbian Council of Commissars, Command 
District 823, Field Command 610 and the headquarters for civil admin-
istration of the Commanding General in Servia. But this intricate 
governmental network was a house of cards; it remained operative for 
only a half a year. 
On January 31, 1942, the period of volksdeutscher control of the 
civilian administration in the Banat came to an abrupt end, Widespread 
unrest in the province required the application of massive police 
power. Measures used in the fall of 1941 to protect a single railroad 
line illustrate the kind of punitive action the Germans took to keep 
13 
The text of the ordinance may be found in Lemkin,.Axis Rule in 
Europe, pp. 602-606. 
14 ' Vegh, "Le Systeme du Pouvoir d'Occupation Allemand dans le Banat 
Yugos lave," p, 532. 
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the peace. Because an attempt had been made to sabotage the railroad, 
twelve Serbians were executed forthwith. Then the German Army ordered 
a night watch to protect the line, which required the parci~cipation 
of all residents in the area. Further, the Wehrmacht warned that 38 
people already in jail would be killed upon the next attempt at 
. 15 
sabotage. In the winter of 1941-1942, a large number of Partisan 
forces were destroyed; but they still resisted. 16 Clearly, the Volks-
deutschen did not possess the milit~y capability to suppress [nsur-
rection on such a scale. 
In view of the growing emergency, a pplice state was created in 
the Banat on February 1, 1942. The province, as well as Old Serbia, 
u was placed under a Superior SS-and Police Leader (Hoherer SS-und 
Polizeif~hrer) stationed in Belgrade, who superceded all the governmen-
tal trappings constructed earlier. Within his competence was created 
a Banat State Guard (Banater Staatswache), manned chiefly by Volks-
deutschen. Since members of the Watch wore black uniforms, they were 
called the Black Police (Schwarze Polizei). 17 Terror methods were used 
by this formation to intimidate not only non-German opponents of the 
occupation but recalcitrant Volksdeutschen as well. 18 SS rule <lorn-
inated in the Banat until the region was liberated by the Russian Army 
and the Partisans on October 2, 1944. 
15 u . Neue Zurcher Zeitung (Zurich), October 2, 1941. 
16n 1 .~ Y 1 . . h S d W ld W 82 on agic, ugos avia in ~ econ or ar, p. . 
17 . 
Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 266; Beitrag zur 
Geschichte, po 93. 
18 
Report of M. R. in Schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 65-68. 
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Questions of security were undoubtedly the major cause for the 
downfall of the volksdeutschen regime in the Banat. However, their 
incompatibility with Reich Germans may possibly also have played a 
role. They did not make a good impression in German Army headquarters 
in Belgrade, where officers judged them as too "Balkanized. 1119 On 
their part, many Volksdeutsche became disgruntled with their situation 
soon after the occupation, and opposition to the Volksgruppe leadership 
20 
developed. In turn, the Volksgruppe moved increasingly into positions 
. . B l' 21 antagonistic to er in. 
Throughout the three and a half years of German occupation the 
I 
Volksdeutschen were granted advantages denied to other ethnic groups in 
that Banat in addition to the supposed control of local government. On 
July 19, 1941, and again on August 6, 1943, orders issued by the Council 
of Commissars clarified the legal position of the Volksgruppe in Banat 
22 
and Old Serbia. The terminology was reminiscent of Pavelich's 
decrees on the Croatian Volksgruppe. All ethnic Germans recognized by 
the Volksgruppe leadership were permitted to ~ngage in political, 
cultural, economic and social work. The Volksgruppe was ranked as a 
juridicial person, and the Nazi outlook was encouraged. The privileged 
position of the Volksdeutschen was also seen in economic transactions 
19Letter of Daniel Stolz from Belgrade, August 31, 1941. T-81/ 
Roll 544/5316596-8. 
20Report of Friedrich Becker of Banat, July/August, 1941. T-81/ 
Roll 544/5316589-93. 
21 Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 265. 
22 
The text of the August 6, 1943 order may be found in Schieder, 
Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 138-140E. 
in the Banat. After the invasion, they were permitted to purchase 
property confiscated from Jews and Dobrovolzen at bargain prices. 23 
Under these circumstances, the German minority found itself 
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roundly hated by other residents of the province. Hungarian antagori-
ism toward the group mirrored that found in the Batschka. Hungarian 
diplomats openly admitted that no good relations existed between the 
24 
Magyars and the Volksdeutschen in the Banat. Since the Serbs were 
the target of most of the reprisals, their attitude toward Nazi collab-
orators ne1ecl not be belabored. Between April 9, 1941 and October 2, 
1944, nearly 3,000 people lost their lives in punitive. actions in the 
25 
Banat. Yet in German circles, the Banat was known as an "oasis of 
II h . 26 peace at t e time. Such a judgment can only be made relative to 
greater terrors elsewhere on Yugoslav land, because it was a peace 
bought at the price of blood and repression. 
The volksdeutsche reputation was further seriously comprised by 
the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division, the famous Prince Eugene 
Division, which was manned largely by Germans from the Banat. Formed 
in the spring of 1942, it was the first of many foreign units soon to 
flood the Waffen-SS. The division, to be composed solely of volks-
deutschen volunteers from former Yugoslavia was designed to counter 
23Nemzet Ujsag (Budapest), July 24, 1941. (German review) T-81/ 
Roll 544/5316215. 
24Memorandum by WeizsM~ker, May 28, 1941. DGFP, Series D, Vol. 
XII, pp. 909-910. 
25 .... 
Vegh, "Le Systeme du Pouvoir d 10ccupation Allemand dans le Banat 
Yougoslave," p. 544. 
26 
Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 266. 
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· 11 . y 1 . 27 guerri a operations on ugos av terrain. On March 1, Janko issued 
a call in the Banat for all native German men between the ages of 17 
d 50 f . 28 an or war service. But the recruiting campaign subsequent to 
Janko's appeal failed to produce enough soldiers. Since coercion and 
conscription were then utilized to fill its ranks, the Prince Eugene 
\. 
D. . . . l" 1 . 29 ivision was in rea ity never a vo untary unit. Obstinent refusal on 
the part of many Volksdeutschen to cooperate with recruiters led to 
. friction between Janko and Himmler in the summer of 1942. Janko re-
fused to acknowledge that the Volksdeutschen·had any legal duty to 
serve in the German army or the Waffen-SS. Exasperated. at th:is.,p9si.:. 
tion, Himmler retorted that Volksdeutsche all over the world must 
perform war service and that it was impossible to allow European Volks-
deutschen to go around as pacifists while Reich Germans protected 
30 
them. By late 1943 and early 1944, 15,000 members of the German 
. . f B l" d . h P . E D" · · 31 minority o anat were en iste in t e rince ugene ivision. 
Despite their reluctance to serve in this formation of the Waffen-
SS, its volksdeutschen members shared in its notoriety. As one of the 
strongest and best equipped German divisions in Yugoslavia, its actions 
27stein, Waffen-SS, p. 170. 
28 
The text of the appeal may be found in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol. V, pp. 167-168E. 
29stein, Waffen-SS, pp. 170-172. 
30The text of a communication on Janko's position by Himmler, 
dated August 10, 1942, may be found in Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das 
Dritte Reich, p. 317. 
31Paikert, Danube Swabians, p. 280; Schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V, 
pp. 64-67E. 
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. b 1 . 32 in att e were conspicuous. Unfortunately, the Prince Eugene Divi-
sion became infamous for outrages on innocent people. Even at the 
Nuremberg trials, Nazi witnesses did not deny its criminal activities, 
but argued instead that warfare in Yugoslavia was traditionally 
33 
brutal. The main body of the force was destroyed in Serbia in late 
1944, and its remnants annihilated in Slovenia in May, 1945. Because 
the Prince Eugene Division was all-Swabian in composition, its record 
was just another piece of evidence to buttress the theory of collective 
guilt of all Volksdeutschen in the reign of terror. 
If the volksdeutsche position was precarious in the Banat, .it was 
dangerous in the extreme in Old Serbia. It was determined early in the 
war to resettle the several thousand Volksdeutschen scattered through-
out Old Serbia, excluding the compact settlement in Belgrade. The 
Deutsche Volksgruppe in Banat und Serbien began their evacuation under 
emergency conditions shortly after the invasion quite independent of 
the RKFDV. In the first months of the make-shift operation directed 
by Dr. Anton Volk, only three people carried it out as best they could. 
By March, 1942, the Volksgruppe had rescued more than 2,000 Volks-
deutsche from isolated settlements in Serbia. Of these, about 1,400 
were relocated in Germany; 370 in Lower Styria; 200 in Croatia; 160 in 
34 Banat; and 30 in Belgrade. In May, 300 more Volksdeutsche were on 
their way into the Reich. At that time, VOMI officials took over the 
32n 1 ·"' Y 1 . · h S d W ld W 113 on agic, ugos avia in ~ econ __£E___ ar, p. . 
33stein, Waffen-SS, p. 273. 
34 Report by Anton Volk, March 7, 1942. T-81/Roll 307/2435341-4. 
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resettlement and planned to remove about 2,000 more Volksdeutschen from 
Old Serbia. 35 A year later, during,August, 1943, 954 people were 
transported into the Reich. Most of them were approved by EWZ exami-
ners f G . . h' 36 or erman citizens ip. In all, more than 3,000 Volksdeutsche 
were thus removed from Old Serbia during the German occupation. 
In addition to clearing Old Serbia of German splinters, an effort 
was also made by the Volksgruppe leadership to sift out undesirable 
Germans living in Belgrade. Janka wired Himmler in July, 1943 that 
only superior, racially reliable Germans should remain in the Serbian 
capital, because it would be unthinkable to allow Germans to be 
servants or office-workers for Serbs! Accordingly, he requested per-
mission to send about 2,500 unreliable Germans who had Serbian-speaking 
children or other Serbian tendencies into Germany for racial reinforce-
37 ment. It is doubtful that this request was heeded. 
The Volksdeutschen of the Banat were anything but servants for 
Serbs during the war years. There was a substantive difference between 
their status and that of the Volksdeutschen in Croatia and the Southern 
Territories of Hungary. They were not only accorded privileges but 
were given control of the entire province within the occupation struc-
ture of Serbia. Whereas an Elicker as governor of Srem was considered 
35 n . 
Vermerk uber die Besprechung der Umsiedlung Restserbien beim 
Reichskommissar, May 8, 1942. T-81/Roll 307/2435338-9. 
36Abschlussbericht ~her die Erfassung van Volksdeutschen 




37 The text of Janka's telegram, dated July 3, 1943, may be found 
in Kark Hnilicka, Das Ende auf dem Balkan, 1944-1945. Die militMrische 
d:umung Jugoslavie~d~ die ~tsche Weh~ht (G~ttingen, 1970), 
pp. 271-273. 
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unusual in Croatia and German notaries in German communities were seen 
as positive triumphs in Batschka, the placement of Germans in all the 
highest offices was the order of the day in the Banat. The ~olks-
deutsche rule may have been a sham, but Volksdeutsche were all too 
willing to cooperate in its establishemnt and therein lay their un-
I 
doing. It was a great tragedy that the evacuation of the Volksdeutschen 
in the Banat was forbidden by the Volksgruppe leadership even as the 
Russian Army approached. Only a few escaped; most were left to the 
mercies of enraged Partisans bent on retribution. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE VOLKSDEUTSCHEN OF THE SLOVENE AREAS 
ANNEXED TO THE THIRD REICH1 
The Slovene territory occupied by Germany in April, 1941, was 
scheduled to be included legally in the Greater German Reich. It was 
the last of the several additions to the German Lebensraum made under 
Hitler. As the Grossdeutsch views on Slovenia finally attained reality, 
Upper Carniola within Gau Carinthia and Lower Styria within Gau Styria 
became frontier zones at the southernmost extension of Greater Germany. 
(See Map 9). After the invasion, Hitler ordered one of his lieutenants 
in Slovenia to "make this land German again for me. 112 When the recon-
struction work was complete, the Slovenian outpost of the Third Reich 
was to form a living wall against the encroachments of the racially un-
suitable hordes beyond the border. 
Since the population was overwhelmingly Slovene, the task of 
carrying out the FMhrer's directive would be formidable. Shortly after 
the occupation, a five-man commission toured Lower Styria and Upper 
Carniola to take an inventory on the new German acquisitions. The 
1Portions of this chapter have appeared in Helga H. Harriman, 
"Slovenia as an Outpost of the Third Reich," Eastern European Quarterly, 
Vol. V (1971), pp. 222-231. 
2Quoted in Ferenc, "Le Syst~me d'Occupation des Nazis en Slov{nie," 
pp. 50, 121-122. 
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169 
commission reported 615,000 people in Lower Styria and in the Carin-
thian additions to Yugoslavia, which included the Me~a Valley, 
Dravgrad and the Commune of Jezersko. The proportion of the Slovene 
170 
population ranged from seventy-eight to one-hundred per cent in these 
various areas, and the only appreciable minority was the German. In 
Upper Carniola, the population of 209,500 people was classed as one-
3 hundred per cent Slovene. In ail, there were probably less than 
13,000 Volksdeutsche in the Slovene areas annexed to the Reich at the 
time of the inventory. 
Since the thrust of the German occupation of Slovenia centered 
on preparing it for incorporation in the Reich, the influence of the 
Volksdeutschen was rather negligible in the war years. Those in the 
v 
Kocevje district which was annexed to the Italian Province of Ljubljana 
became mere pawns in the hands of the RKFDV, as they were resettled 
along the border of Lower Styria. These resettlers and other Volks-
deutsche in the Slovene areas annexed to the Reich were given a privi-
leged position, to be sure, but they could not make much of an impact. 
Not only were they sternly controlled by Reich officials, but Slovene 
uprisings disrupted normal life in the province already from the ear-
liest days of the occupation. 
Although Upper Carniola was attached to Carintha, and Lower Styria 
to Styria, the Slovene provinces were to be administered as separate 
units until they were actually incorporated into the Reich. The su-
preme command in each territory was exercised by the Chief of Civil 
3zusammenfassender Bericht der Kommission die mit der Bestandsauf-
nahme in den Gebieten der Untersteiermark und slldkt<rnten beauftragt 
war, September 13, 1941. 'T-81/Roll 284/2407072--95. 
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Administration (Chef der Zivilverwaltung). Only in matters pertaining 
to the post, telegraph, railways and customs was there central direc-
tion from competent ministries in Berlin. For all else, each Chief of 
Civil Administration was responsible directly to Hitler through Hans 
Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery. He was given an independent 
budget with :the widest scope of power in order t.o carry out the task of 
4 preparing the land for reattachment to the Fatherland. 
The Chief of Civil Administration in both Lower Styria and Upper 
Carniola was also Gauleiter and Reichstatthalter (provincial leader of 
the NSDAP and~ governor; only the first title was generally used) of 
Styria and Carinthia respectively. The Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. 
Siegfried Ueberreither, entered into his duties as Chief of the Civil 
Administration for Lower Styria on April 14, 1941. -Franz Kutschera, 
acting Gauleiter of Carinthia at the time, took over as Chief of the 
Civil Administration for Upper Carniola between April 15 and 30 of the 
same year. On November 30, 1941, he was succeeded by the incoming 
Gauleiter of Carinthia, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, who had previously been 
Gauleiter of Salzburg. 
In order to facilitate the germanization of Slovenia, the Nazis 
accepted the Wendish racial theory developed in the interwar years on 
the Germanic nature of the Slovenes. They operated throughout their 
occupation on the assumption that some Slovenes were acceptable in the 
Reich and others were not. They referred often to "germanizable" 
4clifton J. Child, "Poli ti cal Structure of Hitler's Europe," in 
Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., Survey of International Affairs 
1939-:1945: Hitler's Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 
pp. 99-100. 
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(eindeutschungsfUhig) and "non-germanizable" (nichteindeutschungsd\iig) 
Slovenes. The criteria for identifying the non-germanizable people 
seem to have degenerated into a process of excluding thbse who guarded 
' 
their Slovene national consciousness, who didn't "look German", or who 
exhibited hostility toward the German occupation forces. 
Those who were deemed germanizable were subjected to a series of 
measures designed to assimilate them into the German folk group. These 
included prohibition of the Slovene language and imposition of German 
in its place and German infiltration of the school system. Further, 
organizations were established which enrolled these Slovenes in the 
same ranks as the Volksdeutschen. After the occupation began, the 
Styrian Homeland Union (Steierischer Heimatbund) and the Carinthian 
Folk Union (J<l:rntner Volksbund) were formed.for Lower Styria and Upper 
Carniola respectively. All 10,818 members of the Kulturbund in Lower 
Styria were inducted into the Heimatbund en masse. Command posts in 
both organizations went to former Kulturbund members. 5 In contrast 
to the Volksgruppen in Croatia, Hungary and Banat/Old Serbia, these 
groups were not devoted exclusively to volksdeutschen concerns. 
Belonging to the Heimatbund or Volksbund was considered a prerequi-
site for German citizenship. Permanent members were automatically 
granted full citizenship (deutsche Staatsangeh~rigkeit), while temporary 
members were g~ven a revokable citizenship status (deutsche Staatsange-
hMrigkeit auf Widerruf). The distinction between these two categories 
was based on the degree of German nationality exhibited by various 
members. With the bestowal of some form of citi,zenship, members were 
5Ferenc, "Le Syst~me d'Occupation des Nazis en Sloefene," pp. 67-69. 
liable for service in the Gennan Army. Military conscription was 
introduced in Lower Styria in March, 1942, and in Upper Carniola the 
6 
£o llowing July. 
The organization in Lower Styria was much more successful than 
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that in Upper Carniola. A comparison of the effectiveness of the local 
militia (Wehrmannschaft) associated with each confirms this assessment. 
The Wehrmannschaft in Upper Carniola had disintegrated by early 1942, 
while the same group in Lower Styria was operative until the spring of 
1944. 7 This difference can be attributed to the resistance in the two 
regions. Guerrilla forces in Upper Carniola, already in operation in 
the summer of 1941, gained real strength after the spring of 1942. In 
Lower Styria, the first general resistance materialized only in the 
spring of 1943. The Germans were more effective here also because 
they coveted the territory more, they were better organized, and they 
had a more unified and larger German minority upon which t~ base their 
occupation. 8 Patently, the difference in the intensity of the national:-
ity struggle in Lower Styria and Carniola, which had been evident in 
the Habsburg days was still operative in more recent times. 
Recognizing that undesirable foreign elements were present in 
German-occupied Slovenia to disrupt the germanization process, the 
Nazis planned their removal. They decided in May to deport between 
260,000-280,000 non-germanizable Slovenes, nearly one third of the 
population, to Old Serbia and Croatia. The Slavic evacuees would be 
6rbid., pp. 72-84. 
7Ibid., PP· 90-91, 93. 
8Ibid., pp. 76-77' 79-80, 89. 
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replaced by members of former German minority groups abroad who were 
available in resettlement camps in Germany. Enormous problems attend~ 
ent to the unstable conditions throughout the Yugoslav territories 
caused a sharp curtailment of this program. Less than 20,000 Slovenes 
were actually expelled from Slovenia into Old Serbia and Croatia between 
June and September, 1941. Since there was no place to send the large 
number of unwanted Slovenes, they simply had to remain in Lower Styria 
and Upper Carniola. The Nazis were then confronted with the urgent 
problem of how to make room for the Kotevje Germans, who were scheduled 
to arrive in the annexed Slovene areas from the Province of Ljubljana. 
As mentioned previously, these Volksdeutschen were exempted from 
Hitler's decision of August 2, which postponed volksdeutsche resettle-
ment from Southeastern Europe. On Himler's orders, 35,000 Slovenes of 
the new frontier zone along the Sava and Sotla (Sattelbach) rivers in 
Lower Styria were sent into Germany between October, 1941 and June, 
1942. (See Map 9). The Germans systematically cleared only about 
55,000 Slovenes from their area of occupation. 
On August 12, 1942, Gauleiter Ueberreither made a public announce-
ment that the resettlement activities in the border zone of Lower 
Styria, were ended. 9 This date can be taken as a termination of the 
entire resettlement program for Slovenia, because the Sava~Sotla strip 
was the major site of the program in the first place and no others were 
developed. Quite prematurely, the Nazis had to abandon the most crucial 
step toward the conversion of Slovenia into an impregnable frontier 
9Kundmachung tber die Beendigung der Um-und-Aussiedlung in der 
Untersteiermark, rtajerski Gospodar, August 15, 1942. T-81/Roll 
306/2434211. 
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zone for the German race. After fifteen months of German rule, it was 
clear that Slovenia would not become the outpost of the Third Reich 
that Nazi planners had envisioned. 
As the Slovene expulsions commenced in the spring of 1941, so did 
the preparations for the transfer of the Germans in the Italian-held 
portion of Slovenia to the Reich. In May, the Volksgruppe leaders of 
the Korevje Germans issued the call for the coming resettlement. They 
admonished tl:E Volksdeutschen to await Hitler's orders with iron 
d . . l' 10 iscip ine. On August 31, an Italian-German treaty was signed for 
the relocation of the Volksdeutschen from the Province of Ljubljana. 11 
The German population in the province included 12,400 people in the 
V, 
KocevJe district, 1,500 in Ljubljana and its environs and about 500 
. h d . . 12 more in ot er scattere communities. 
In the fall, the Italians permitted the EWZ to enter their terri-
f . . f h . 1 13 tory or registration o t ese prospective resett ers. Of the 11, 7 56 
v 
Kocevje residents recorded as opting for resettlement within the Reich, 
11, 113 were given a "ST" (Steiermark) classification, indicating that 
they were to move into the frontier zone of Lower Styria. Less 
reliable settlers, who numbered 562, were classified "A" for transport 
into the Altreich. They were to be given employment and Reich bonds 
10 ~ 
Gottscheer Zeitung (Kocevje), May 22, 1941. 
11 The text of the treaty may be found in Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol. V, pp. 141-152E. 
12Einteilung des Gebietes Gottschee Ortsbezirke, October 20, 1941. 
T-81/Roll 306/2433960. 
13Abschlussbericht 
Gottschee und im Gebiet 
stelle, December, 1941. 
aber die Erfassung der Deutschen in der 
der Stadt Laibach durch die Einwandererzentral-
T-81/Roll 306/2433592-680. 
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for any lost possessions. Only 81 Germans of Ko'tevje received the 
"S" classification for "special case" (Soriderfall), which meant that 
there were doubts about their loyalty, race or nationality, and that 
they were unacceptable to the Reich. 
The EWZ registe~ed a total of 1,280 German resettlers in the 
Ljubljana area and other scattered communities. Of these individuals, 
819 were given a"K" _.{KMrnten) classification for settlement primarily 
in Upper Carniola. Another 395 were classified "A", while only 41 were 
given the "S" rating. 
v 
Volksdeutsche migration from the Kocevje district into the cleared 
homesteads of the Sava-Sotla strip, which the Nazi bureaucracy called 
"Settlement Area A", followed hard on the heels of the deportations o 
v 
Between November, 1941 and July, 1942, nearly 13,000 Kocevje settlers 
" were moved into the region in the twenty-five Sturme formed during the 
Nazification of the group before the war. Since they were spared a 
waiting period in resettlement camps, their first assignments were 
' 
temporaryo Necessary adjustments would be forthcoming later. The 
v 
thousand immigrants from the industrial sector of the town of Kocevje 
were established as tradesmen in urban areaso The rest of the repatri-
14 
ates, all peasants, were given agricultural property. Three former 
Slovene homesteads were combined to make one new German farm in an 
15 
effort to correct the uneconomical fragmentation of the lando 
14Ferenc, "Le Syst~me d'Occupation en Slov,nie," p. 660 SS-
Sturmbannfuhrer Laforce, Besiedlungsplan des Siedlungsgebietes 
A in der Untersteiermark. May 10, 1942. T-81/Roll 284/2406856-944. 
15 Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, p. 244. 
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Among the new residents were established small enclaves of ethnic 
Germans from South Bukovina, Bessarabia, the Dobruja and South Tyrol. 
The Bessarabian Volksdeutschen, made up of wine growing families from 
the region of the Black Sea and numbering 507 people, were deemed suit-
able as protectors of a border zone because of long experience against 
a French majority in their former home. Unfortunately, their heavy 
accents made their German incomprehensible in Lower Styria. The Volks-
deutschen from the Dobruja, comprising 410 members of wine growing 
families, were given land as were about 80 South Tyrolean families, 
experienced as fruit and wine growers. Finally, a few expert artisans 
from South Bukovina were also included in the new German community. 16 
v 
All told, over a thousand additional ethnic Germans joined the Kocevje 
group in Settlement Area A. 
The Nazis were quite solicitous of the volksdeutschen settlers 
in many ways. When the first trainload of resettlers pulled into the 
Sava Valley, they were greeted by an official reception. 17 Women wel-
fare workers met Korevje immigrants as they arrived and helped them 
adjust to their new environment. The RKFDV Main Staff Office in Berlin 
tried to protect the German residents of Settlement Area A from un-
pleasant contacts with former owners of the property they now occupied. 
A rule was issued that members of the uprooted Styrian border population 
were absolutely forbidden to return to the area. 18 Further, special 
16Besiedlungsplan des Siedlungsgebietes A. T-81/Roll 284/2406856-
944. 
17v3lkischer Beobachter (Munich), November 25, 1941. 
18stier to See, February 3, 1942, T-81/Roll 279/2400529-31. Stier 
to Ueberreither, June 1, 1942. T-81/Roll 279/2400544-6. 
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courses in maternal and child care were provided for the Kotevje 
women. 19 In April, 1942, Gauleiter Ueberreither visited the new resi-
dents of Lower Styria and bestowed German citizenship upon them, He 
callenged them to fulfil their duty as Wehrbauern and guardians of the 
20 
Southeastern frontier of the Great German Fatherland. The health and 
happiness of the German vanguards on the border received great atten-
tion from Hitler's lieutenants. 
The RKFDV in Lower Styria, with headquarters in Maribor, worked 
diligently to create a model border settlement along the Sava-Sotla 
strip, With ludicrous detail, SS-Sturmbannftthrer Laforce submitted a 
21 
plan for the reorganization of Settlement Area A in May, 1942. Ana-
lyzing the Ko'tevje settlers with many maps and charts, Laforce tried to 
perfect the simulation of conditions in their new homes to those they 
had left behind. For the peasant population, he took into consider-
ation such factors as general landscape features, fertility of the soil, 
crops raised, home industrial skills, location of neighboring cornrnun-
ities, and transportation facilities to towns or cities, For the small 
urban group, he correlated vocational ability with job opportunities in 
the Reich, Laforce recommended that sixty per cent of the Ko°tevje 
settlers stay where they were and that the remainder be transferred to 
new locations more comparable to their previous homes. 
19Marga Sessner, T!tigkeitsberichte ~her die M~tterschulungsarbeit 
von Ende Juli bis Ende September 1942 im Ansiedlungsgebiet der Unter-
steiermark, September 20, 1942. T-81/Roll 284/2406841-2. 
20Neues Wiener Tagblatt (Vienna), April 10, 1942. 
21Besiedlungsplan des Siedlungsgebietes A. T-81/Roll 284/ 
2406856-944. 
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The building of an ideal frontier community in Lower Styria 
collapsed by the fall of 1943. From March, 1942 to November, 1943, 
twenty-one meetings of the RKFDV settlement office in Maribor were 
held, usually under the chairmanship of Ueberreither, to carry into 
effect many of Laforce's recommendations. 22 Reallocation of property 
was made at these conferences. By the time of the last meeting, how-
ever, reports were heard of Partisan raids on the volksdeutschen 
settlers. Over a hundred of them had been ejected from their homes 
and two had been killed. By this time, the greater part of Slovenia 
23 had fallen into the hands of the National Liberation Front. Contin-
uation of the RKFDV project was impossible. 
For their part, the Ko~evje Germans did not exhibit the least en-
thusiasm over the arrangements which had been made for them. As they 
arrived in the Sava-Sotla strip in the winter of 1941-1942, some of 
the resettlers were appalled at how bleak and spartan their new home-
24 
steads were. One resettler commented that it was difficult ta sleep 
25 
at night in houses of expelled Slovenes. Fu~~her, the structures 
were much inferior to the ones left behind. Because the Sava-Sotla 
strip had a denser population than the home territory in Lower Carniola, 
the Ko'{evje Germans were spread among many more Slovenes than before. 
22 Berichte I-XX! fiber die Sitzung des Ansiedlungsstabes, March 19, 
1942~November 17, 1943. T-81/Roll 285/2407726-882. 
23nonlagi'~, Yugoslavia in the Second World War, p. 128. 
24Martha Weizen~bfer, Bericht llber die Betreuungsarbeit bei der 
Umsiedlung der Gottscheer Volksgruppe, No date. T-81/Roll 284/ 
2406851-2. 
25 
Report of K. R. in Schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 31-37. 
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They no longer formed a coherent group. No one had a clear, over-all 
picture of the resettlement program, so that gro~s inequities seemed 
apparent, Hardly half of the Volksdeutsch immigrants had been awarded 
property by the end of the war. As the Partisan danger increased, the 
resettlers were inadequately defended. 26 The discontent naturally 
associated with a transfer of population was heightened by wartime 
conditions. 
Since the evacuation operation in Upper Carniola had been halted 
prematurely, the RKFDV officers stationed in Bled (Veldes) were hamp-
ered in carrying out a resettlement program. They felt frustrated 
because they had been allotted such a small scope for action, One 
wrote a strongly worded memorandum to the effect that the germanization 
of Upper Carniola could not be accomplished in terms of importing a 
hundred German families but in terms of a thousand such families, He 
recognized that much blood would be shed in the process, but deemed 
that one should get on with the task regardless. Proposing that 500 
families should be settled in Upper Carniola by the end of 1942, he 
counseled that the tempo of resettlement be quickened in the next 
27 year, 
Recognizing that ethnic Germans immigrating into former Yugoslav 
territory in South Carinthia would be put under great strain, RKFDV 
officers carefully scrutinized populations to find appropriate material 
for the area. The Bled office reported to Ranier in July, 1942, that 
26 
Report of Alois Krisch in Schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp, 
9-31, 
2 7 0 ,, • " /1 • Nimpfer, Grundsatzliche Gedanken und Vorschlage.fur die Durch-
fhrung der Aufgabe des RKF. August 1, 1942, T-81/Roll 279/2400519-22, 
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the following settlers were available: about 5,000 Volksdeutschen from 
Bukovina; 20,000 Bosnian Germans who were not at all reliable politi-
cally; between 10,000-20,000 settlers from Lorraine, of whom only a few 
would be suitable; about 1,000 KocYevje Germans, for whom there was no 
room in Lower Styria; and 670 South Tyroleans, Berlin acknowledged 
that these groups would not provide enough political leadership for 
Upper Carniola and that the ideal solution would be the importation of 
h G f C . h. 28 Af . h 1' trustwort y ermans rom arint 1a proper. . ter perusing t e 1st 
of prospective settlers, Ranier approved the Bukovinans, Ko"6evje 
Germans and South Tyroleans, expressed skepticism about the Bosnians, 
and showed interest only in the industrial workers from Lorraine, 29 
The RKFDV bureaucrats in Carinthia, as their counterparts in Lower 
Styria, engaged in methodical population planning. During the summer 
of 1942, they were preparing a master plan to reorganize Upper Carniola, 
so that the land would become German again in the best way possible. 
·Rural and industrial areas were being identified as key points of accel-
d . . 30 erate german1zat1on. Many statistical studies on the order of that 
by Laforce were undertaken. For example, an attempt was made to indi-
cate where South Bukovinan Volksdeutsche should be placed so that their 
new surroundings would be similar to those in their homeland. 31 
28Friedl to Gauleiter Rainer, July 20, 1941, . T-81/Roll 279/ 
2400534-5, 
29Friedl to Stier~ July 23, 1942. T-81/Roll 279/2400536-7, 
30ss-GruppenfHhrer und Generalleutenant der Polizei to SS-oo -- -- --
Gruppenfuhrer Ulrich Greifelt, August 7, 1942, T-81/Roll 279/2400538, 
31 U H u 
Erklarungen zu den Ortsbereichen der Sudbuchenlander, August 20, 
1942, T-81/Roll 279/2400476-7. 
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All told, very few ethnic Germans were established on Slovene soil 
attached to Carinthia" By June, 1942, 592 Volksdeutsche from the 
province of Ljubljana were reported in both Carinthia and Upper 
Carniola, The rest of the 1,280 Germans registered by the EWZ were 
scattered in Styria and other parts of the Reich, 32 Upon arrival in 
Upper Carniola, many of the Ljubljana immigrants were located in 
33 "resettler homes" such as resort hotels, where they were very uneasy, 
In addition, 412 South Tyrolean artisans were reported settled in 
"liberated" Slovene homesteads in Upper Carniola" 34 
Without the introduction of large numbers of reliable Germans, the 
germanization effort depended largely upon the temper of the Slovene 
populace" Neither in Upper Carniola nor in Lower Styria were the Nazis 
satisfied with their efforts to convert Slovenes into Germans" Neither 
region was ever incorporated into the Reich. Orders to incorporate in 
October and November, 1941, were cancelled "for technical reasons of 
legislation," which was probably an euphemistic reference to the dis-
35 turbances then current among the Slovenes" Officials in Bled and 
Maribor were fully aware early in the occupation that the major part 
of the Slovene population had been thorou~hly alienated against German 
rule" Their conclusions are corroborated by the reprisal actions taken 
32~bersichtlicher Bericht ~her die Umsiedlung aus der Provinz 
Laibach, June 30, 1942, T-81/Roll 306/2433892-3, 
33Lage in den Oberkrainer Umsiedlerheimen der Laibacher Umsiedler, 
April 8, 1942, T-81/Roll 279/2400281-2" 
34 
·schechtmann, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, p. 64. 
35Ferenc, "Le Syst~me d'Occupation des Nazis en Slovenie," pp, 
81-83, 
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by the Germans during the occupation. In Lower Styria, where the Nazis 
had their greatest strength, the German data is sobering: 14,216 
civilians shot; 27,208 people tortured; 27,408 people arrested; and 
21,069 people interned. 36 This was not an atmosphere for building pro-
German sentiment. 
The German attempt to convert Slovenia into an ethnically homo-
geneous extension of Greater Germany failed. Had the Nazis been able 
to deport 280,000 Slovenes as they had originally planned, rather than 
only 55,000, they may well have succeeded in their attempt to germanize 
Lower Styria and Upper Carniola. But this course of action was closed 
to them, and they could not win over the Slovenes to their point of 
view. 
In this unhappy situation, the Volksdeutschen of Slovenia had 
little chance to enjoy the long-awaited realization of the dream of 
incorporation into the Reich. They were still a small minority in a 
sea of Slavs, since their numbers were not appreciably increased despite 
all the reshuffling of people. They seemed to be insignificant in the 
larger scheme for their province, conceived by SS officers and doomed 
to disaster. When they fled for their lives before the Partisan on-
slaught in the spring of 1945, they carried away with them all German 
aspirations in a land where their forefathers had lived for so many 
centuries, 
3611Information on the People's Liberation War in Yugoslavia," in 




How responsibJe were the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen for their fate at 
the end of the war? Fairly and judiciously, Paikert has assessed the 
Volksdeutsche reception of the German invaders in Hungary in the follow-
ing terms: 
... the plain rank and file, the ordinary conformists were not 
derelicts but, in a sense, rather victims: victims of allur-
ing promises, bombastic slogans and merciless intimidations 
of an ugly and unscrupulus ideology. However, they were 
equally victims of their own discrimination, ambition and in 
many cases plain greed. 1 
This connnent applies equally well to the German minority in the Inde-
pendent State of Croatia, the Southern Territories of Hungary, the 
Banat with Old Serbia, and the Slovene areas annexed to the Third 
Reich. In all these component parts of the former South Slav state, 
the Volksdeutschen accepted treatment as a superior people. ·Through 
the Deutsche Volksgruppe in Kroatien, 150,000 of them were accorded 
unusual rights in intimate association with the Ustashi. Through the 
Deutsche Volksbund in Ungarn, 190,300 of their number were elevated 
into positions of special privilege. In the Banat, 120,000 Germans 
became the outright ruling class through the Deutsche Volksgruppe in 
Banat und Serbien. In the Slovene areas annexed to the Third Reich, 
1Paikert, Danube Swabians, p. 131-132. 
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about 30,000 Volksdeutschen were acknowledged as leaders among the 
n 
germanizable Slovenes in the Steierische Heimatbund and the Karntner 
Volksbund. To be sure, the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen found their pre-
eminence to be a hollow fraud as the systems of occupation developed 
185 
in Yugoslavia during the war. But when they accepted advantages at the 
expense of their neighbors in April, 1941, they made themselves account-
able for the consequences of such privileges. 
If they were disillusioned, the German minority of Yugoslavia 
remained closely associated with Axis rule throughout the war nonethe-
less, They may have been horrified at the atrocities corrnnitted by the 
Croatian Ustashi and the Hungarian army or the harsh SS methods in the 
Banat and Slovenia, but they did not organize a strong resistance to 
these acts of terror. Instead, they seemed to acquiesce in silence. 
As before the war, the voice of Die Donau in Apatin remained a lone 
anti-Nazi cry, Few Germans aided the Partisans, even after the tide 
of war had turned, ~ The Ernst Thalmann Company, named in honor of the 
former chairman of the German Corrnnunist Party, was formed by the 
Partisians in 1943 to dissuade the German minority from collaboration 
with fascists, but very few Volksdeutsche joined the company. 2 
Not only the arrangements made for them in splintered Yugoslavia 
but the plans drafted for them but never carried out were deeply rooted 
in the history of German nationalists ideology. According to vglkische 
doctrines, the German minority in Yugoslavia had a mission to fulfill 
in building Mitteleuropa. In Germanic islands along the Danube, they 
were to perpetuate the German idea outside the borders of the Reich. 
2stojkovi~~ National Minorities in Yugoslavia, p. 54. 
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As a regional (lite, they would provide the cement for incorporating 
the Southeast into the European heartland dominated by Germany. The 
plan for Reichsfestung Belgrad circulating in the spring and summer of 
1941 may have come to naught, but German agencies continued to consider 
autonomous volksdeutsche settlements on conquered Yugoslav territory 
until the Battle of Stalingrad in January, 1943 estinguished the hopes 
of planners. Only in the face of defeat were the "slender threads" 
leading deeply into the past finally severed. The Nazi design for 
Southeastern Europe which had been built upon the legacy of the 
Habsburg Empire, nineteenth century nationalism, Austro-German war aims 
between 1914-1918, Gesamtdeutsch historiography, and Volkstum organiza-
tions in the interwar years, then crumbled into oblivion. 
After the summer of 1941; postwar planning for the German minor-
ities based on vc1lkische principles was sporadic and disjointed. In 
1942 Himmler had toyed with the prospect of resettling all the Volks-
deutschen out of Croatia, with the possible exception of Srem, in order 
to strengthen German outposts elsewhere. At one point, he wanted to 
move the Germans of West Slavonia into Srem to reinforce the German 
3 settlements there. An officer in the SS resettlement projects argued 
against this course of action at the time, since he felt that the rich 
and contiguous German communities in Slavonia and Srem should not be 
given up lightly. 4 The Foreign Office also opposed Himmler's suggestion 
by invoking the traditions of the Military Border and Prince Eugene 
3schieder, Vertreibung, Vol. V, pp. 79-80E. 




in protecting German interests along the Danube. Throughout the war, 
the theme of Wehrbauern on a revived Military Border on Yugoslava soil 
permeated SS thinking. A proposal in this vein was forwarded to SS 
offices in October, 1941. 6 As late as March, 1944, the SS apparatus 
approved the construction of a Military Border in Bosnia to guard 
a~proaches to the Reich. 7 Unquestionably, much of this futile planning 
was confused and at cross purposes. Since Hitler never could make up 
I 
his mind as to the fate of the Volksdeutschen in the Balkans, it is not 
surprising that Nazi agencies lacked a clear-sighted approach to the 
problem of the Danube· Swabians in Yugoslavia. 
Wuescht maintains that resettlement was the ultimate solution 
8 which Berlin espoused for the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen. Although a 
total of only approximately 36,000 were resettled from Serbia, the 
Province of Ljubljana and the Ustashi state during the war, all 500,000 
were destined for new homes in Greater Germany. Certainly, as the 
German position on the battlefield deteriorated, a new outlook on 
German policies in occupied Yugoslavia arose. Hermann Neubacher, pleni-
potentiary and extraordinary envoy to the Southeast in the fall of 
1943, proposed that the Ustashi regime be replaced by one more amenable 
to the Croatian people and that the Serbian royalists be given enlarged 
powers in Old Serbia, Hitler never approved of Neubacher's proposals~ 
5wehler, "Reichsfestung Belgrad," pp. 79-80. 
Foreign Office Memorandum, dated November 5, 1942, 
posal appears on p. 84. 
An extract of a 
on Himmler's pro-
6 Rothenburg, "Croatian Military Border," p. 34 fn. 
7 Orlow, Nazis in the Balkans, p. 126. 
8 
Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich, p. 251. 
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but they were in line with a growing feeling in German circles that the 
South Slavs must be given a greater voice in their affairs. Even in 
Slovenia, after the Nazis took over the Province' of Ljubljana in the 
fall of 1943, they entertained suggestions to create a Slovene province 
within the Reich. 9 The presence of Volksdeutschen under such conditions 
would be untenable •. Clearly, then, resettlement became the ultimate 
-
solution of the Third Reich for the Yugoslav Volksdeutschen, but only 
when all else had failed. 
As the observer of 1938 had predicted, the racial doctrine, 
carried to its logical extremes in the Independent State of Croatia, 
the Southern Territories of Hungary, the Banat within Old Serbia and 
the Slovene areas annexed to the Reich during the war, recoiled upon 
its own zealots with tenfold violence. Minorities remote from German 
territory and less prolific than the majority peoples around them sue-
cumbed to a terrible destiny. Of the 500,000 Volksdeutschen in 
Yugoslavia as of 1931, only 55,000 remained there in 1948. About 
50,000 members of the German minority died in combat against the Allies 
h P . . 10 or t e artisians. The bulk of the Volksdeutschen population, number-
ing some 320,000 people, escaped into Austria and Germany at the end of 
the war. The treatment of those remaining took on the character of 
mass liquidation. Many of the ethnic Germans were executed or placed 
in concentration or forced labor camps. About 30,000 from the Batschka 
and Banat became captive workers in the Soviet Union, and German 
9Ferenc, "Le· Syst~me d 'Occupation des Nazis en S lovfnie," 
pp. 112' 117 . 
10stojkovil, National Minorities in Yugoslavia, pp. 21-22. 
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property was confiscated by the Yugoslav government. 11 The history of 
the German minority in Yugoslavia had come to its inevitable close. 
The tragic absurdity of German dreams of dominance in Southeastern 
Europe was revealed a century too late. 
11Rohrbacher, Ein Volk Ausgel~scht, p, 33; Schieder, Vertreibung, 
Vol, V, pp, 90-118E. 
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